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 7 
Introduction 
 
 
Swanson (1992) suggests that comparative research is like entering foreign lands. Researchers 
who have invaded the territories of cross-national studies encounter substantial diversity 
resulting from country-specific characteristics. However, as argued by Esser & Pfetsch (2004) 
in the view of the development of global communication processes, which no longer stop at 
national boarders, research studies cannot be focused on particularities of a given country and 
more comparative perspective is needed. This notion is particularly true for the field of the 
political communication. Though the essence of politics over many centuries has involved 
constructing, sending, receiving and processing politically relevant messages (Graber, 
2004:45), political discourse has been substantially modified in the last decades. This was 
mainly due to homogenization, modernization, secularization and mediatization processes, as 
to be explained in Chapter 1, which reshaped the interdependencies between political players, 
media and the voters.  
 
This study is cross-national in nature and compares political communication in Germany and 
Poland. The analysis offers two separate case studies that highlight the patterns of political 
communication from the perspective of two different players: political parties and media. So 
far there have not been any attempts to compare political communication in these two 
countries. Such an undertaking is particularly important as it shows how political parties and 
media are affected by a combination of interdependencies derived from political system and 
media system characteristics. Studies on established and evolving democracies constitute a 
welcoming environment for comparison and are needed for a number of reasons. Firstly, they 
help to show how political communication in both countries differs from each other and see 
own routines and practices more critically. Secondly, they focus the attention to the macro-
societal structures showing how the development of political and media system influenced 
political communication. Thirdly, they help to verify whether practices adopted by political 
and media players can be seen in the context of mediatization processes.  
 
In this study political communication is seen as a system of dynamic interactions between 
political actors, the media and audience members, each of whom is engaged in the process of 
producing, receiving and interpreting political messages (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995). 
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Chapter 1 describes changing patterns of political communication in a cross-national 
perspective. Firstly, the study outlines changes that have defined mutual interdependence 
between involved players over the last decades, especially in the third age of political 
communication (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). Particular attention is given to processes of 
homogenization, modernization and secularization which made political discourse more 
diverse, fragmented and complex. In the second step the analysis shows how communication 
abundance contributed to the increasing mediatization which can be illustrated with such 
indicators as, among others, increasing coverage on party campaigning, focus on political 
leaders, rising extent of negativity and emotionalization. Thirdly, Chapter 1 briefly outlines 
examples of comparative research in the field of political communication showing how other 
authors analyzed this domain in a multinational context. Finally, the author draws particular 
attention to the unexplored field of political communication explaing why more detailed 
examination of political communication in Germany and Poland has become object of this 
analysis.  
 
It cannot be questioned that many forms of political communication arise from political 
system differences (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Without a doubt such influences like 
homogenization, modernization, secularization and mediatization would be hardly possible in 
Central European countries without significant changes in politics. Countries like Poland for 
decades remained navigated by the communist regime leaving very little space for 
independent acting (Jakubowicz, 2007). Therefore this study takes a system-oriented 
perspective on the relationship between all actors participating in political communication 
process stressing the importance of the shape of political system and its historical background. 
Chapter 2 explores the main elements of political systems in Poland and Germany. Firstly, 
the study outlines the essential features of party system in both countries. Secondly, the 
analysis scrutinizes the functioning of electoral system which regulates parliamentary 
campaigns. Finally, Chapter 2 reflects differences concerning political participation showing 
how it might affect political communication patterns in analyzed democracies. The 
comparison of political system characteristics is organized round country-based analysis and 
then followed by concluding remarks which highlight a comparative dimension.  
 
Simultaneously political communication is intensively affected by changes within media 
system. Hallin & Mancini (2004a) show that there are clusters of media system characteristics 
which tend to occur in distinct patterns. Their idea is to show why media systems develop in a 
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particular way and what roles they play in political, social and economic life of a given 
country. Therefore Chapter 3 offers a comparison of media systems in both countries based 
on the framework provided by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). Such a comparison sheds some 
light on the main similarities and differences between Polish and German media landscape 
showing the potential consequences for the functioning of the political communication in a 
given society. Chapter 3 outlines the essential features of Polish and German media landscape 
focusing on three dimensions: newspaper industry, political parallelism, and journalistic 
professionalization. Simultaneously, the analysis concentrates predominantly on newspaper 
market. Other media, such as television, radio and internet are given marginal attention and 
are discussed only in the context of media consumption patterns and media credibility. This 
has a number of reasons. Firstly, the empirical part of the study comprises two case studies, 
the first focused on party advertisments, the second focused on newspaper’s reporting. Thus 
more detailed examination of Polish and German titles, mainly in the context of political 
parallelism and journalistic professionalism, is needed to provide explanation to hypotheses 
related to the second case study and formulated in Chapter 4. Secondly, newspaper market 
serves as useful illustration of how journalistic practices are affected by the political context 
but also how forces of globalization and commercialization dramatically transformed the 
media landscape.  
 
Chapter 4 proposes a number of hypotheses exploring the political communication patterns 
in Poland and Germany. The hypotheses are formulated separately firstly – for party 
advertisements, and secondly – for media coverage. Though some of the phenomena to be 
analyzed in this study, for instance focus on leaders or negativity, will be measured in both 
party spots and media coverage, separating hypotheses according to the medium (party spots, 
media coverage) is applied. This type of structuring has two explanations. Firstly, both media 
belong to different actors and thus comparing them according to the same set of hypotheses 
would provide difficulty. Secondly, the number of similar phenomena analyzed in both spots 
and media reporting is limited. The author refers to only three categories (focus on leaders, 
negativity, theme spectrum) that are scrutinized in both party commercials and media 
coverage. Other hypotheses reflect media-specific characteristics, such as, for instance, the 
question of media’s political sympathies, which is only applied to media reporting. The 
comparison between Poland and Germany is more transparent when party commercials and 
media reporting are discussed separately, both in terms of formulating hypotheses and 
reflecting the results of the empirical part of the study. The structuring of Chapter 4 is also 
 10 
mirrored in the organisation of the empirical part. Chapter 5 outlines the design of the study, 
separately for both types of media. Finally, obtained results are discussed separately for party 
spots in Chapter 6, and for media coverage in Chapter 7. This enables a clear comparison of 
political communication practices in Germany and Poland based on two different actors 
engaged in the political communication processes.  
 
The main question that arises when comparing political communication in Germany and 
Poland is what sort of framework should be used to show the differences and similarities 
between both countries. Therefore Chapter 5 presents the key features of the proposed 
research design. Firstly, it is explained why the content analysis has been chosen as an 
empirical tool for analyzing political communication. Secondly, this part explains why the 
study concentrates on political communication during three parliamentary campaigns in each 
country (1997-2005 for Poland, 1998-2005 for Germany) and embraces the period of the last 
four weeks before the polling day, which is seen as “hot phase” of campaign (Kaid, 2004). 
Particular attention is given to the selected objects of empirical analysis, namely party spots 
and media coverage. Party broadcasts are particularly useful for analysis as they show how 
the process of mediatization of politics is reflected in political campaigning. Moreover, party 
spots represent “pure” messages sent by political parties since they are not affected or 
modified by the media. The analysis of party advertisements is followed by examination of 
media coverage during party campaigning. This enables showing how journalists present the 
political scene and whether the processes of mediatization of politics can be detected. The 
explanation of the choice of selected research material is addressed at greater length in 
Chapter 5. Thirdly, Chapter 5 describes the coding instruments and applied variables aiming 
at testing hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Finally, information on coders’ recruitment, 
training process and results of achieved reliability is provided.  
 
The process of mediatization has a particular impact on party campaigning led by political 
groupings. Research studies confirm that political actors adapt to the mediated environment in 
their communication strategies (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995, Kaid, 2004). However in older 
democracies the transition from traditional methods of political electioneering to campaigning 
based on political marketing took place in steps over a period of years (Swanson, 2004) while 
in newly established democracies these changes were far more rapid in nature. Chapter 6 
discusses the findings related to empirical analysis of Polish and German commercials. The 
study shows how mediatization of politics is mirrored in communication techniques adopted 
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by political parties which include, among others, professionalization, focus on leaders, 
volume of negative and emotional appeals. Additionally the author applies the categories 
derived from Trent & Friedenberg (1983) to determine whether political incumbents and 
challengers in both countries employ similar strategies depending on their position within the 
political landscape. Chapter 6 is organized round testing hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. 
Due to differences in the number of broadcasts showed in both countries, as to be presented in 
Chapter 6, the evaluation concentrates mainly on a comparative perspective. The comparison 
is also intended to show how political players anticipate and embody the political culture of 
their own country. This Chapter offers systematization of acquired results in the context of 
importance of political system and media system characteristics for political communication 
in Poland and Germany.  
 
In the next step, Chapter 7 concentrates on the way newspapers report on politics during 
parliamentary campaigns. Collected data is used to scrutinize whether the processes of 
mediatization found their exemplification in political reporting. Firstly, it is showed whether 
in the last weeks prior to the polling day the newspapers predominantly focus on party 
campaigning. Secondly, the analysis reflects findings concerning the focus on leaders which 
is mirrored in the extent of personalized media reporting. In the next step, negativity found in 
journalistic pieces is evaluated. The assessment of negativity is conducted on two levels, on 
the level of article, on the level of presented themes. Additionally, on the article level, the 
degree of dramatization as well as the extent of conflict-oriented or cooperation-oriented 
depicturing is addressed. Finally, the study shows how Polish and German media tend to 
portray the political groupings and whether titles are characterized by distinct identities. The 
same pattern of evaluation is applied separately for Poland and Germany and then followed 
by a direct comparison aiming at testing hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4.   
 
Finally, Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks and the assessment of the results of the study. 
In this context particular attention is given to the political system and media system 
characteristics and their influence on political communication practices. Simultaneously, as 
suggested by Voltmer (2006:7) viewing political communication as a system of dynamic 
interactions “can be employed as a heuristics to guide the analysis of political communication 
in any political context. Because of its emphasis on change, it seems particularly suited to the 
study of political communication processes in new democracies”. Thus it is also particularly 
suited to the study of political communication in a comparative perspective, especially 
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between countries that do not share the same level of development. Therefore the last part of 
the study discusses which aspects of political communication should be analyzed in future 
comparative projects on established and emerging democracies. Simultaneously, it also refers 
to the methodology to be employed in such undertakings. In this context the limitations of this 
study and barriers encountered during comparative analyses are also discussed at greater 
length.  
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Chapter 1 | Trends in Political Communication  
 
 
This Chapter examines changes within political communication embedded in the context of 
homogenization, modernization and secularization processes. In the next step particular 
attention is given to the mediatization and its indicators showing how political communication 
has become more turbulent, more fragmented and more difficult to control. Thirdly, the study 
provides examples of comparative studies on the relationships between the media and 
political actors. Finally, it is explained which comparative analyses need to be taken, showing 
the unexplored fields of research in that respect and the gap between studies on political 
communication in both analyzed countries, Poland and Germany.  
 
1.1. Changing Patterns of Political Communication 
 
McNair (1995:3) observes that the term “political communication” has proven to be 
“notoriously difficult to define with any precision, simply because both components of the 
phrase are themselves open to a variety of definitions, more or less broad”. The author 
proposes a definition which stresses the intentionality of political communication, which is 
described as “purposeful communication about politics” (McNair 1995:4). This intentional 
communication includes three elements. Firstly, communication used by political actors to 
achieve their own objectives. Secondly, communication that is addressed to political actors 
by non-politicians (e.g. voters). Finally, media discourse understood as communication about 
political actors. In short, political communication can be seen as a system of dynamic 
interactions between political actors, the media and audience members, each of whom is 
engaged in the process of producing, receiving and interpreting political messages (Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1995).  
 
Conceptualizing political communication as a system of interactions shows that all players 
involved in the process are dependant on the performance of the other actors to achieve their 
own interests and objectives (Schulz, 1997). Not surprisingly, what emerges is a substantial 
degree of mutual interdependence between political actors, the media and audience involved 
in the political process. As a consequence all changes affecting one of the three integral 
coordinates of the communication system – political actors, media, and the public – are likely 
 14 
to exert influence on the other players thus modifying the patterns of political communication. 
These changes are attributed to long-term processes of increasing functional differentiation of 
modern societies (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004:12).  
 
As observed by Lilleker (2006) political communication is as old as political activity itself 
and was already a feature of Greek and Roman Empire. What is important is that political 
communication was throughout the history rather a linear, top-down process. Its nature has 
been rapidly changed in the twentieth century by both democratization of political systems 
and proliferation of media channels. Blumler & Kavanagh (1999:209) conclude that the 
avenues of political communication are multiplying in a process that is becoming more 
diverse, fragmented, and complex, but also, at a deeper level, relations among key message 
providers and receivers are being rearranged. The authors identify three ages of political 
communication that mirror the changes occurring in the postwar period. In the first age that 
emerged after the II World War, political communication was viewed as “the golden age of 
parties” (Janda & Colman, 1998 quoted by Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). During that time 
political discourse was largely subordinated to stable political institutions. At the same time 
the voters’ behavior was marked by strong party identification. Political communication in the 
first age was characterized by three distinct features. Firstly, political messages were more 
substantive, which meant that political candidates talked about what made them distinctive 
from their opponents in their policies. Secondly, many such messages were granted relatively 
ready access to the media. Thirdly, the voters’ response was frequently characterized by 
selectivity and reinforcement of political beliefs.  
 
The second age of political communication, which started in the 60s, was marked by the 
increasing importance of television, which dominated the political debate. This period was 
characterized by four transformations. Firstly, television led to reduction of exposure to party 
propaganda as it offered a broader platform for alternative directions and policies. This trend 
was further intensified by the decline of party press and other organizations attached to the 
political groupings. Secondly, television “constitutionally mandated to such nonpartisan 
norms as fairness, impartiality, neutrality” (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999:212) which became 
central for political communication. Thirdly, television contributed to enlarging the audience 
since it penetrated also these segments of the electorate that were earlier difficult to reach and 
thus less prone to the media exposure. Simultaneously, party identification was loosening as a 
consequence of short-term influences which took a form of news events showing immediate 
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successes and failures of political actors. Finally, the fact that television news was able to 
exert such short-term influences led to modification of parties’ tactics which had to adjust to 
the “media logic” (Mazzoleni, 1987).  
 
Finally, the third age of political communication brought a rapid proliferation of different 
communication channels. As suggested by Blumler & Kavanagh (1999:213) “to politicians, 
the third age media system must loom like a hydra-header beast, the many mouths of which 
are continually clamoring to be fed. When something happens, they are expected to tell the 
media what they are going to do about it well before they can be fully informed themselves. 
For journalists, the news cycle has accelerated, since more outlets combined with increased 
competition across them piles pressure on all involved to keep the story moving and to find 
angles on it. Journalists ‘feeding frenzies’ become yet more frantic. Time for political and 
journalistic reflection and judgment is squeezed”. Simultaneously, communication abundance 
changed how voters receive and decode political messages. New media increasingly 
individualize communication (Schulz, 2004), the capacity that is particularly assigned to 
Internet (Castells, 1996).  
 
It is important to bear in mind that the cross-national applicability of the typology offered by 
Blumler & Kavanagh (1999) reflects mainly Anglo-American experience. This framework 
however becomes more problematic when applied to, for instance, countries in transition that 
until the 90s remained under the authoritarian rule. In countries comprising post-Soviet block 
the first and second age of political communication was tailored to the needs of communist 
dominance. This had two major consequences. Firstly, the media was subject to state-control 
and deprived of independent acting, which could be also observed in Poland (Goban-Klas, 
1994). Secondly, ruling party was liberated from competing groupings since there was no 
alternative to the government subordinated to Moscow. As a consequence throughout decades 
political communication in established democracies and those under authoritarian rule 
developed at fully different pace. Such countries like Germany gradually underwent a 
structural change and smoothly entered the third age of political communication. In contrast, 
transition countries like Poland, which regained their independence in the 90s, rapidly entered 
into new political and media reality. Political activities performed by both parties and the 
media needed to adjust to a new environment. And it was particularly the third age of political 
communication that brought about changes resulting from such phenomena as rising 
homogenization, modernization, secularization and mediatization.  
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1.1.1. Homogenization: Americanization and Globalization 
 
As noted by Esser & Pfetsch (2004) media systems in established democracies are becoming 
increasingly alike in their products, relationships with other institutions and political sphere. 
Simultaneously, political systems are also evolving and acquiring similar patterns of 
communication. These phenomena can be described as homogenization process leading 
towards greater similarity across Western Europe and the United States. One could pose a 
question regarding the reasons that stimulate this process. In their explanation of trend toward 
global homogenization Hallin & Mancini (2004b:25) propose two pairs of contrasting 
perspectives: “Much of the literature on homogenization sees its in terms of Americanization 
or globalization: that is, in terms of forces external to the national social and political systems 
in which media systems previously were rooted. Other explanations focus on changes internal 
to these national systems. An important distinction can also be made between mediacentric 
perspectives, for which changes in media systems are autonomous developments that then 
influence political and social systems, and those that see social and political changes as 
causally prior to media system change”. 
 
The idea of external forces leading toward homogenization of media and political systems is 
often embodied in the concept of Americanization or globalization. Americanization is a 
useful tool to show that homogenization processes to the large extent resemble a convergence 
of media toward practices that were first introduced in North America. These include, among 
others, extensive commercial broadcasting, information-oriented journalistic professionalism, 
media-centered party campaigning adopted from marketing strategies (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004b). These patterns are also actively spread in European democracies, just to mention the 
homogenization of party campaigning that include features which have transatlantic echoes 
(Kaid, 2004; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos 1996).  
 
The Americanization thesis rests on the assumption that there is a transnational diffusion of 
American model which results in a „directional convergence” worldwide (Plasser, 2000). 
However, this notion is not entirely true since distinct features in individual countries 
regarding the nature of political and media system do matter. This observation is consistent 
with the extensive body of literature indicating that many countries choose a “middle-way” 
model of “hybridization” instead of copying American patterns (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha 1995; 
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Blumler & Gurevitch 2001; Plasser & Plasser 2002; Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). Hybridization 
is based on a “shopping model” where country specific elements interact with selected 
features from American model (Nord, 2006:66). In other words: certain international trends 
are borrowed and then coexist with domestic characteristics that have endured over time. 
These phenomena also link well to the Ritzer’s (1993, 1998) McDonaldization thesis stating 
that the society has adopted a model of organization that resembles the global fast food 
restaurant with the substantial American influence. 
 
The notion of Americanization suggests that the convergence of communication systems can 
be attributed to a single country that imposes its concepts on other states. As noted by Hallin 
& Mancini (2004b:27) it is certainly possible to affirm that “many of the structures and 
routines that dominate an increasingly homogeneous global communication system were tried 
and tested in the United States. Their diffusion around the world cannot, however, be 
attributed to the action of a single agent. It has not been a unilateral process: where European 
countries have borrowed American innovations, they have done so for reasons rooted in their 
own economic and political processes, often modifying them in significant ways”. Therefore 
it appears to be more useful to apply the idea of globalization (Tomlinson, 1999; Scholte, 
2000). This concept enables to integrate the analysis of external factors that modify the 
internal processes of social change within a given country. In Europe such external factors as, 
among others, harmonization of common broadcasting market within European Union 
countries (e.g. “Television Without Frontiers” Directive, 1989) or internationalization of 
media ownership (Jakubowicz, 2007; Ociepka, 2002) contributed to higher similarity of 
communication practices. These phenomena are reflected, for instance, in the development of 
Polish media system which will be addressed at greater length in Chapter 3.  
 
1.1.2. Modernization and Secularization 
 
Apart from external influences there are also internal factors which exert influence on the 
patterns of political communication. These internal factors include modernization and 
secularization of modern society which are neatly interconnected. The idea of modernization 
stresses the increasing individualism that replaces the centrality of organized social groups 
that once organized citizens’ community. As observed by Hallin & Mancini (2004b:28-29) 
“the ties of individuals to these groups were central both to their identity and to their material 
well-being, and the institutions connected with these groups were central to the organization 
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of the public sphere. If political communication is being transformed, this cannot be 
understood without reference to the collapse of the old political order, and its displacement by 
a more fragmented and individualistic society”.  
 
Another concept that might help to capture changes within the political communication is 
secularization. Nowadays the Church is no longer capable of controlling the socialization of 
modern individuals who are attracted by values proposed by post-modern society. Similarly 
political parties, trade unions that structured the political order are no longer able to define the 
course of citizens’ engagement. Swanson (2004:47) notes that the changing relationship 
between parties and voters may be seen as a “transition from a sacred politics to secular 
politics”. The “sacred” politics, founded on the collective identity and expressing the 
collective’s values, has faded away in the post-industrial society where individual identities 
become volatile and fragmented. Moreover there are at least three power centres emerging 
close to the political system: international corporate institutions and alliances, NGO’s and 
various single-issue groups (Swanson, 2004) which become a substitute for political parties. 
Additionally, many of the decisions which affect citizens of a given country are now taken at 
the supranational level. The case of EU’s policy making serves as a good example being 
described as joint exercise of sovereignty by the member states (Stadtmüller & Cesarz, 2000).   
 
The secularization of modern Western societies is accompanied by increasing presence of so-
called “catch-all” or “electoral-professional party” (Kirchheimer, 1966) which replace mass 
parties rooted in distinct ideological social groups. At the same time the connection between 
political parties and their electorate have been weakened. This finds its exemplification in 
declining party membership, shifting political preferences, lack of consistency in electoral 
behaviour and, in many countries, in declining voter turnout (Gray & Caul, 2000; 
Kostadinova, 2003). Other explanations related to the transformation of the political life 
highlight the growth of consumer society and expanding sphere of economics with the 
emphasis on the individual rather than a group. This corresponds with the Inglehart’s (1977) 
postmodernization hypothesis where the establishment of welfare system provokes people to 
place higher priority on post-material values such as individual freedom or self-expression. 
This phenomenon is nowadays mirrored in the changing political agenda of parties which 
stress post-modern values in their political programmes, such as environmental issues or need 
for social equality.  
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Yet another cause of the transformation of political life can be seen in the decline of political 
polarization between the parties where ideological differences have faded away (Cwalina & 
Falkowski, 2005; Mair, 1997). Finally, the transformation of political system may be also 
attributed to the increased education of society which transforms the population into “self-
mobilized” citizens (Dalton, 1996) who seek information much more independently from the 
political organizations (which often results in issue-based rather than group loyalty-based 
voting). As noted by Mazzoleni & Schulz (1999:253) “many more people than ever before 
develop higher cognitive skills and a higher degree of political sophistication. Political 
sophistication determines a person’s capacity to process information and to make meaning of 
the political issues encountered in mass media”. On the one hand there is a group of Dalton’s 
“self-mobilized” citizens who have become more independent in their electoral decisions. On 
the other hand however, a substantial number of people not much interested in politics, the 
“chronic know-nothings” (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999:253), has become more volatile in their 
decisions as well (Cwalina & Falkowski, 2005). Research studies highlight especially the role 
of television (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999), indicating its primary role as information provider 
and source for political guidance in electoral choice.  
 
1.1.3. Mediatization of Politics and Its Indicators 
 
In cannot be questioned that the media has become the main source of information about 
politics and in so doing partly deprived political parties of the information functions they once 
possessed (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Simultaneously, the proliferation of communication 
channels influences the strategies used by political groupings, which is particularly seen 
during the time of campaigning (Kaid, 2004). The growing intrusion of media into the 
political domain has led some scholars to describing this phenomenon as “media-driven 
republic”, in which media usurps the traditional functions of political actors. Thus media is 
seen as having “mutagenic” impact on politics and the ability to change political discourse 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999:248). In this context it is useful to refer to the concept of 
mediatization to examine interdependencies between media and political players.  
 
As argued by Imhof (2006) modern societies undergo a process of functional, stratificatory 
and segmentary differentiation which has been accelerated since the 90s of the XX century. In 
the modern media society one can observe a new structural transformation which increasingly 
brings the media towards the center of the public sphere. According to Imhof (2006) the 
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mediatization (Medialisierung) is expressed in the penetration of public communication by 
media which works according to its own logics and possesses the ability to impose its 
orientation towards current events. Simultaneously, the “disembedding” (Giddens, 1992) of 
the media from its social origins, the replacement of audience (understood as citizens) with 
media consumers, the market orientation of the media and its increasing importance 
contribute to reshaping of modern democracy. 
 
In reconstructing mediatization as an analytic concept Schulz (2004:98) concludes that there 
are four processes of change that represent different aspects of mediatization: “first, the media 
extend the natural limits of human communication capacities; second, the media substitute 
social activities and social institutions; third, media amalgamate with various non-media 
activities in social life; and fourth, the actors and organizations of all sectors of society 
accommodate to the media logic”. It is particularly this fourth aspect that plays a vital role in 
political communication activities. On the side of the political actors the process of 
mediatization is characterized, among others, by such indicators as professionalization, higher 
focus on leaders, increasing negativity and emotionalization. Simultaneously, these indicators 
can be attributed to the media as well. The following paragraphs briefly outline each of them 
showing their role during party campaigning.  
 
Mediatization processes are characterized by professionalization of political communication 
which is mirrored in strategies adopted by both media and political actors. This phenomenon 
can be well illustrated by party campaigning practices. Over the last decades, political 
marketing, campaign centralization build an integral element of election campaigns conducted 
by parties (Kavanagh, 1995; Negrine, 1996; Norris 1999; Holtz-Bacha, 2002). The 
professionalization of campaigning is neatly connected with the electoral professionalism, a 
set of strategies tailored to mobilizing the voters and attracting the media attention (Norris 
2000; Lilleker & Negrine 2002). Electoral professionalism is also partly embedded in societal 
changes where voters become less partisan and seek alternative economic, rational or 
emotional reasons on which to base their political choices (Kircheimer, 1966; Inglehart, 
1984). Thus, as argued by Panebianco (1988), political parties apply representative 
bureaucratic model, what can also be seen in terms of managerialism. In a similar manner 
Lilleker (2006:76) notes that party leaders increasingly act as managers of the party system, as 
well as of the electorate and the country, if elected. Parties respond to the voters’ volatility by 
becoming more professional in both organization and communication techniques. This leads 
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to increasing use of consultants (Falkowski & Cwalina, 2005; Plasser, 2001) recruited often 
outside the political sphere, from public relations and marketing who are responsible for 
managing the communication process. In this context the professionalization can be seen as 
rising market orientation of the political actors (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2005).  
 
The process of professionalization is neatly connected with a higher personalization which is 
demonstrated in a shift from party-based to candidate-oriented reporting (Wattenberg, 1994). 
Focus on leaders should be seen, among others, in the context of adjustments on the side of 
political parties. These adjustments have been accelerated by rising volatility of voters who 
lack stable party affiliation and also by weakening role of political groupings in political 
socialization. Research studies (Patterson, 1989; Van Zoonen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000) show 
that candidates’ image qualities increasingly contribute to electoral choice. This has a sharp 
impact upon political groupings which try to “humanize” their candidate (Schulz & Zeh, 
2005) and pronounce his/her image traits. Simultaneously, personalization is also designed to 
make the political parties more “suitable” for television and newspapers reporting. As 
observed by Graber (1976) media coverage is increasingly image- rather than issue-based. 
Consumerism and commercialization (Jakubowicz, 2007) drive media towards a market 
orientation, which results in move away from issue-based to personality-based reporting. The 
media noticed that personal lives of candidates, including private sphere, sell better than news 
on political issues. Nevertheless, coverage on private life is still a domain of American and 
British media, private sphere is rather excluded from political discourse in countries like, 
among others, Germany. Simultaneously, the level of personalization is also influenced by the 
constellation of competing themes and the candidates themselves (Wilke & Reinemann, 
2000).   
 
In this context it should be noted that personalized politics increasingly attracts candidates 
driven by narcissistic motivations (Winterhoff-Spurk, 1995). As observed by Donsbach 
(2002:10) there are “several negative consequences of the new political personality for the 
political system. First, people with important competences may shy away from political 
offices because they do not have or think they do not have the pre-requisites needed to 
succeed in media democracy. Second, people with important competences might just not 
make it into political offices because their party affiliates do not support them. Third, political 
careers today can circumvent party procedures, which itself can lead to a loss of the 
importance of the parties in the political system (…) Fourth, politics happens on two stages: 
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symbolic politics for the masses and real politics for the political elite. This alters the political 
system as compared to its ideal principles. Fifth, there is a change in the political role of 
media as kingmakers. If success in the news media becomes the criterion for political power, 
then the media itself are no longer an observer or referee but a major player in the political 
process”.   
 
Another central feature of mediatization is manifested in rising volume negativity, which 
characterizes both strategies of party campaigning and media reporting. On the side of 
political actors negative appeals are used to point out the weaknesses in arguments, behaviour, 
personality or credentials of the opponents. In so doing negative campaigning intends to 
undermine the credibility of the other parties. Reseach conducted among American audience 
suggests high level of recall of negative messages, especially among the lower-educated and 
low income groups (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Additionally, negative campaigning 
should create awareness of the shortcoming of the rivals, ensuring that voter’s evaluations of 
the candidates become so polarized that their electoral choice becomes simplified (Atkin & 
Heald, 1976). However, as showed by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) the extent of negative 
appeals may vary substantially across different countries and is influenced by the 
constellation of candidates and the political context.  
 
Simultaneously, rising negativity has been also a feature of media coverage on politics. A 
study by Patterson (1993) showed that election- and candidate-related reporting of news 
magazines in the United States experienced a dramatic change between 1960 and 1992. 
Throughout that period negative coverage increased considerably and candidates emerged in 
the context of bad news. Furthermore, Patterson found that substantial portion of reporting 
oriented on “policy schema” was replaced by the “game schema”, which included coverage 
on electoral strategies, emphasis on scandals, conflicts, controversies and ‘horse race” 
between the candidates. Finally, media reporting was marked by de-authentication since 
candidates were quoted verbatim to the lesser extent. Shorter length of direct quotes of 
candidates was also observed within press in other countries (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000). 
Simultaneously, also television news was marked by decreasing length of sound bites of 
candidates (Lichter & Smith, 1996). Overall U.S. media provide candidates smaller changes 
of authenticity when compared to other countries, for instance, Germany (Donsbach & 
Jandura, 2003).  
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Simultaneously, many authors (Capella & Jamieson, 1997; Maurer, 2003; Wolling, 1999, 
Kepplinger, 1998) share the view that such phenomena as, among others, increasing 
negativity, personalization and infotainment (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001) contribute to 
the misrepresentation of political processes. As a result political reporting is seen as at least 
partly responsible for changes within voters’ behavior which include, among others, loss of 
trust in political institutions or strengthen political alienation.  
 
Finally, another manifestation of the mediatization is visible in emotionalization processes. 
The use of emotional appeals is particularly visible in strategies employed by political parties. 
There is a clear body of evidence (Bucy, 2000; Richards, 2004; King, 2002) showing the 
importance of emotional components in political discourse. As noted by King (2002) party 
leaders should posses the ability to share common emotional experiences with their audience. 
The ability to demonstrate emotions is tangibly demonstrated in party commercials which aim 
at evoking voters’ attachment. A study by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995:223) proved that 
political ads exposure correlated with image ratings of candidates and indicated “strong 
payoff for candidates who can succeed in striking the proper resonance with voter emotions”. 
Simultaneously the authors concluded that the impact upon viewers could be affected by the 
shape of political system which regulates formats and length of party commercials.   
 
1.2. Comparative Research on Political Communication 
 
Having outlined the changes within the political communication, one could ask whether the 
indicators of mediatization have any regular patterns across different countries. Thus Esser & 
Pfetsch (2004) urge scholars to “go comparative” and appreciate the potential of comparative 
research on political communication.  As noted by Blumler & Gurevitch (1995) comparisons 
help to prevent parochialism and ethnocentrism showing how one’s own country differs from 
the other. Secondly, it sheds new light on one’s own country political communication patterns 
leading to viewing own routines more critically. Thirdly, it attracts the attention to the macro 
structures which are often taken for granted within one’s own system. Fourthly, it offers 
access to a vast array of alternative solutions showing how own dilemmas may be solved 
using solutions adopted from different country. Fifthly, it expands available databases helping 
redefine theoretical approaches on political communication. And finally, transnational trends, 
similarities, and deviations from general patterns become apparent only when a broad – 
meaning: comparative – perspective is taken.  
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There are many factors that accelerated the development of comparative studies on political 
communication, a subfield of communication studies that was somewhat neglected in the 
earlier decades (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1975; Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990). Firstly, the world 
became a global village (McLuhan, 1962) where international conferences provide ample 
opportunities for the exchange of ideas and networking. Secondly, democratization processes 
in former authoritarian regimes opened up new unexplored fields of communication research 
becoming an interesting field of study (Jakubowicz, 2007). Thirdly, increasing use of modern 
media and easier access to various databases is yet another reason facilitating comparative 
efforts (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). However, one of the most important factors responsible for 
expanding number of comparative undertakings is the awareness of globalization and 
increasing homogenization of political communication across previously more diverse 
societies (Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004: 327).   
 
Over the last decades Gurevitch & Blumler regularly attempt an assessment of the “state of 
the art” of comparative political communication research. In their first efforts (Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1975) they referred to comparative political communication analyses as a field “in 
its infancy”. In their second evaluation (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990) the analyzed domain 
evolves into “at least late adolescence” and experiences rapid proliferation. Reviewing the 
discipline again at the beginning of the XXI century (Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004) the authors 
observed growing maturity of comparative studies related to political communication. Thus it 
is useful to provide examples of such comparative research1 that have explored these 
phenomena across different countries. Provided studies illustrate some of the recent 
developments by showing theme spectrum of comparative undertakings. 
 
In this context it should be mentioned that comparative research on political communication 
usually comprises studies that concentrate on limited number of countries, often including the 
United States, Germany and Britain (Pfetsch, 2001; Semetko et al. 1991; Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 2001; Esser, Reinemann & Fan, 2000). Comparative designs across multiple 
countries have not been broadly applied. In that respect the studies provided by Mancini & 
Swanson (1996) and Gunther & Mughan (2000) stand out. Mancini & Swanson (1996) 
                                               
1
 It is beyond the scope of his study to describe the comparative research on political communication in this 
Chapter. See: Esser & Pfetsch (2004); Kaid (2004). An overview of the discipline is also offered by Blumler & 
Gurevitch (1975); Gurevitch & Blumler (1990, 2004). For strategies used in comparative projects consult 
Swanson (1992).  
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compared campaigning techniques adopted by political players in eleven democracies 
(including North and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Israel) that show a 
different stage of development. Thus the analysis included established democracies, as well as 
those which were newly reborn or those that have recently undergone destabilization. 
Scholars participating in the project were provided with detailed theoretical framework. It 
included hypotheses discussing possible factors underlying the process of innovations in 
campaigning and stressed the importance of increasing modernization and differentiation of 
society. Simultaneously, it discussed the role of context factors (e.g. different electoral 
system, structures of party competition, campaign regulations, political culture, shape of 
media system etc.) that might affect the party campaigning. Conducted national case studies 
were organized along the same theoretical guidelines which allowed a comparative 
perspective. The results indicated that there was a common pattern of campaigning that could 
be viewed as a result of modernization processes. Changes within campaigns were brought 
about by the rise of “catch-all” parties trying to appeal to voters that were no longer tied to 
one party or institution. Secondly, changes within campaigns resulted to adopting parties to 
the logic of the media, particularly television. Simultaneously, the media in its reporting 
preferred “personalities to ideas, simplicity to complexity, confrontation to compromise, and 
heavy emphasis on the “horse race” in electoral campaigns” (Mancini & Swanson, 1996:251). 
The study also indicated the importance of context factors, especially political culture. 
 
Gunther & Mughan (2000) provided a study of the role of media in both new and established 
democracies. The analysis comprised ten case studies relating to authoritarian, transitional and 
democratic regimes in Spain, Russia, Hungary, Chile, Italy, the United States, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Great Britain and Germany. Each of the authors sought to find patterns in how 
the media have encouraged or sustained democracy (understood as plurality of views and 
accountability of the political actors) in a given country and identify the macro-level factors 
that exert influence on the functioning of democratic order. The results (again) indicated that 
the impact of the media on politics was a product of complex interactions between various 
context factors which included media technologies, the structure of the media market, the 
legal regulations, the shape of the political institutions and the citizens’ profile. One of the 
main findings was that the role of media in politics was strongly influenced by the prevailing 
political system, with best performance in established democracies. However, it should be 
noted that other studies (Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck, 2001; Thomaß & Tzankoff, 2001) 
indicated also media’s positive role in transformation of newly-established democracies. In 
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this context it should be remembered that post-communist transformation of Central and 
European media necessarily involved replication of many of the same processes that could be 
earlier observed in Western countries (Jakubowicz, 2007:9). Many of these processes, often 
contradictory in nature, were marked by a positive influence on established democracies. 
Such phenomena as, among others, separation of media from political structures (Alexander, 
1981), professionalization of journalists (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a), media decentralization, 
specialization (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979) and diversification greatly enhanced the quality 
of citizen’s participation. The positive effects were mirrored inter alia in identifying and 
catering the needs of various social and interest groups, reducing of public interventionism, 
and setting the stage for the emergence of private sectors. These effects are also, to the 
varying degree, applicable to the transition countries where the media functions as a 
barometer of the consolidation towards a democratic order and serves as a guarantor of the 
development of civic society (Manaev, 1995). However, the occurrence and intensity of these 
effects depend on various aspects of the transformation processes, particularly political 
changes and economic context (Jakubowicz, 2007).  
 
Much recent comparative work is devoted to the political communication during the time of 
party campaigning. While media scholars frequently regard American example as a certain 
starting point for their analysis (Plasser, 2001; Newman, 1999), they differ considerably in 
supporting the notion whether the persistence of system differences influences the degree of 
Americanization. For instance, in a study led by Blumler (1983) researchers examined the role 
of television during the European Parliament elections held in 1979. The results indicated that 
campaigns conducted in analyzed nine countries were different and concentrated to the large 
extent on the national than on the European level. In other words: campaigns conducted in a 
given country were deeply embedded in the given national context and model of 
campaigning. Nevertheless the study showed some similarities regarding the journalistic 
reporting. The journalists concentrated more on the campaign itself rather than on political 
issues. This resulted, among others, in a larger volume of personalization and giving priority 
to the national aspects of the campaign. Simultaneously, the study indicated a substantial role 
of television as a communication channel during the time of campaigning in all countries.  
 
The study by Blumler (1983) started a number of subsequent analyses (e.g. Cayrol 1991; 
Schulz & Blumler 1994; Scherer 1995; Maier & Tenscher, 2006) which focused on the 
European campaigning. Still, even though European election analyses profit from the fact that 
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they examine one common event in relatively similar political systems, research provided 
certain difficulties. As observed by Schulz & Blumler (1994:199) elections to the 
supranational European Parliament have mainly expressive functions. In other words: they 
function as indicators of the political spirit, as popularity test for politicians, as manifestation 
of support for a political system as such. National parliaments also do have expressive 
functions but simultaneously they posses a number of instrumental functions which include 
exerting power, selection and legitimization of the political elites. European elections do not 
have this second type of functions. As noted by Holtz-Bacha (2004: 219) decreasing interest 
in European elections might be due to the fact that they are usually seen as of “second order”. 
The electorate in barely interested in voting and has little knowledge about the candidates. 
Secondly, the parties prefer to invest money in national elections where the advantages of 
gaining power are higher and their candidates are more known among the society. Thirdly, the 
media itself tends to treat European elections with moderate attention.  
 
In that respect studies analyzing political communication in the context of national elections 
prove to be an interesting object of analysis (Schmitt-Beck, 2000; Farrell, 1996). Comparative 
research on national elections has hardly resulted in findings that could be applied with 
consistency within analyzed countries. Moreover, many projects indicated that 
Americanization paradigm should be treated with caution within European countries, which 
are highly dependent on their political culture. Kaid and Holtz-Bacha (1995) explored the 
content and effects of political advertising among several European democratic systems and 
showed some striking similarities across cultures. For instance, most analyzed countries 
concentrated the content of their ads on issues. Simultaneously, political ads were mainly 
positive in their focus and showed similar strategies to convey their messages. Nevertheless 
the study observed differences in emotional and logical appeals across analyzed states. These 
findings should be seen in the context of differences in media and political system variables 
that influenced both format and substance of political broadcasts. The importance of media 
and political components of a given country for political advertising was also confirmed by 
other studies (Kaid, 1999).   
 
1.3. Unexplored Field of Comparative Research on Political Communication 
 
As noted by Gurevitch & Blumler (2004:333) comparative research “should be designed to 
realize “double value”. That is, it should aim to shed light not only on the particular 
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phenomena being studied but also on the different systems in which they are being examined. 
In other words, more mature comparative research will be “system sensitive””. It is 
remarkable that the great majority of comparative political communication studies are still 
designed to realize this “double value” concentrating on a comparison between established 
democracies, the United States and Western European countries (Lin, 2004). There are still 
much fewer analyses discussing political communication between, among others, European 
states which do not share the same level of development in the political, social and economic 
field.  
 
The comparison between Western democracies and transition countries belongs to those 
unexplored fields of cross-country research which needs to be addressed by media scholars 
(Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). It is therefore the aim of this analysis to provide a closer look at the 
changing political communication in a comparative perspective between Germany and 
Poland. There are no research analyses that would compare political communication in those 
two countries. Thus this study intends to fill the existing research gap. Such a comparison 
should be undertaken for a number of reasons. Firstly, comparative perspective helps to 
demonstrate the differences in political communication in an established democracy and a 
transition country. Secondly, it is “system sensitive” and directs attention to the structural 
elements of the political and media system characteristics that reshape the patterns of political 
discourse. Thirdly, it enables to show whether processes of mediatization influence 
communication strategies of political parties and media across different countries. Finally, the 
importance of such a comparative study is further influenced by disproportional volume of 
Polish and German studies on political communication. The following paragraphs briefly 
outline literature available in both countries.  
 
While political communication research in Western countries has entered its mature stage 
(Lin, 2004:72), it is still on the way from infancy to adolescence in former Soviet block 
countries. This is also party true for Poland which still suffers from a tabula rasa problem: 
political science research prior to Gorbachov’s perestoika was characterized by pro-
communist bias. Thus the research before the 90s allowed very vague insights into political 
communication during the Soviet dominance. Democratic changes breathed new life into 
academic research and only since the 90s media scholars from Central and Eastern European 
countries finally explore the field of political communication. Moreover, they broke “their 
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national shells” (Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004:340) and started to compare similarities and 
differences in the field of political communication practices with their fellow researchers.  
 
The Polish field of political communication studies is still less advanced than in Germany. 
This is however applicable also to other Central and Eastern European countries which were 
dominated by the Soviet regime. Beginning from the early 90s Polish scholars increasingly 
focused on examining political discourse. Polish studies on political communication can be 
characterized by three distinct features. Firstly, the scope of undertaken projects is relatively 
small. Available analyses tend to focus on relatively short time framework. For instance, 
Trutkowski (2000) examined the presentation of Polish politics during parliamentary 
elections. The author compared the reality of a sender (political parties), the reality of a 
recipient (voters) and the reality of transmitter (media) to show how the picture of political 
sphere varied depending on chosen perspective (Trutkowski, 2000:132). The study combined 
individual in-depth interviews with politicians, focus group interviews with voters and 
quantitative content analysis of political programmes and newspapers’ coverage. Still, 
Trutkowski (2000) centered his analysis only round the 1997 parliamentary campaign. So far 
there is no longitudinal study on political communication in Poland that would provide 
empirical evidence drawn from a broader time framework.  
 
Secondly, the volume of empirical studies (e.g. Cwalina, 2000; Cwalina & Falkowski, 1999; 
Cwalina & Falkowski, 2000) is still limited. It can be frequently observed that results from 
projects on political communication in Poland are reported in descriptive manner (e.g. 
Giereło, 2005; Jeziński, 2004; Cichosz, 2003; Mazur, 2005; Kolczyński, 2005; Skrzypiński, 
2005; Janik-Wiszniowska & Wiszniowski, 2005). For example, Mazur (2005) analyzed 
negativity in Polish political advertising, based on qualitative analysis of only two cases 
studies, the first from parliamentary and the second from presidential campaigns. Small 
popularity of using complex empirical methods has three reasons. Firstly, qualitative studies 
are a commonly used research technique in Poland (which should not be surprising given the 
scope of undertaken studies). Secondly, empirical projects that apply, among others, 
quantitative analysis or experiments, usually require much higher financial resources. Thirdly, 
the research design is also partly influenced by access to statistical programmes like SPSS, 
which is not standard software available to students and researchers.  
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Finally, the number of comparative projects on political communication which include Poland 
is limited. Moreover, so far there has not been noted an attempt to bring comparable empirical 
data on Poland and Germany. Available studies focus predominantly on political advertising 
and compare Poland with either the United States or established Western democracies. For 
instance, Cwalina, Falkowski & Kaid (2000) provided a study on the influence of political ads 
on forming the image on political candidates and the citizens’ voting behavior. In that context 
particular role is ascribed to the attitude to the candidates and estimation of their personal 
qualities. The authors proposed a sequential model of the influence of political advertising on 
voting behavior. In order to verify proposed model, experiments were conducted in Poland, 
France and Germany. Cwalina, Falkowski & Kaid (2000) distinguished three types of impact 
that political broadcasts have on voting decisions. Firstly, party advertisements may 
strengthen already existing voting preferences. Secondly, political ads may weaken former 
preferences or, in extreme cases, lead to their change. Thirdly, party ads may also result in 
lack of impact or only small fluctuation in voting behavior followed by partial reconfiguration 
of candidate’s image by the voter.  
 
Another study by Cwalina, Falkowski & Kaid (2005) focused on examining the images of 
political players in evolving and established democracies proposing comparative study of the 
Polish and the U.S. presidential elections in 2000. Using experimental data from both 
countries, the authors utilized structural equation modeling and multiple regression analysis to 
demonstrate the most effective way to use image construction to influence voters’ behavior. 
Simultaneously, the authors showed the key role of affects which could be seen as a vital 
factor that designed and created the images of political candidates. Obtained results proved 
that Polish and American voters tended to perceive the socio-political reality created by the 
media in a different manner but in both countries political advertising influenced the creation 
of political images.  
 
In contrast, political communication in Germany has been more intensively documented. This 
is also mirrored in the volume of books, dissertations and conference papers presented to the 
academic community. For instance, the very party advertising was subject to a number of 
analyses. Dröge, Lerg & Weissenborn (1969) analyzed the presentation formats of party 
commercials and used qualitative content analysis to show that campaigning was reduced to 
communicating social norms (Normenwissen). Another study scrutinized spots broadcast in 
Bundestag elections held between 1972 and 1990 concentrating on advertising formats (Klein, 
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1992 quoted by Holtz-Bacha, 2000). Jakubowski (1998) focused on the ads showed during the 
1994 parliamentary elections to show the communication strategies used by political parties. 
The broadcasts presented in the 1994 elections were also evaluated by in the context of 
negative campaigning (Rimpel, 1996 quoted by Holtz-Bacha, 2000). Finally, Holtz-Bacha 
(2000) analyzed party advertising of German parties which embraced the period 1949-1998 
and was subsequently extended to the 2002 and the 2006 Bundestag elections (Holtz-Bacha, 
2003; 2006). German ads were also analyzed in a comparative perspective (e.g. Holtz-Bacha, 
Kaid & Johnston, 1994; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995).  
 
Simultaneously, German studies focused on the media coverage on party campaigning. A 
longitudinal study conducted by Wilke & Reinemann (2000) analyzed press coverage of 
major dailies in the period between 1949 and 1998. Their analysis was then extended to the 
elections held in 2002 and 2005 using the same design of the study. Similarly, German 
scholars paid particular attention to the role of television in depicturing politics. An analysis 
by Genz, Schönbach & Semetko (2001) compared the structures of television reporting on 
Bundestag elections held in the period 1990-1998. The authors showed changes that were 
partly compatible with Americanization thesis which took a form of increasing “horse race” 
oriented reporting, and higher volume of negativity. A study by Schulz and Zeh (2005) 
analyzed the television news appearance of top candidates in the period 1990 and 2002 and 
demonstrated increasing coverage on the campaign and candidates themselves. Moreover, 
reporting became more vivid with the emphasis put on the “game schema”. Another study by 
Donsbach & Jandura (2003) focused on the impact of authenticity in television news reports 
on the perception of candidates. The authors analyzed how different forms of a candidates’ 
appearance in television news affected their perception by the viewer. Using a large-scale 
content analysis of German television news coverage during the 1998 Bundestag election the 
study found that German candidates still had a substantial opportunity on television news to 
address the viewers in their own words. Moreover, the results indicated that the degree of 
authenticity had a vital impact on the perception of the candidate by the audience. Overall, 
pictures transmitted a better image than sole verbal news about a given candidate, and original 
sound bites with pictures left a better impression than pictures with just the voice-over.   
 
Overall, studies on political communication in Germany have a number of distinct features 
that make them differ from Polish literature. Firstly, the scope of undertaken projects is not 
only limited to single Bundestag elections, but studies focus on broader time framework (e.g. 
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Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Wilke & Reinemann, 2000). Moreover, selected campaigns are also 
subject to joint projects (e.g. Noelle-Neumann, Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1999; 2005) showing 
political communication in Germany from a range of different perspectives. Secondly, studies 
predominantly utilize more complex methodological tools, combining quantitative content 
analysis, surveys, and experimental designs. Thirdly, the recognition of political 
communication as a distinct area of media studies came much earlier in Germany due to its 
political background. While German universities offer communication studies as a distinct 
discipline, research on political communication in Poland is mainly undertaken by scholars 
with primary qualifications in political science, sociology or international relations. Fourthly, 
the volume of comparatively oriented studies in Germany is higher (e.g., Pfetsch, 2001; Kaid 
& Holtz-Bacha, 1995) than in Polish research. At the same time Germany is also frequently 
included into comparative studies as an example of established democracy. However, since 
there is no comparative research that would compare Germany and Poland, the analysis 
offered in the following Chapters is particularly needed.   
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Chapter 2 | Comparing Political Systems 
 
 
This Chapter focuses on the comparison between political system in Poland and Germany. 
Firstly, party systems in both countries are presented. In the second step, the main features of 
electoral systems are discussed. Thirdly, political participation in both countries is showed at 
greater length. These three elements have been chosen because they offer a comprehensive 
overview of political landscape showing the factors that influence the processes of political 
communication. The Chapter is organized round country-based analysis and then followed by 
concluding remarks which highlight a comparative dimension.  
 
2.1. Comparing Party Systems 
 
The literature on party systems (e.g. Duverger, 1954; Blondel, 1968; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; 
Sartori, 1976) has produced a number of measures for the description of political groupings. 
This Chapter focuses on the profiles of political parties in both Poland and Germany, stressing 
differences in fragmentation and stability of the political scene which arose mainly due to 
historical background. Both German and Polish parties are presented according to their 
position on the right-left continuum, membership data, historical roots, participation in 
exerting political power and electorate gained during the last three election campaigns2. 
Country-based description is followed by a comparative analysis of the main features of the 
party system characteristics. 
 
2.1.1. Party System in Poland 
 
As noted by Benoit & Hayden (2004:401-402) “for Eastern European parties it is quite 
difficult to obtain accurate, summary measures of ideology or policy. In Poland this problem 
is further aggravated by the fluidity of the parties, their members, and their policies”. The 
fluidity of the parties and the development of party system in Poland were strongly influenced 
by three factors – the communist dominance after 1945, the mode of exit from Soviet rule and 
                                               
2
 The following paragraphs concentrate on outlining the political party template. However, the analysis offers 
additional bibliography that discusses a given political player in detail. It should be also remembered that the 
literature concerning Polish political parties development is rather limited when compared to Germany, mainly 
due to their short history and frequent fluctuations. Simultaneously, Polish parties have not yet established own 
foundations (contrary to all major German parties) that also collect data related to a given political grouping. 
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the sequence of post-communist developments. “In contrast to Latin America and southern 
Europe, transition to democracy in post-communist Europe has occurred under conditions of a 
deepening economic crisis, a disintegration of regional security and economic institutions, and 
political instability across the region. Poland was hit especially hard by the economic crisis of 
the 1980s, with an inflation rate reaching close to 600% by 1990, a crushing foreign debt, 
persistent food shortages, and the collapse of the manufacturing sector. As Poland moved to 
develop and consolidate its new political institutions after 1989 it confronted both a deeply 
dysfunctional economy and a discredited political system” (Michta, 1997: 68-69).   
 
Table 1: Polish cabinets between 1997 and 2005 
Prime Minister (Party) Period  Coalition  Additional Remarks 
Jerzy Buzek  
(AWS) 
1997-2001 Right/centrist  
coalition composed 
of AWS and UW 
In 2001 UW left the coalition; a 
rightist AWS minority government 
was created  
 
Leszek Miller  
(SLD) 
2001-2004 Social democratic/ 
agrarian coalition 
composed of SLD 
and PSL 
 
The PSL was thrown away from the 
coalition by SLD; SLD minority 
government was created 
 
Marek Belka 
(SLD)  
2004-2005 Social democratic 
government led by 
SLD 
Due to political scandals, with so-
called Rywingate on top, Miller was 
replaced by Belka 
 
Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz  
(PiS) 
2005-2006 Right/ populist 
coalition composed 
of PiS, LPR,  
Samoobrona 
 
Marcinkiewicz resigned after rift 
with Kaczyński in 2006 
 
While German party system established in 1945 gradually evolved towards five-party model 
in the early 90s, Poland’s political landscape remained “frozen” for a number of decades of 
continuous Soviet dominance. During the period of communist regime the Polish United 
Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) defined the political landscape 
(Wojtaszczyk, 1998) exerting monopoly of power3. The collapse of Soviet empire paved the 
way to the creation of a competitive party system. Polish political parties in the post-
communist era had their roots either in the Solidarity movement or in the parties that operated 
legally during the Soviet rule. Thus the parliamentary system of the early 90s was divided and 
parliamentary elections held in October 1991 demonstrated high fragmentation of the political 
scene. Out of more than eighty political groupings taking part in General Elections, twenty 
                                               
3
 It should be however mentioned that the Soviet dominance revitalized the dissident movements and Catholic 
Church. In the eyes of polish society the Church was perceived as the only legal form of opposition to the 
communist power and a symbol of national independence (Paczkowski, 2005).  
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four won seats in the Polish parliament (Sejm). The scope of this fragmentation was tangibly 
proved by the fact that many political parties represented won only one single seat in the 
parliament each. Some parties, e.g. the Polish Party of Beer Friends (Polska Partia Przyjaciół 
Piwa) would capture 16 seats in the 1991 General Elections. The most important outcome of 
the first free elections was the fact that it was difficult to build a strong government capable of 
introducing economic and social reforms. Furthermore, the very fragmentation of Polish 
parliament also reflected deep ideological polarization, making stability a truly challenging 
task. Thus the first years of regained independence were marked by weak coalition 
governments (Jednaka, 2002, 2004; Rydlewski, 2000). In the period to be analyzed in this 
study, as showed in Table 1, Poland had four cabinets and two of them ended as minority 
governments. Between 1997 and 2005 there was also no party in Poland that would have a 
majority so creating coalition governments was a necessity (Paszkiewicz, 2004).  
 
Table 2: Results of Sejm elections held between 1997 and 2005  
1997 elections Percentage of votes Number of seats 
Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (AWS)  33.83 201 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) 27.13 164 
Unia Wolności (UW) 13.37 60 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 7.31 27 
Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP) 5.56 6 
2001 elections Percentage of votes Number of seats 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Unia Pracy (SLD-UP) 41.04 217 
Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 12.68 65 
Samoobrona 10.20 53 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) 9.50 44 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 8.98 42 
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 7.87 38 
2005 elections Percentage of votes Number of seats 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) 26.99 155 
Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 24.14 133 
Samoobrona 11.41 56 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) 11.31 55 
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 7.97 34 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 6.96 25 
Source: PKW (2007) 
 
With its multi-party system Poland still undergoes, similarly as its electoral system, the 
process of transformation (Paszkiewicz, 2004). Initially, the political division was a clear-cut 
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line between groups and parties4 that emerged from the Solidarity movement, and the post-
Communist groups. However, compared with the early ‘90s the Polish political landscape has 
become far more crystallized, as the major political formations on the Polish scene had been 
defined (Herbut, 2000). Political parties in Poland can be arranged on a Left/Right continuum. 
In the last decade there could be observed a kind of a sinusoid - the government would switch 
from the Left to the Right every four years. Table 2 gives an overview of parties which 
received parliamentary seats in the last three Sejm elections.  
 
The “traditional” right-wing parties in Poland have a very dramatic and dynamic history. Prior 
to 1989 the Polish opposition movement was unified around a single issue – the quest for 
national emancipation and struggle against the „reds”. When political independence was 
regained, diverse anti-communist groups started to articulate their own political programmes 
and the “Solidarity ethos” faded away. The results of fragmentation had far reaching 
consequences. Right wing parties active in the beginning of the 90s were often described as 
“sofa parties” (partie kanapowe) – a rather unflattering suggestion that their entire 
membership would not occupy more space that can be found on a couch.  
 
In the analyzed period 1997-20055 the number of right-wing parties participating in elections 
decreased and the Right became somewhat more consolidated when compared to the early 
transition period (Antoszewski, 2000). The right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja 
Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS) won elections held in 1997. However, after spectacular success 
in 1997 the same political grouping, which in the meantime evolved into Solidarity of the 
Right Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy, AWSP), lost elections in 2001 
and disappeared completely from the political scene. Similar fate met Union of Liberty (Unia 
Wolności, UW), AWS’s coalition liberal partner after the successful 1997 elections. In 2001 
UW did not gain any votes and was divided into scattered movements. Currently the right-
wing position is represented by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the liberal 
wing by Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO). Both PiS and PO have been 
established in 2001 and embraced many members of former AWS and AWSP movements. 
                                               
4
 Very often Polish “parties” did not have any formalized structures, e.g. during the parliamentary elections held 
in 2001 the Civic Platform was officially an electoral committee and was formally registered as a party in 2002. 
See also: Paszkiewicz (2004).  
5
 This Chapter reports the developments observed within Polish party system until the parliamentary elections 
held in 2005. The overview of German political parties is arranged in a similar manner.  
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The following paragraphs briefly present the right-wing parties (arranged on the basis of their 
foundation) present on the political scene between 1997 and 2005.  
 
UW – Freedom Union (UW, Unia Wolności) is a center-right party with a liberal profile 
which gathered among its membership some of the best known Polish intellectuals6. UW was 
created in 1994 through a merger of the Democratic Union (UD, Unia Demokratyczna) and 
the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD, Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny). During the 
1997 elections Leszek Balcerowicz was the UW chairman, since 2001 the party was led by 
Bronisław Geremek. The party was established after post-communists succeeded in 1993 
parliamentary elections and the UW leaders intended to unite the post-Solidarity environment. 
Freedom Union promoted decentralization of public power and development of local 
authorities that would be near to citizens. According to the party the idea of civic society 
should be mirrored in a social engagement, responsibility and solidarity of individuals. Unia 
Wolności advocated economic liberalism, favored rapid privatization of the state-owned 
enterprises and promoted European integration and Poland’s membership in NATO7.  
 
During the 1997 elections UW gained 13.37% of the votes and entered a coalition with 
Solidarity Electoral Action. Due to programme differences it left the government in 2000 
becoming an opposition party. Worsening economic situation in Poland, low support for 
AWS found its reflection in decrease of Freedom Union’s popularity. Negative effects of 
necessary economic transformation were often attributed to Leszek Balcerowicz, one of the 
UW leaders and author of main economic reforms in Poland8. The party’s role was 
additionally weakened when group of UW members with Donald Tusk created a new party 
Civic Platform (PO) which appealed to the similar electorate. The crisis of UW was 
confirmed during the 2001 elections – the party gained 3.1% of the votes and did not enter the 
parliament. Freedom Union remained present in the political scene playing however a 
marginal role. The party had 10 000 members9 and evolved into Democratic Party (Partia 
Demokratyczna) in 2005.  
 
                                               
6
 Inter alia Bronisław Geremek, Jacek Kuroń, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and others.  
7
 More information about UW is offered by Garlicki (2001); Rydlewski (2000); Jednaka (2002).  
8
 So-called Balcerowicz Plan (Plan Balcerowicza) also named “Shock Therapy”, was a packet of reforms leading 
to rapid transition from the communist economy to the capitalist market economy. Introduced measures, though 
having a positive effect in a long run, divided the society.  
9
 Data obtained from UW.org.pl (n.d.).  
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ROP – Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP, Ruch Odbudowy Polski) was 
established in 1995 as a center-right party. During the time before the 1997 elections Ruch 
Odbudowy Polski was one of the most popular Polish parties supported by 16% respondents 
asked in CBOS survey (Paszkiewicz, 2004). The party argued Poland’s accession to the 
NATO and promoted Catholic ethics in the country. However, with the establishment of 
Solidarity Electoral Action the popularity of ROP decreased substantially. The party gained 
6.56% of the votes during the 1997 parliamentary elections. This result and changes on the 
political scene provoked changes within Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland as well. 
Firstly, some of its members joined AWS. Secondly, before the 2001 elections ROP 
negotiated with AWS which led to a joint coalition, Jan Olszewski entered “Solidarity of the 
Right” Electoral Action electoral committee. However, the alliance with AWSP did not last 
long and ROP candidates finally were chosen from the election lists of League of Polish 
Families (e.g. Jan Olszewski), while some of ROP young members switched to electoral lists 
of Law and Justice. In the 2005 elections candidates of Ruch Odbudowy Polski were present 
on electoral lists of various right-wing parties10.  
 
AWS – Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS, Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność) was established in 
1996 and gathered right-wing political forces linked to the anticommunist opposition (mainly 
Solidarity movement)11. The alliance remained open to new parties, thus the number of 
political groupings within AWS varied and comprised up to a few dozens. The founders of 
Solidarity Electoral Action, among them AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski hoped to unite the 
right-wing parties and in so doing create one political platform which could compete with the 
left-wing, post-communist SLD. AWS primary goal was centered round launching joint 
parliamentary campaign in order to win 1997 Sejm elections. The programme of AWS 
intended to integrate the political heritage of all the participating parties. The alliance 
advocated the idea of social solidarity which was to influence the social and economic life. 
Simultaneously Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność promoted decentralization of Poland, 
establishing strong local authorities (samorządy) and lustration of candidates for major 
political posts. The social politics included defeating unemployment, reforms concerning 
social and health insurances and finally, changes related to education sector. AWS stressed 
the need for Polish access to the NATO and the European Union.   
                                               
10
 Figures regarding ROP membership are not available. ROP, similarly as Civic Platform and Self-Defense did 
not respond to author’s enquiries regarding this issue.   
11
 See: Rydlewski (2000); Garlicki (2001); Kolczyński (2003).   
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During the 1997 elections Solidarity Electoral Action achieved spectacular success gaining 
33.8% of the votes which constituted 201 seats in Sejm. After negotiations with UW both 
parties created a coalition led by Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. The style and methods of 
governing were widely criticized both from the opposition and AWS member parties 
(Rydlewski, 2000; Jednaka, 2002). The very creation of Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność 
contributed to substantial political success but it did not seem to be enough to prevent internal 
quarrels within the alliance caused by a rising rivalry for leadership. Additionally, UW was a 
rather “ideologically inconvenient” coalition partner (Paszkiewicz, 2004), mainly due to its 
liberal profile that often remained in contrast with Solidarity Electoral Action principles.  
 
Internal fights, public critique regarding the implementation of major reforms expressed by its 
own members, insufficient credentials12 and lack of competence13 strengthened citizens’ 
distrust in AWS. In 2001 UW left the coalition and Jerzy Buzek became a Prime Minister of a 
minority government. The internal weakness of Solidarity Electoral Action increased after 
2000 presidential elections. AWS presidential candidate Marian Krzaklewski gained only 
15.57% of the votes which meant deepening crisis of AWS leadership. Marian Krzaklewski 
was replaced as AWS chairman by Jerzy Buzek but it did not improve the alliance’s position. 
In the months before the 2001 parliamentary elections a substantial number of Akcja 
Wyborcza Solidarność members founded new political parties, inter alia Civic Platform (PO), 
Law and Justice (PiS) and League of Polish Families (LPR). During the 2001 elections 
AWSP (“Solidarity of the Right” Electoral Action, AWS was renamed) gained 5.6% of the 
votes. This was not enough to enter a parliament due to 8% hurdle required for electoral 
coalitions.  
 
                                               
12
 Just to give an example of so-called BMW rule, Bierny, Mierny, ale Wierny (Passive, Without Credentials, but 
Loyal). This slogan describes a policy of promoting own supporters in state institutions where the main criterion 
of appointment is loyalty to currently ruling power. The abbreviation itself is a sarcastic reference to BMW cars 
which are a symbol of high quality (which is however absent in the work of promoted officials). The term BMW 
also indicates that the lack of competence is desired by the politicians who know that supporters’ limited 
knowledge prevents any independent actions that could threaten elites. 
13
 This style of politics was described as TKM. TKM (Now the F… We) is a metaphor, used for the first time by 
Jarosław Kaczyński, to describe relations among Polish politicians. TKM refers to the mentality of successful 
parties which distribute political positions to their supporters without willingness to implement necessary 
reforms.  
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PO – Civic Platform (PO, Platforma Obywatelska) is a centre-right party representing a 
synthesis of liberal, conservative and Christian-democratic beliefs14. The party proposes 
measures to improve free market economy, advocates de-politicization of the state structures. 
It stresses the need of reforming educational system, promotes the idea of Poland’s integration 
with Western Europe. PO was established in 2001, however the very idea of creating Civic 
Platform appeared already after presidential elections held in 2000 when Andrzej Olechowski, 
independent candidate representing liberal electorate, gained substantial support (17.3%)15. 
The Platforma Obywatelska founding fathers, Andrzej Olechowski, Donald Tusk (liberal 
politician from UW) and Maciej Płażyński (conservative politician from AWS), also called 
“Three Tenors” by the Polish press, saw an opportunity to gather and unite the electorate that 
earlier supported Olechowski. Civic Platform was perceived as a political alternative and 
attracted some UW and AWS members.  
 
Until the parliamentary elections held in 2001 the Civic Platform remained an electoral 
committee, it became formally registered as a party in 2002. During the 2001 elections PO 
managed to lead an effective political campaign and gained support of 14.1% of voters. 
During the legislative period 2001-2005 Civic Platform constituted the main opposition party 
in Polish Sejm. In the 2005 elections PO won 133 seats in Sejm and 30 seats in the Senat. It 
was believed16 that Civic Platform would create a government coalition with Law and Justice, 
which did not happen inter alia due to programme differences. After the 2005 parliamentary 
elections PO remained the biggest opposition party in Polish parliament. Donald Tusk (PO 
presidential candidate in 2005, lost with Lech Kaczynski) was seen as its main leader.  
 
PiS - Law and Justice (PiS, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) is a right-wing conservative party17 
established in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins. PiS was founded on a wave of popularity gained 
by Lech Kaczyński, who was a Minister of Justice in the AWS government. PiS is not a 
homogenous party, some of its members were earlier active in AWS or ROP. Law and Justice 
gained 9.5% of votes in the 2001 elections, whereas in 2005 the party quite unexpectedly18 
                                               
14
 For more information abort Civic Platform see also: Słodkowska & Dołbakowska (2004, 2006); Kolczyński 
(2003).  
15
 Olechowski lost only with Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who became the President of Poland. 
16
 Such electoral outcomes were frequently reported both in Polish press and political declarations.  
17
 See: Słodkowska & Dołbakowska (2004, 2006); Kolczyński (2003).  
18
 Opinion polls (conducted by the most reliable institutions CBOS, OBOP and PBS) showed that PiS would be 
the second or even the third force in Sejm.  
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took the first place with 26.99% of votes. The year 2005 brought a double victory as, also 
unexpectedly19, Lech Kaczyński became the President of Poland.  
 
PiS promotes traditional values based on the Catholic social teaching. The party supports a 
state-guaranteed minimum social safety and promotes state intervention in the market 
economy. More importantly, the party advocates stronger criminal penalties, introduction of 
effective anti-corruption measures and postulates greater transparency of public institutions. 
The party opposes euthanasia, abortion, homosexual marriages and soft-drugs, and at the 
same time postulates a return of capital punishment20. In contrast to Samoobrona and LRP, 
Law and Justice generally supported the EU enlargement, however only on conditions 
beneficial for Poland. Similarly as LPR, PiS stands for the de-communization of Poland. Law 
and Justice currently has more than 13 000 members21.  
 
LPR - League of Polish Families (LPR, Liga Polskich Rodzin) is a conservative right-wing 
party22 promoting Christian-democratic values. The party was established shortly before 
elections held in 2001 and succeeded in gaining 7.87% of votes. There is some evidence to 
suggest that LPR owned some of its parliamentary success to the Catholic radio station Radio 
Maryja23 which unites (usually elderly) Poles with strong religious beliefs (Paszkiewicz, 
2004). LPR managed to recruit some politicians with parliamentary experience, mainly from 
the right-wing AWS which suffered from internal quarrels. In the 2005 parliamentary 
elections League of Polish Families received 7.97% of votes and entered a government 
coalition with Self-Defense and PiS. 
 
The political agenda of LPR promotes social conservatism, isolationism and economic policy 
based on its own interpretation of the Catholic social teaching. The party stresses the need for 
patriotism, Polish national sovereignty and conservative social values. League of Polish 
Families opposes abortion, euthanasia and gay marriages (anti-homosexuality policy). It also 
                                               
19
 Opinion polls predicted that the PO leader Donald Tusk, and not Lech Kaczyński, would become the head of 
the state.  
20
 It should be noted that capital punishment is forbidden in EU member states.  
21
 Data obtained from PiS.org.pl (n.d.).  
22
 More information about LPR is offered by Kolczyński (2003); Migalski (2003).  
23
 Radio Maryja is a conservative Catholic radio station founded in 1991. It attracts a large audience, mostly 
elderly people of traditionalist, right-wing views blindly supporting the charismatic Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. The 
listeners are often described as “the army of mohair berets”, an epithet stressing the usual dressing code (berets) 
of the Radio Maryja’s supporters. The station is said to be dominated by intolerance, anti-Semitism and engaging 
in politics.  
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stands for the de-communization of Poland and opening the archives of the Polish communist 
secret police. LPR opposed the Polish accession to the European Union. However, in 2004 the 
party participated in the European Parliament elections and received 15.92% of votes 
becoming the second largest Polish representation in the EU structures24. League of Polish 
Families comprises about 10 000 members25. 
 
The fragmentation of Polish Right contrasts with the left-wing political groupings The Left in 
Poland has always been perceived as a monolith when compared to the right wing parties 
(Antoszewski, 2000) and is mainly represented by Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej, SLD) that is continuously present on the Polish political scene.  
 
SLD – Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) was first a relatively 
loose coalition of left-wing groupings established in 1991. It constituted an umbrella coalition 
of the Left acting as an alliance during Polish General Elections. Its core was the Social 
Democracy of the Polish Republic formed in 1990 following the dissolution of the Polish 
United Workers’ Party. During the 1991 parliamentary elections SLD gained 11.98% of the 
votes, in the 1993 elections it nearly doubled its results securing 20.4% of the votes. This led 
to establishing a coalition with PSL and contributed to creation of governments led by Józef 
Oleksy (SLD), than Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD) and finally Waldermar Pawlak (PSL). 
The fact that post-communist regained political influence was met with mixed feelings. 
Democratic Left Alliance, a direct descendant of the former Communist Party, was 
unacceptable as a partner to groups spawned by the Solidarity movement.  
 
SLD became a conglomerate of over 30 political groupings which evolved into single party26. 
The reasons for consolidation were numerous. Firstly, member parties could be prevented 
from promoting their own identity and programme (which happened to the right wing parties 
in Poland). Secondly, there existed a problem of co-called “dwuwładza”27 between two 
groupings (SLD and SDRP) which had to be eliminated. In 1999 Democratic Left Alliance 
was officially registered as a political party and Leszek Miller became its chairman. During 
                                               
24
 However, it should be taken into account that the participation in the elections to the European Parliament was 
very low. Only 20.87 % of the Polish citizens entitled to vote decided to cast a ballot.  
25
 Data obtained from: Sekretariat LPR (sekretariat@lpr.pl), 1 August 2007. RE: Czlonkowie LPR – pytanie. E-
Mail to Musiałowska, E., (Ewa_Anna.Musialowska@mailbox.tu-dresden.de). 
26
 See also: Herbut (2000); Jednaka (2002).  
27
 The term stands for describing a competition between two different political forces.  
 43 
the presidential elections held in 2000 the SLD candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski was 
elected the President of Poland for the second time winning in the first round (53.9%).  
 
During the 1997 General Elections SLD gained 35.7% of votes becoming the main opposition 
party. Before the 2001 parliamentary campaign Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej entered an 
electoral alliance with Labour Union (UP, Unia Pracy) and other left-oriented groupings. The 
alliance received 41.04% of the votes securing 216 seats in Sejm and 75 in Senat. These 
results, though very encouraging, did not guarantee a majority in the parliament. Thus SLD-
UP created a government coalition with PSL led by the Prime Minister Leszek Miller. The 
coalition lasted till 2003 and collapsed due to the programme differences. Again, similarly as 
during AWS-UW coalition, a minority government was created.  
 
Internal fights, numerous political scandals (just to mention RywinGate28 scandal) undermined 
the support for the party. Decreasing trust in SLD-UP coalition was confirmed by falling 
support of the voters. As reported by Paszkiewicz (2004:166) before the 2001 General 
Elections Democratic Left Alliance had approximately 150 000 members. Due to internal 
verification conducted in 2003 the SLD membership decreased by 71 000 members. Finally, 
in the 2005 election SLD achieved 11.31% of votes, considerably less than four years earlier. 
The internal changes within the grouping went deeper: some party members led by Marek 
Borowski founded a new political party Socjaldemokracja Polska (SdPL). Changes could be 
also observed within party leaders. Prime Minister Leszek Miller was replaced by Marek 
Belka one day after Poland had joined the European Union (2nd May 2004). The party was 
chaired by Miller, than by Krzysztof Janik and finally by Wojciech Olejniczak.  
 
There are two more parties that should be mentioned. Both of them do not have an equivalent 
in Germany that would be placed that prominently in the political system as it is the case in 
Poland. Party system in Poland is characterized by a strong presence of Polish Peasants’ Party 
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) and Self-Defense (Samoobrona) which role cannot be 
underestimated.  
 
                                               
28
 One of the biggest corruption scandals in Poland named after the film producer Lew Rywin. On behalf of the 
so-called “group of power” Rywin made a bribe proposal to Adam Michnik, chief editor of the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza”, which was revealed by the newspaper and led to establishing of the so-called Investigation 
Commission in the Polish parliament. 
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PSL – Polish Peasant Party (PSL, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) is quite unique among the 
Polish parties29 as it “represents a relatively uniform constituency with a clearly articulated set 
of political interests” (Michta, 1997:91). In 1990 the Polish Peasant Party “Renewal” merged 
with other parties to continue the traditions of the prewar peasant movement, representing the 
tradition and achievements of Polish agrarian parties, inter alia SL established in 1895, 
Bataliony Chłopskie, to the ideas promoted by such leaders as Wincenty Witos and Stanisław 
Mikołajczyk. Polish Peasant Party is an agrarian party which integrates the doctrine of 
Catholic Church in its programme. PSL emphasizes agriculture as a critical branch of the 
national economy, advocating government subsidies and protective tariffs. The party stands 
for social support to the disadvantaged; it also advocated Poland’s accession to the EU 
structures. PSL has currently 140 000 members30.  
 
PSL is a very important political player in Polish politics. For a substantial period of time it 
played a pivotal role, in a way similarly as FDP in Germany, deciding on the shape of 
government coalitions. Despite of its PRL heritage Polish Peasant Party – in contrast to SLD 
– was not isolated on the political scene. On the contrary, PSL politicians succeeded in all 
General Elections, often created political agreements with other groupings and regularly 
entered coalitions (Rydlewski, 2000). Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe had its representatives, 
among others, in governments led by T. Mazowiecki, J.K. Bielecki, J. Olszewski, H. 
Suchocka, W. Pawlak, J. Oleksy, W. Cimoszewicz, L. Miller. Waldemar Pawlak, PSL 
chairman, was twice Prime Minister of Poland. In the analyzed period PSL received 7,31% of 
popular vote in 1997, compared to 8,98% in 2001 and 6,96% in 2005.   
 
Self-Defense – Self-Defense (Samoobrona) is a left-wing party, a trade union and a social 
movement at the same time31. The party needed a decade to enter the Polish parliament. In the 
1993 parliamentary elections it gained 3.35% of votes and in 1997 only 0.24% of votes. 
Simultaneously, the party’s leader Andrzej Lepper participated without success in two 
presidential campaigns in 1995 (1.32% of votes) and 2000 (3.05% of votes). Years of political 
isolation were finally rewarded in 2001 when Samoobrona gained 10.20% of votes becoming 
the third political force in the country. During the last parliamentary campaign held in 2005 
the party strengthened its position by gaining 11.41% of votes. In the 2005 presidential 
                                               
29
 See also: Garlicki (2001); Rydlewski (2000); Jednaka (2002).   
30
 Data obtained from PSL.pl (n.d.).  
31
 See also: Słodkowska & Dołbakowska (2004, 2006); Kolczyński (2003).  
 45 
election Andrzej Lepper received 15.11% of votes, a remarkable change when compared to 
his previous presidential campaigns.  
 
Self-Defense proposes a political agenda that is populist in nature. The party stands for 
extending government social programs, state-founded agriculture, promotes isolationism and 
euro-skepticism (e.g. protesting against the European Union enlargement). The party has 
often marked its presence with undemocratic behavior, e.g. using its own loudspeakers after 
microphones had been switched off due to exceeding the time assigned for parliamentary 
speeches. A certain number of party’s parliamentary representatives, including Andrzej 
Lepper himself, are subject to criminal investigations ranging from bribery to fraud. This 
mirrors the level of political culture in Poland, especially if one bears in mind that it is 
Andrzej Lepper who was Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture in Poland.  
 
Overall, the development and profiles of Polish parties demonstrate continuous transformation 
and institutionalization of party system in Poland. Over the last two decades the plethora of 
small parties has been excluded from parliament, which should be seen as a positive process 
that marks decreasing fluidity of Polish party landscape. However, the very process of 
political consolidation is still unfinished. This is mirrored in the fragility of political 
groupings, which is well exemplified by right-wing parties that frequently compete for the 
similar electorate and vary mainly in their support for Christian values and liberalization of 
market economy. Additionally, it is visible in relatively high openness of political system to 
newcomers, for instance in the entrance of radical parties such as Self-Defense or League of 
Polish Families to Sejm. Both political groupings have already vanished from the political 
scene due to the results of parliamentary elections held in 2007.  
 
It should be also stressed that creating political coalitions and alliances in Poland remains 
until now a challenging undertaking. Though with the passage of time the historical 
background of a given grouping has become somewhat blurred, especially for part of the 
voters, it is still one of the criteria that influence the formation of political coalitions. As 
demonstrated in this Chapter, the ideological stretch that characterizes Polish political parties 
results in lack of ideological cohesion and inability to establish programmatically clear 
relationships. This was well mirrored, among others, in the creation of coalition comprising 
PiS, LPR and Self-Defense in 2005 that gathered actors pursuing a different set of political 
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goals. As indicated in the following paragraphs, the process of government formation in 
Germany, particularly in the analyzed period, proved to be easier.  
 
2.1.2. Party System in Germany 
 
The German party system, established after the World War II, reflected the main desire of the 
founding fathers, which was stability (Glaeßner, 1999). For obvious reasons, the capacity of 
the party system to represent a wide range of political players, a distinct feature of the Weimar 
period (Lösche, 1993), was considered of secondary importance: excessive fragmentation of 
the political scene was to be avoided. A process of party system concentration ended de facto 
in 1961 as the “two-and-a-half” party system comprising CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD was 
established. The demise of the small parties showed that the cleavage structure underlying the 
German party system had become simplified. For more than two decades the “core parties” 
fully succeeded in securing more than 90% of the popular vote and all Bundestag seats. The 
period between 1961 and 1983 was characterized by alternative majorities with the Free 
Liberals playing a decisive role (Zünglein an der Waage). The German party system reached 
its highest concentration during 1976 elections when the three Bundestag parties (CDU/CSU, 
SPD, FDP) won 99.1% of the popular vote (von Alemann, 2003:57).  
 
The “two-and-a-half” model proved to be the dominant pattern in German party system and 
continued until 1983, when the Greens first gained seats in the Bundestag. For two reasons, 
their entrance into the parliament marked a beginning of new equilibrium. Firstly, it showed 
that the party system had a capacity of extending its representation. After twenty years of 
three parties’ hegemony, another player, regarded by established Bundestag parties as 
illegitimate newcomer (von Alemann, 2003:63), joined the political scene. Secondly, FDP 
could not longer occupy a pivotal role as the Greens deprived the Free Liberals of the 
monopoly to support either CDU/CSU or SPD.  
 
The unification of Germany resulted in an emergence of five-party system, as PDS gained its 
parliamentary representation. The very strength of PDS was largely due to the support of the 
East Germany electorate which perceived the Socialists as their spokesman (Moreau, 2002). 
The processes occurring within German party system at that time were hardly marked by a 
smooth transfer of the West German parties to the Lands of former German Democratic 
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Republic (von Alemann, 2003) and differences concerning social composition of electorates 
in both West and East Germany were substantial.  
 
With the development of the Greens and PDS, Germany acquired a multiparty system. Still, 
the increase in number of political parties has not caused any greater instability (Rudzio, 
2006). Political alliances are created by few, and always the same, players who share the same 
playing field. That constitutes a vital factor for continuity and stability of the political 
agendas. As showed in Table 3 German government coalitions can be perceived as strong and 
stable, major political fluctuations generally remain absent (Sontheimer & Bleek, 2005). The 
stability of governmental coalitions is Poland, as already indicated in Table 1, is remarkably 
lower. 
 
Table 3: Political coalitions and Chancellors in Germany 1998 – 2005  
 
Election 
campaign 
 
 
Coalition before given 
election  
 
Coalition formed  
after given election 
 
Chancellor 
before given 
election 
 
Chancellor  
chosen after 
given election 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
CDU/CSU + FDP 
 
SPD + Bündnis 90/Grüne 
 
Helmut Kohl 
 
Gerhard 
Schröder 
 
2002 
 
 
 
SPD +  Bündnis 90/Grüne 
 
SPD + Bündnis 90/Grüne 
 
Gerhard 
Schröder 
 
 
Gerhard 
Schröder 
 
2005 
 
 
 
SPD + Bündnis 90/Grüne 
 
CDU/CSU + SPD  
 
Gerhard 
Schröder 
 
Angela Merkel 
 
The clear dominance of CDU/CSU and SPD has also shaped the election campaigns. The 
practice to nominate chancellor-candidates and highlight coalition preferences (e.g.: warnings 
against particular alliances; campaigning explicitly for Zweitstimme) turned Bundestag 
elections into choice of Chancellor and future shape of the government. In Poland, the 
election campaigns say quite little about possible government constellations as the process of 
political bargaining, after votes have been cast, is much longer and more complicated. As 
noted by Jednaka (2002) independent Poland experienced frequent political turbulences; in 
the first twelve years of transformation the Prime Minister was selected ten times. As showed 
in Table 4, the political scene in Germany is defined by a stable set of five parties. In the 
following paragraphs the essential features of each party’s profile are indicated.  
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Table 4: Results of Bundestag elections held between 1998 and 2005 
1998 elections 2002 elections 2005 elections  
Percentage 
of votes 
 
Number  
of seats 
Percentage 
of votes 
Number  
of seats 
Percentage 
of votes 
Number  
of seats 
CDU/CSU 35.2 
 
245  38.5 248  35.2 226 
SPD 40.9 
 
298  38.5 251  34.2 222 
FDP 6.2 
 
43  7.4 47  9.8 61 
Bündnis 90/Grüne 6.7 
 
47  8.6 55  8.1 51 
PDS 5.1 
 
36  4.0 2  8.7 54 
Other parties 5.9 
 
- 3.0 - 4.0  
 Total: 669 seats 
 
Total: 603 seats Total: seats: 614 
Adopted from: von Schwartzenberg & Geiert, (2002); Schorn & von Schwartzenberg (2005). 
 
CDU/CSU – the Christian Democrats are historically the moderate right-of-centre force in 
German politics, rooted in Catholic and Protestant values32. CDU cooperates neatly with its 
sister party CSU at the federal level, but both remain separated as far as legal regulation and 
organizational matters are concerned. Both parties function as one in matters concerning 
national politics, they campaign together nationally, form a single Fraktion in the German 
parliament and enter the government as a coalition (Dalton, 1993). Their alliance is 
commonly referred to as The Union and the joint group is called CDU/CSU. CDU/CSU’s 
programme generally supports the idea of social market economy and is mostly conservative 
on social policy. CDU has approximately 600 000 members33, being one of the biggest 
German parties, the Bavarian CSU comprises roughly 173 000 members (Facts about 
Germany, 2007).  
 
CDU was created after the World War II with the intention to combine forces representing 
catholic values. The party is often identified with Roman Catholics, although the general 
emphasis on Christianity has become profoundly lower than it was the case in the 50s or 60s 
(Buchheim, 1966). CSU roots go back mainly to the Bavarian People’s Party (Bayerische 
Volkspartei, BVP) (Rudzio, 2006) and shows uniquely high level of dominance in Bayern 
securing substantial political stability (Decker, 2007). 
                                               
32
 More information about CDU/CSU: Decker (2007); Woyke & Heinrich (2003); Bösch (2001); Buchhaas-
Birkholz (1981).  
33
 Data obtained from CDU.de (n.d.). 
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CDU/CSU builds a core element of the German party system and became one of the dominant 
players with Konrad Adenauer as its leader from 1949 to 1963. After SPD and FDP formed a 
coalition in 1969, CDU/CSU waited thirteen years to regain its leadership position. With the 
emergence of Christian-Liberal coalition founded in 1983, the Christian Democrats succeeded 
in ruling the country under Helmut Kohl for another sixteen years. In the meantime, with the 
German reunification, CDU extended its structures to the territory of the former GDR. The 
party was again defeated in 1998 by SPD. Helmut Kohl continued to be the party leader and 
after that Wolfgang Schäuble served as a chairman till 2000 and was then succeeded by 
Angela Merkel, who was elected Chancellor after 2005 elections. Both Helmut Kohl and 
Angela Merkel were CDU chancellor candidates during 1998 and 2005 Bundestag elections 
respectively. During the 2002 campaign CDU/CSU chancellor candidate (Edmund Stoiber) 
was chosen from CSU.  
 
In the analyzed period CDU/CSU achieved a vast group of voters. In the 1998 Bundestag 
election CDU reached 28.4% and CSU 6.7% of the national vote. In 2002 general election 
CDU gained 29.5% and the CSU 9% of the votes. In the last elections held in 2005 the 
CDU/CSU polled 35.2% of total votes becoming the winner34.  
 
SPD – the Social Democrats are the mainstream left-of-centre party. With nearly 600 000 
members (Facts about Germany, 2007) the SPD belongs, similarly as CDU, to the largest 
parties in Germany. Simultaneously SPD35 is one of the oldest organized political parties in 
the world, rooted in the workers’ movement. In 1959 in the Godesberg Programme, SPD 
abandoned a programme derived from Marxist doctrine and began to appeal not only to the 
working class but to the wider spectrum of German society as well (Dalton, 1993).   
 
After World War II, SPD remained in opposition from the elections held in 1949 till 1966. In 
1966 it formed a so-called Grand Coalition with CDU/CSU. Beginning with 1969 when the 
Social Democrats won the majority of seats, the country was ruled by Social-Liberal coalition 
under Billy Brandt and then Helmut Schmidt from 1969 until 1982. In 1982 SPD lost power 
and CDU/CSU and FDP coalition under Helmut Kohl governed for more than one decade. In 
                                               
34
 Results of Bundestag elections presented for each German party were obtained from data provided by the 
Bundeswahlleiter (2007), von Schwartzenberg & Geiert, (2002); Schorn & von Schwartzenberg (2005); Decker 
(2007).  
35
 More information about SPD: Decker (2007); Potthoff & Miller (2002); Appelius (1999).   
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the early 90s, similarly as other Bundestag parties, SPD was established as a separate party in 
East Germany and then joined its West German counterpart.  
 
The Social Democrats returned again in 1998 when they emerged as the winner of the 
elections with the substantial figure of 40.9% of votes. In the 2002 elections SPD gained 
38.5% of votes and again succeeded in forming a government with the Greens. This time 
however the party was only slightly ahead of CDU/CSU opponents. In the 2005 election SPD 
achieved 34.2% of votes and became a partner in a Grand Coalition formed with CDU/CSU 
under the leadership of the chancellor Angela Merkel. In all three elections to be analyzed in 
this study, it was Gerhard Schröder who was to run for the Chancellor office.  
 
FDP – the Free Democrats are the major liberal party in Germany with 65 000 members 
(Facts about Germany, 2007). FDP36 stands for reducing taxes and rely more on individual 
initiative in a society than regulation and state oversight. The party was formed in 1948 by 
local liberal parties whose members were previously active in the German People’s Party 
(Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP) and the German State Party (Deutsche Staatspartei) (von 
Alemann, 2003:45). The strength of the Free Democrats could be observed in their potential 
to create coalitions with either CDU/CSU or SPD. For a substantial period of time it played a 
pivotal role, deciding on the shape of government coalitions (Dittberner, 2005). For this 
reason the party was present in the governmental structures of most German coalitions, either 
as CDU/CSU or SPD partner. In contrast to CDU/CSU and SPD the Free Democrats - given 
their role in the German political system – rather refrain from proposing Chancellor 
candidates during its election campaigns and instead concentrate on campaigning for second 
votes (Zweitstimme).  
 
In the analyzed period FDP’s electorate has increased. In the 1998 elections the party received 
6.2% of total votes. In the 2002 Bundestag campaign it gained 7.4% of the national vote. 
Finally, in the 2005 election the Free Democrats were supported by 9.8% of the voters. 
Between the 1998 and 2005 elections the party had following leaders: Wolfgang Gerhardt 
served as Bundesvorsitzende till Mai 2001 when Guido Westerwelle became FDP chairman. 
 
                                               
36
 Additional information related to FDP is offered by Decker (2007); Dittberner (2005). 
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The Greens – the Greens first entered the German parliament in 198337. According to 
Poguntke (1993:181) the advent of the party led to the situation where all established parties 
have felt “compelled to adapt programmatically to the Green challenge”. The Greens 
traditionally pursue an agenda of strong environmental protection, opposition to war and 
nuclear power (Dalton, 1993). During the 1987 elections in West Germany the party increased 
its support and received 8.3% of votes. In the 1990 elections held in newly unified Germany 
the Greens did not pass - similarly to PDS as indicated in the next paragraphs – the 5% 
threshold to gain seats in the Bundestag. However, due to the temporary modification of the 
electoral law, the 5% “hurdle” applied separately in Eastern and West Germany and the 
Greens succeeded in acquiring parliamentary seats. In the 1994 elections the Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen gained 7.3% of the nationwide vote, followed by 6.7% of the vote in 1998, 8.6% in 
2002 and 8.1% in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Between 1998 and 2005 the Greens ruled 
the country as a coalition partner of SPD. Simultaneously, Joschka Fischer emerged as one of 
the main leader of the party. His strong position continued in the 90s and in 1998 he became a 
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs under SPD/Bündnis 90/Die Grünen coalition. The 
Greens have approximately 45.000 members (Facts about Germany, 2007). 
 
PDS – the party appeared in the Bundestag after 1990 elections, facilitating the five-party-
system in Germany. PDS is a left wing socialist party38, seen as the successor to SED 
(Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) which 
governed the German Democratic Republic until the collapse of Soviet empire. PDS is 
generally absent in Western Germany (Andersen & Woyke, 2003), mainly active in new 
Lands and remains a strong player in local governments in Eastern Germany. In 2005 PDS 
entered an electoral alliance with Labour and Social Justice Party (WASG) and was renamed 
the Left Party (Linkspartei)39.   
 
In the 1990 elections PDS won 2.4% of the votes, however under the legal regulations 
reflected in the electoral law at that time (one time exception) the party led by Gregor Gysi 
entered the Bundestag. During the 1994 campaign PDS increased its vote to 4.4% and entered 
the parliament for the second time due to gaining support in four Berlin districts. In 1998 the 
party gained 5.1% of the nationwide vote and thus achieved for the first time the 5% threshold 
                                               
37
 More information concerning the Greens can be obtained from Andersen & Woyke (2003); Oberreuter, 
Kranenpohl, Olzog & Liese (2000).  
38
 See also Spier (2007); Behrend (2006).  
39
 In 2007 the Linkspartei and WASG created together a new political grouping – Die Linke.  
 52 
required for a parliamentary representation. In 2002 PDS did not achieve enough votes 
required for guaranteed proportional representation in Bundestag as the support sank back to 
4%. The party got only two representatives elected directly from the districts. Finally, after an 
electoral alliance with WASG was created, the Linkspartei won 8.7% of the votes during the 
2005 elections, achieving the best result in its history. Die Linke currently has approximately 
72 000 members (Die Linke.de, 2007) 
 
In sum, party system in Germany is characterized by high level of stability and 
institutionalization. The spectrum of political groupings which enter Bundestag remains 
practically unchanged over the last decades. The entrance of new groupings, the Greens in the 
80s and PDS in the 90s, was not a short episode but marked an establishment of a new 
political equilibrium. Moreover, the shape of German party system was not undermined by 
the reunification of the country but led to partial replication of party structures existing in 
West Germany in the new Lands. In this context one of the issues that are likely to influence 
the future German party system is perhaps the role of PDS, a legitimate representative of East 
German voters, which is not considered an acceptable coalition partner on the federal level. 
Overall however, German party system has produced stable governments which were created 
by few political players that had less difficulty in establishing joint political programme than 
their Polish counterparts.  
 
2.1.3. Conclusions  
 
Out of a wide rage of approaches to the classification of party systems both Germany and 
Poland represent the multiparty type. However, the major difference can be found in the 
structures of competition for government between the political parties. Mair (2002) identifies 
three factors that can be considered relevant in that respect. Firstly, there is a question of the 
prevailing model of government alternation. Secondly, there is the issue of 
stability/consistency in the governing alternatives as well as the extent to which competition 
for government can be predicted. Thirdly, there is a vital question “who governs?” and the 
extent to which access to the government is limited or open to diverse political players. 
Following these three factors sheds some light on the shape of party system in analyzed 
countries.  
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The parliamentary campaigns held between 1997 and 2005 in Poland are an example of 
wholesale alternation (Mair, 2002) where every election resulted in displacing parties from 
their position as incumbent. This pattern was also frequently echoed in the Polish party 
system in the early 90s. Germany on the other hand provides a more complex picture in that 
respect. During the 1998 parliamentary elections the country experienced a wholesale 
alternation (with Social Democrats and the Greens displacing incumbents CDU/CSU and 
Liberals), the 2002 Bundestag election were marked by non-alternation and those held in 
2005 by partial alternation. Throughout decades Germany however very often represented a 
partial alternation, just to give an example of governments between 1969 and 1998 when FDP 
played a pivotal role in SPD or CDU/CSU governments.   
 
Similtaneoulsy, Polish and German party systems differ not only in their patterns of 
alternation, but also in the degree of innovation and familiarity (whether or not a given 
party/combination of parties has governed before in that particular format) of alternative 
governing formulae.  In the last three parliamentary campaigns in Germany analyzed in this 
study the governing formula was rather familiar (as the core parties CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, 
the Greens remain present in Bundestag). In Poland the patterns were more complex. Polish 
party landscape frequently experienced experiments with new formulas and new coalition 
alliances. The case of AWS proves to be a good illustration in that respect. AWS, the party 
that won parliamentary elections in 1997, within four years of governing literally vanished 
from the political scene, a scenario that would be hard to imagine for major German Christian 
party.  
 
The third distinction made my Mair (2002) refers to the range of parties which gain access to 
government showing whether the structure of party competition is closed or open. This is yet 
another difference between Germany and Poland. The German party system is relatively 
closed and thus governing alternatives can be rather predicted. Over the last decades the 
German governments were regularly composed by CDU/CSU, FDP, the Greens or SPD. PDS 
continues to play the role of “outsider” with no access to governmental offices. In a quite 
different manner, Polish party system is far more open and thus more unpredictable. The 
parliamentary elections held between 1997 and 2005 again serve as a good example to 
illustrate this phenomenon. After the 1997 elections AWS and UW formed a right-wing 
coalition which was replaced in the 2001 Sejm election by the left-wing parties SLD/UP and 
PSL. After the 2005 parliamentary elections the coalition was formed by PiS, LPR, Self-
 54 
Defense which programmes were often contradicting. This confirms the openness of the 
Polish party system in comparison to Germany. This lack of closure is often also striking in 
other parts of post-communist Europe as well as it was, among others, in Spain and Portugal 
through to the 1980s (Mair, 2002).  
 
Simultaneously, it has to be mentioned that parties in both countries differ in the manner of 
selecting coalition partners. In Poland the political heritage is still often a vital criterion for 
creating government. Parties which derive their political roots from the anti-communist 
opposition refuse to create any coalitions with post-Communist (as in case of PiS for 
example). In Germany this problem is rather absent and can be only partly seen in excluding 
PDS from the governmental coalitions.  
 
And finally, it should be also stressed that political parties in both countries differ in their 
structural and organizational background40. A comparison between membership rates in 
Germany and Poland proves substantial disproportion. While political groupings like SPD or 
CDU have approximately 600 000 members each, it is more than all current major Polish 
parties have altogether. As indicated earlier, Social Democrats in Poland estimated the 
number of their supporters at 150 000 whereas PSL at 140 000. Other right-wing parties 
usually have about 10 000 members41. These structural differences undoubtedly affect the 
scope of political communication methods in each country.  
 
2.2. Comparing Electoral Systems 
 
The electoral system is the ultimate symbol of modern democracies. Elections, by enacting 
citizens’ right to choose by who they are to be governed, lie at the very heart of each 
representative democratic order. The importance of free elections can be also observed in the 
context of post-Soviet countries’ transformation. Those of them aspiring to membership in EU 
structures would need to establish democratically elected representative chambers, as 
indicated in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and other official documents of the European 
Union. The following paragraphs intend to compare the electoral systems in Germany and 
                                               
40
 However, in this context it should be stressed that political parties in both Poland and Germany receive 
financial support in a form of state subsidies. For more information regarding organizational background, 
particularly financing of political parties consult Wettig-Danielmeier, Linnekugel & Wettig (2005); Lisicka 
(2005).  
41
 It should be however remembered that Germany’s population is twice as numerous as in Poland. Still, the 
disproportion between party memberships is substantial. 
 55 
Poland, commenting on how they operate. The electoral system as such can be understood as 
a body of legal rules, regulating the right to elect, the right to be elected as well as general 
voting principles and methods employed in organizing elections (Żukowski, 2003). This 
analysis focuses rigidly on the very nature of the electoral system. Again, the study offers a 
country-based description followed by a comparative perspective.  
 
2.2.1. Electoral System in Poland  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997 stipulates in its Article 4 that 
“supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation. The Nation shall 
exercise such power directly or through their representatives”. With regard to the 
parliamentary elections the Basic Law states that “elections to the Sejm shall be universal, 
equal, direct and proportional and shall be conducted by secret ballot” (Art. 96 (2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland). Deputies shall be representatives of the Nation. They 
shall not be bound by any instructions of the electorate (Art. 104 (1) of the Basic Law). 
Similarly as in Germany, citizens articulate their will through the system of representative 
democracy.  
 
The political system in Poland, similarly as in Germany, is based on the centrality of the 
party. National elections in Poland are held every four years to determine the representatives 
to the Parliament which is the most important legislative body on the national level. 
Simultaneously political players have to cross the electoral threshold (5% for parties, and 8% 
for coalition election committees) in order to be represented in Sejm. These legal restrictions 
prevent, as to be discussed in the next paragraphs, uncontrolled proliferation of parties 
receiving parliamentary seats (Żukowski, 2003; Antoszewski, 2002).   
 
Sejm members – in contrast to parliamentary representatives in Germany – are not the only 
officials directly elected by the public to the Polish Parliament. According to the Article 187 
of the The Act of 12th April 2001 on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to 
the Senate of the Republic of Poland also Senat members (equivalent of Bundesrat in 
Germany) are elected directly by Poles42. It is worth mentioning that the electoral law related 
to presidential elections in both countries is different as well. President of Poland is chosen in 
                                               
42
 Poland’s Parliament comprises two chambers. Elections to Sejm and Senat are conducted jointly on the same 
day.  
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universal, equal, direct, secret elections (Articles 2-6 of the The Act of 27th September, 1990 
on Election of the President of the Republic of Poland) whereas in Germany the president is 
elected by the Federal Convention (Bundesversammlung). 
 
According to the Article 160 (1) of the The Act of 12th April 2001 on Elections to the Sejm of 
the Republic of Poland and to the Senate of the Republic of Poland Polish citizens entitled to 
vote cast only one ballot for Sejm candidates. A voter casts a vote for only one constituency 
list by putting an “x” mark in the box on the ballot paper, indicating only one name of 
candidate on the list. In so doing voters indicate priority for a given candidate in the allocation 
of seats. In contrast to Germany, a postal ballot is not indicated in Polish electoral law. This 
issue exerts also influence of the voter turnout in Poland. As noted by Żukowski (1999) the 
voting absence may be classified enforced or due to own fault. In this particular case one may 
talk about enforced voting absence as certain Polish citizens do not have an opportunity to 
cast a ballot due to physical disability, work responsibilities etc. As noted by Zbieranek 
(2005) the Polish electoral law is one of the most conservative in Europe. The Polish voter 
needs to cast a ballot in the polling station. The only exception is made to the very limited 
number of voters present in hospitals, residential nursing homes. However this exception does 
not refer to disabled and old citizens who stay at their homes due to physical constraints and 
cannot participate in elections43. The postal ballot could have been introduced to the Polish 
electoral law in 2004 while legal measures concerning European Parliament was established. 
However due to numerous technical shortcomings the amendments were not accepted 
(Zbieranek, 2005:7).  
  
It is also noteworthy to have a closer look at the methods concerning the implementation of 
legal measures related to electoral system. Benoit & Hayden (2004) examined the institutional 
change in Poland between 1989 and 2001 arguing that Polish electoral law can be described 
not as policy-seeking but rather as office-seeking. In policy-seeking explanations of electoral 
system design, electoral procedures are viewed as a result of a struggle by political parties 
with preferences for alternatives based on the expected policy outcomes or shared political 
goals/ideology. In contrast, office-seeking approach indicates that each party prefers 
legislative solutions that maximize its own share of parliamentary seats rather than those of 
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 Polish electoral law does not allow voting by a representative, a legal measure that is used in other European 
countries like France, Belgium, Holland or England.  
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any other political party44. Polish case conforms to the office-seeking model. “It should (…) 
be pointed out that the coalitions for or against various electoral law bills formed solely on the 
basis of seat maximization, even when these groupings comprised parties whose policy goals 
were incompatible. In more than one episode we saw ideologically opposed parties, such as 
the post-Solidarity Solidarity Electoral Action/AWS and the post-communist Alliance of 
Democratic Left/SLD (1997), or the liberal and urban Freedom Union/UW and the 
conservative and rural Polish Peasant Party/PSL (1997, 2001), vote in similar ways on 
electoral bills solely because they perceived a similar profile of electoral costs and benefits. 
Parties in Poland made institutional decisions above all in order to consolidate their own 
electoral positions, apparently without regard to whether this also improved the position of 
their greatest opponents or worsened the position of ideologically closer parties” (Benoit & 
Hayden, 2004:424).  
 
As noted by Wesołowski (1990:440) the Polish electoral system introduced in 1989 “was 
intended to enable the communist Party to hold power and the opposition to express 
criticism”. During the parliamentary elections in 1991 the seat allocation was based on both 
Hare-Niemeyer and Modified Sainte-Leaguë method. This electoral law had a dramatic impact 
on the shape of the political system. As a consequence numerous parties managed to enter the 
Parliament which hindered establishing stability (Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005). 
 
The electoral law introduced in 1993 weakened the proportional system. Firstly, seats were 
distributed according to d’Hondt method which privileged stronger parties. D’Hondt formula 
is considered to be one of the least proportional since it favors large parties considerably 
(Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005). The method takes the votes which were obtained by each party 
list and divides them by 1,2,3,4 etc. until all the seats are allocated. The quotas obtained are 
than ranked from the largest to the smallest, seats are distributed to the lists with the highest 
average. Secondly, the number of constituencies increased from 37 to 52 which resulted in 
lowering the number of mandates which could be gained in a given district. It also led to 
lowering the changes for mandates in case of parties with smaller voters’ support. Thirdly, 
threshold was introduced. Thus the percentage of „lost” votes for parties which did not cross 
the given threshold amounted to 34,35% in 1993, 12,4% in 1997 and 9.36% in 2001 
(Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005:70).   
                                               
44
 Office-seeking model has been observed in post-communist Hungary (Benoit & Schiemann, 2001) or Russia 
(Remington and Smith, 1996).   
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The results of parliamentary elections held in 1993 proved that limiting proportionality had 
positive impact on the shape of the party system in Poland. Only 6 parties (SLD, PSL, UD, 
UP, KPN, BBWR, and 4 representatives of German minority) entered the parliament. As 
noted by Chmaj, Sokół and Żmigrodzki (2001) the proportional system together with the 
threshold had substantial influence on the party system: the number of parties participating in 
electoral process decreased dramatically. During the 1997 parliamentary elections (seats were 
distributed according to the 1993 electoral law) the number of parties which entered the 
Parliament remained relatively low as well. Table 5 shows the number of electoral 
committees participating in parliamentary elections in Poland between 1991 and 2001 
indicating how many of them entered the Polish parliament.  
 
Table 5: Number of electoral committees in parliamentary elections in Poland 1991-2001 
Parliamentary elections Number of electoral committees  
which -  
1991 1993 1997 2001 
were participating in elections  85 25 22 15 
were able to register a national list (or as in 
case of 2001 elections, registered their lists 
in more than half of districts) 
29 11 10 9 
entered the parliament 24 6 5 7 
Source: adapted from Chmaj, M., Sokół, W, Żmigrodzki (2001:243). 
 
The 2001 parliamentary elections were based on new electoral law adopted on 12.04.2001 
which brought substantial modifications. Firstly, the law included the adoption of Modified 
Sainte- Leaguë method, which gave bigger chances to medium parties45. The Sainte- Leaguë 
method is similar to the d’Hondt method but intends to minimize the advantage of d’Hondt to 
large parties. Instead of dividing the votes received by parties by a succession of numbers 
starting with one, the Sainte- Leaguë method divides them by odd numbers (1,3,5,7, etc.). 
Again, the seats are distributed to the lists with the highest averages. In Modified Sainte- 
Leaguë, which was used in Poland, the votes were divided at first by 1.4 rather than 1. 
Consequently, it was more difficult for smaller parties to gain their first seat. Secondly, the 
national list was removed. Thirdly, the number of districts was reduced to 41.  
 
                                               
45
 That was mainly due to the fact that AWS and UW, incumbents at that time, understood that they did not 
enjoy high support from voters and thus decided to opt for legal solutions that would strengthen the 
proportionality of the voting results and strengthen their chances of success. 
 59 
Finally, the 2005 parliamentary campaign was conducted according to the electoral law 
adopted on 12.04.2001. However, the Modified Sainte- Leaguë method was again replaced by 
d’Hondt formula. Overall, as noted by (Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005:84) the introduction of the 
electoral law in Poland was conducted in a manner that should be viewed critically. It is a 
practice of adopting an important legislative document “five minutes before twelve” 
(Gebethner, 2001) which has a deeply rooted tradition in Poland. The electoral law was 
introduced “in a hurry” in 1989, in 1991, in 1993 and also in 2001. This practice, as observed 
by the authors, need not have repeated in 2001 as the legislative work started already in 1999. 
In contrast, the electoral system in Germany, as to be demonstrated in the following 
paragraphs, is characterized by a high degree of stability.  
 
2.2.2. Electoral System in Germany  
 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany stipulates in its Article 20 (2), that “all 
state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections 
and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies”. With regard 
to the elections for the German Bundestag, the Basic Law contains a few fundamental 
principles. Article 38 of the Basic Law, which forms a basis of the Federal Electoral Law, 
states as follows: “Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, 
equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people; not bound by 
orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience”. Thus eligible citizen has the 
right to vote directly for candidates, cannot be put under pressure of any kind to vote in a 
particular manner and nobody may know how she/he has voted. Each vote carries the same 
weight with respect to the final composition of the Bundestag. Elected candidates have a 
mandate to represent the interests of citizens through the system of representative democracy.  
 
Bundestag members are the only officials directly elected by the public to the German 
parliament. Elections to this legislative body are held every four years and eligible citizens 
cast two ballots (Schmidt, 2007; von Beyme, 2004). The first ballot (Erststimme) is a vote for 
a direct candidate via majority voting. The second ballot (Zweitstimme) is a vote for a 
concrete party selected on the basis of proportional representation. At the election to the 
Bundestag the voter has two options. Eligible citizens can cast his/her first vote for a 
candidate of a specific party and his/her second vote for the Land list of the same party. It is 
however also possible to cast the first vote for a candidate of a specific party and the second 
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vote for a Land list of a different party. The latter option is known as so-called splitting votes 
(Stimmensplitting). Moreover, a postal ballot is also possible since the third election in 1957. 
It is an efficient method of enabling the possibility to vote for specific group of voters, among 
them older, ill and those who cannot participate in elections due to other important reasons. 
According to Schorn & von Schwartzenberg (2005), the number of voters who prefer a postal 
ballot rises with each election and amounted to13,4% in 1994, increased to16,0% in 1998 and 
18 % in 2002.  
 
The percentage of votes acquired by each party in the second ballot verifies the number of 
seats each party gains in the Bundestag. Only if a party either receives 5% of second ballot 
votes (so-called “five percent hurdle”) or if members of that party win at least three direct 
mandates in at least three direct constituencies, it is eligible to be represented in German 
parliament. These formal requirements prevent multiplication of small representations, 
strengthen the effectiveness of policy-making and have their roots in the history of political 
system. The German electoral system which emerged after World War II was designed to 
avoid the mistakes of the Weimar period and dangers of too many parties entering the system 
and destabilizing it (Woyke, 1998; Nohlen, 2007). Since reunification of Germany there was a 
temporary change of the threshold rule during the 1990 elections. As Bundestag elections 
were held shortly after Germany had been reunified, the Federal Court decided that for this 
election the 5% hurdle should apply separately in the two parts of the country formerly 
divided into Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic. These amendments were 
meant to insure that smaller parties which lacked appropriate partners in the other part of 
Germany were not disadvantaged (Schmidt, 2007).  
 
The election count46 starts with constituency votes which are counted to show which 
candidate is elected and to determine the total number of constituency seats for each of the 
parties in each Land. The candidates with most votes in each constituency are elected. The 
results are often highly disproportional. As argued by Farrell (1997:92) it is usually the case 
“that only the two larger groupings, the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) and the Social 
Democrats, stand any chance of winning constituency seats”. Therefore smaller parties often 
treat the first vote as lost cause. Instead they concentrate their resources on the campaign for 
the second vote, where seats are allocated on the proportional basis. This phenomenon finds 
                                               
46
 Extensive explanation of seat allocation in Germany is offered by Schorn & von Schwartzenberg (2005).  
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its clear exemplification in methods of advertising, which has been exploited with success by 
the Free Democrats (Farrel, 1997) or the Greens.  
 
The second votes are distributed according to Niemeyer method47. It insures that the 
distribution of seats corresponds exactly to the proportional system. The seats are allocated 
among parties in proportion to the total number of second votes gained in the election in the 
whole country. Only those parties that have polled at least 5% of the second votes in entire 
Germany, or that have won at least three constituency seats on the basis of first votes can be 
considered. The aim of this restriction is to exclude potential splinter parties and in so doing 
ensure proper functioning and stability of German parliament. According to the Niemeyer 
method, the total number of parliamentary seats is multiplied by the number of second votes 
obtained individually by each party and the resulting product is then divided by the total 
number of second votes for all parties participating in seat distribution. Each party receives 
one seat for each integer accruing to it. The remaining seats are allocated in the descending 
sequence of the greatest “remainders” resulting from this calculation. In case the “remainders” 
are equal, the Federal Returning Officer draws lots to determine final seat allocation. After 
the number of seats which are to be allocated to each party in the electoral area as a whole 
(combined Land lists) has been determined, the seats obtained by each party are distributed 
among individual Lands. The seat distribution is again based on the Niemeyer calculation.  
 
The Niemeyer method is seen as an efficient means which mirrors the exact results of voting. 
It is more effective that d’Hondt method used till the 10th German elections (Schmidt, 2007). 
The exact performance of smaller parties is also evaluated in a better way (Woyke, 1998). The 
Niemeyer calculation often results in anomalities concerning the actual number of seats for 
each of the parties. It is possible for a party to obtain more constituency seats in any one Land 
than the total to which its share of votes entitles it. It is for this reason that the party may gain 
extra seats, so-called Überhangsmandate. Overhang mandates become relevant when, in a 
given Land, a party gains more direct constituency seats than it is entitled to on the basis of 
the number of second votes cast for it in that Land. Überhangsmandate were various in 
number, 1998 – there were 13 (13 for SPD), 2002 – there were 5 (1 for CDU, 4 for SPD), 
2005 -   there were 3 extra seats (1 for CDU, 1 for CSU, 1 for the Greens) (Nohlen, 2007). 
The reasons why these Überhangsmandate appear are complex and can vary from state to 
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 For more details related to seat distribution see: Schmidt (2007); Woyke (1998); Nohlen (2007).  
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state. One explanation could be the practice of Stimmensplitting, when a voter casts a first 
ballot for one political party and a second vote is given to another political formation. Via 
Stimmensplitting voters can help the party acquire a representation in Bundestag and 
overcome the 5% hurdle.  
 
2.2.3. Conclusions 
 
It cannot be questioned that Polish and German electoral rules are quite different. Firstly, 
differences between electoral law in Germany and Poland are strongly influenced by 
frequency of changes concerning legal measures. As proved by research studies (Elster, Offe 
& Preuss, 1998; Geddes 1996) the adoption of Eastern European electoral systems during the 
transition to democracy indicates that electoral design was at least partially motivated by 
partisan interests. According to Benoit & Hayden (2004) party system development in Poland 
has involved not only parties adapting to electoral institutions in each election, but also parties 
modifying these institutions prior to every election48. Electoral institutions in Poland can be 
perceived as “one element in an ongoing cycle of endogenous political competition by parties 
struggling for distributive advantage” (Benoit & Hayden, 2004:397). Every parliamentary 
elections since 1989 in Poland meant contest among political players to modify the electoral 
law and resulted in frequently changing legal measures in the period between 1989 and 2005. 
This is not the case in Germany when the electoral law is characterized by a stability of legal 
measures and seat allocation is based on the Niemeyer method which followed the d’Hondt 
method used till the 10th German elections.  
 
Secondly, both countries use different seat allocation measures. The Niemeyer method applied 
in German parliamentary elections is seen as an efficient means which mirrors the exact 
results of voting (Woyke, 1998). The d’Hondt formula used in Poland is the least proportional 
and most favorable to large parties49. Still, the main difference between both countries should 
be rather seen in the voting possibilities for German and Polish citizens. Voters in Germany 
are in much better position in that respect: they can vote for a concrete candidate and use the 
tactics of Stimmensplitting to indicate his/her coalition preferences. Additionally, the presence 
of postal ballot broadens the spectrum of German voters when they cannot cast a ballot in a 
                                               
48
 For details see: Gebethner (1996, 1997).  
49
 Hare/Hare-Niemayer system secures the highest proportionality, followed by the Modified Sainte-Laguë, 
Sainte-Laguë and - the least proportional - d’Hondt method.  
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polling station. Polish voters are deprived of those two important elements of electoral 
system. First, they basically vote for a party list, which does not always mean that a candidate 
they supported will be elected even if a party received parliamentary seats. Second, Polish 
voters do not have a possibility to manifest their preferences concerning possible coalition 
partners. And third, the lack of postal ballot might be one of the reasons explaining low 
political participation in Poland. The design of Polish electoral system is still to a considerable 
extent under transformation and influenced by bargaining situation among self-interested 
political actors in the transition process.  
 
Finally, while discussing differences in Polish and German electoral system one should also 
refer to legal measures that regulate political campaigning. This issue needs to be addressed in 
light of the fact that the empirical part of this study scrutinizes, among others, political ads. In 
that respect, legal solutions again mark substantial differences between Poland and Germany. 
Both Poland and Germany belong to the group of countries in which political parties are given 
free time on public television and are also allowed to purchase time in both public and private 
broadcasting outlets. However, they differ in amount of time allocated to political groupings. 
In Germany, political parties were assigned a number of 5- to 10-minute slots on public 
television when political advertising was introduced in 1957. However, over the last decades 
the time for each individual slot was continuously reduced. Currently each ad cannot exceed 
90 seconds when showed as free broadcast on public television (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). 
In Poland, political ads are longer when compared to their German counterparts. During the 
elections held between 1997 and 2005 the commercials lasted up to approximately 8 minutes. 
However, the length of unpaid broadcasts showed on public television has already been 
shortened to 30 minutes blocks in 2007 and each grouping was forced to present 
advertisements that only slightly exceeded 2 minutes. Overall, in both countries one may 
notice the tendency towards shortening free broadcast time, which can be also observed in 
other democracies (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). In sum, different regulations concerning the 
spots’ length undoubtedly open Polish and German parties varying opportunities to address 
the electorate via television channels, which is to be verified in Chapter 6.  
 
2.3. Comparing Political Participation 
 
Democracy would be unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate in the governing 
process. Thus different forms of political participation have been continuously scrutinized by 
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political scientists (e.g. Verba & Nie, 1972; Barnes & Kaase, 1979) interested in reasons for 
civic engagement and its consequences. Within various indicators of political participation, 
three have been frequently addressed by the academic community. Firstly, the study of voting 
turnout has gained much attention due to its centrality in influencing the electoral outcomes. 
Secondly, participation in party campaigning and parties’ activities is one of the most often 
examined fields of political research since it indicates the level of citizens’ involvement. 
Thirdly, considerable interest continues to be directed at membership in political parties or 
institutions and associations, which characterizes activeness in political sphere but also in 
other social spheres. The next paragraphs discuss in detail these three indicators and compare 
the scope of political participation in Poland and Germany.  
 
2.3.1. Political Participation in Poland 
 
The participation in election campaigns in Poland is much lower when compared to 
Germany. Generally, the willingness to participate in the Polish political life is sinking. 
During the parliamentary elections held in 1991 only 43.20% of Polish citizens eligible to 
vote decided to cast a ballot. The voter turnout was disappointingly low given the fact that the 
Poles had an opportunity to choose their candidates independently. During the 1993 
parliamentary elections the percentage of voters reached 52.08%, which is the best result in 
the whole 1991-2005 period. The three election campaigns, which are a subject of this 
analysis, brought each time lower participation and amounted to 47.93% in 1997, compared to 
46,29% in 2001 and  40.57% in 2005. What is also quite interesting is that there are, similarly 
as in Germany, substantial differences in voters’ participation in East and West regions of the 
country, where East regions remain more passive (PKW, 2007). It should be remembered that 
although the Poles rejected communism, the socialist mindset on social welfare issues formed 
and strengthened in the communist era would remain present also in post-communist politics. 
Homo sovieticus would be reflected in the voters’ choice and supporting post-communist 
parties during General Elections in Poland. Additionally, Polish voters may have difficulty 
when it comes to casting a ballot as political groupings are often not recognized. This problem 
is further aggregated by politicians who often change their political affiliation and thus 
confuse the voters.50 
                                               
50
 Party members frequently change their political groupings; this is particularly visible in the development of 
the right-wing parties in Poland. Polish press has ironically argued that this phenomenon can be compared to 
seasonal transfers which could be previously observed only in sports.  
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The election campaigns on the local level also indicate limited political participation. In that 
respect Poland generally undergoes the same trends as Germany. Firstly, participation in local 
elections is lower than in General Elections. Secondly, participation in Sejm- European and 
communal- elections varies among Polish regions - voters’ turnout which is usually higher in 
Western parts of Poland (PKW, 2007). Overall, Polish society is not interested in politics. If 
one explores the attitude of voters towards politics, there is a substantial lack of trust in parties 
and dissatisfaction with the development of democracy in Poland. Criticism of the democratic 
practices in Poland is accompanied by a belief that the transformation of the Polish political 
system is not particularly advanced (CBOS, 2006a).  
 
There is hardly any data concerning participation in party campaigning and parties’ activities 
as research studies do not address this issue. However, it can be expected that the level of 
participation in parties’ activities is even lower than in Germany where, as stated in the next 
paragraphs, about 5% plays active role during campaigns. There can be observed a rising 
level of dissatisfaction with politics within Polish society. According to IPSOS (2005) half of 
Poles were interested in the 2005 parliamentary campaign but only 14% followed the 
campaign with interest. Moreover, only 36% of Polish society hoped for positive changes 
after the elections, the majority (53%) did not share this view. 
 
The rates of membership in institutions and associations may also show the patterns of civic 
participation. Currently (CBOS, 2006d:9) there are 45.000 associations and 7.000 foundations 
registered in Poland. According to various CBOS surveys (2002, 2006d) the number of Polish 
respondents working voluntarily for their local community or those in need has increased 
from 19% (2002) to 23% (2006). Overall, since 1998 the percentage of Poles who spend their 
free time engaging in associations, foundations, political parties, clubs, committees or other 
remains nearly the same. The great majority of Polish citizens (77%) are not active in any 
organization. The remaining 23%, as stated in CBOS survey (2006d) engage mostly in only 
one activity (about 61%). The percentage of those active in two or more than three institutions 
is much lower and amounts to 17% and 22% respectively. Moreover, one could define certain 
“niches”51 of civic activity, which is: education system, workers’ movements, religious, sports 
and charity associations. The level of civic engagement is defines by citizens’ social 
                                               
51
 See also: Gliński & Palska (1997).  
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background. The better education experience and professional position, the more time is spent 
working in various organizations. Thus the most active group is constituted by Polish cadres 
and intelligence. Active membership is also visible among pupils, students, individuals 
closely related to Catholic Church and Poles sharing social-democratic political values 
(CBOS, 2006d:12-13). 
 
2.3.2. Political Participation in Germany 
 
The participation in election campaigns in Germany can be described as high when compared 
to other European countries and Poland. Since 1949 the rate of participation in West Germany 
reached 85.3%, which is very high as for a country where voting is not obligatory 
(LeDuc/Niemi/Norris, 2002; Norris, 2002). The same trend could have been observed also in 
election campaigns in earlier stages of German history, just to give the example of the period 
1919-1933, when on average 81% of voters decided to cast the ballot (Gabriel/Holtmann, 
2005). During Bundestagswahlen held in 1972 the participation rose and reached 91.1% of 
eligible persons. From this point, elections are marked by the sinking numbers of participating 
voters, which is also viewed as a crisis of party democracy (Wiesendahl, 1998). During first 
elections of unified Germany the percentage of voters reached 74.5%. This is an interesting 
phenomenon, when one bears in mind that the moment of reunification built an important 
point of departure for the future development of the country. The relatively low number of 
voters can be seen as an indicator of relatively small interest in political sphere. The last three 
election campaigns, which are a subject of this analysis, bring following outcomes: 1998 – 
82,3%; 2002 – 79,1%, 2005 – 77,7%. What is also quite interesting is that there are 
substantial differences in voters’ participation in East and West regions of Germany. In 
Western part the participation is quite stable, in Eastern part it decreased in the large extent. 
This is perceived as an indication of better institutionalization of democratic habits in West 
Lands (Gabriel/Holtmann, 2005).  
 
Simultaneously, German elections on the local level indicate three main trends 
(Gabriel/Holtmann, 2005). Firstly, the participation is lower than on the national level. 
Secondly, the intensity of participation in local elections has a similar rhythm as those held on 
the Bundestag level– till mid 70s there could have been observed a rising participation, from 
this point gradual decrease. Thirdly, participation in Landtag-, European and communal- 
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elections in new Lands of Germany is much lower than in the Western parts (Andersen & 
Woyke, 2003).  
 
Yet another exemplification of political engagement in Germany is mirrored in participation 
in party campaigning and parties’ activities. Verba/Nie (1972) rightly point out, this form of 
engagement requires more effort than simply casting a ballot. No wonder that intense political 
activity attract fewer citizens. German citizens active in party campaigning and parties’ 
activities can be perceived as a minority. According to research studies 20% of respondents 
declare as taking part in political action groups, and 5% plays active role during election 
campaigns (Gabriel/Holtmann, 2005). Compared to other Western European countries, the 
activity of German population in party-related sphere German is placed in the middle of the 
rank (Gabriel & Holtmann, 2005).  
 
When one analyzes membership in political parties among German population, it is lower 
than in some other European countries (Widfeldt 1995; Norris 2002). Generally speaking the 
rates of membership rose slowly after the Second World War, when the majority of 
population was not willing to participate in political parties. That was due to the historical 
past as well as hard economic situation in the early years after 1945. With the economy 
development and improvement of living conditions, German citizens became more active. 
This was not only demonstrated in the rates of participation in election campaigns but in rates 
of membership in political parties as well. Between 60s and 70s the number of party members 
doubled and started to fall down in 1983. Similar tendencies could have been seen in the rates 
of voters. Currently nearly two million German citizens belong to political party (Rudzio, 
2006; Gabriel/Niedermayer/Stöss, 2002).  
 
The rates of membership in other institutions and associations also shed some light on 
patterns of civic participation. According to data collected in 2005 there are 594.277 
associations registered in Germany (V&M Service, 2005). The German citizen most often 
engages in the activity concerning sport and free time. It should be mentioned that 
membership in associations is much lower in East Germany when compared to Western 
Lands (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). This phenomenon can be explained when one refers to the 
different political development proceeding decades before reunification. In old Bundeslands 
beginning from 1945 average citizen had a vast opportunity to engage in social activities. In 
Eastern part, similarly as in communist Poland, mass organizations were centrally coordinated 
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by the totalitarian regime. What it meant practically, is that citizens could not freely join 
associations that correspond with their needs. After reunification high rates of unemployment, 
again similarly as in Poland, contribute to lower interest in social participation.   
 
2.3.3. Conclusions 
 
While comparing Germany and Poland it is useful to refer to Lester W. Milbrath (1965) who 
makes an interesting analogy between political participation and gladiators’ spectacles in the 
classic era. He distinguishes between apathetics, who remain uninvolved in electoral activity 
and have general disinterest in political sphere; spectators, who may support a candidate but 
are only minimally involved in politics; and gladiators, highly committed, who live and 
breathe their activism. Political research proves that this last group is by far the smallest and 
the roles participants take are quite stable (Almond and Verba, 1965). This metaphor is 
particularly useful as it shows a continuum from the inactivity to intense political 
participation. Between these two extremes, there is a wide repertoire of civic engagement 
components. What is particularly interesting is the behavior of spectators who build the core 
of the civic society. 
 
If one were to refer to Milbrath’s (1965) analogy between contemporary political participation 
and gladiators’ spectacles from the classic era, it could be said that gladiators in Poland are 
more rare than in Germany. Particularly worrying is the substantial number of apathetics, who 
remain uninvolved in electoral activity. The lower political participation in Poland is however 
not only a product of citizen’s mindset and passiveness. It is also the result of the prevailing 
shape (and condition) of party and electoral system that hinders citizens from their activism.  
 
Political participation is the lifeblood of democracy vitally contributing to the shape of 
political system. The comparison between Germany and Poland shows that both countries 
differ in their intensity of their citizens’ engagement. The weaker civic engagement in Poland 
can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, one can refer to cultural factors resulting from the 
communist period and embracing inter alia collapse of civic and democratic traditions, 
negative connotations attributed to such terms as social work. Secondly, mentality factors 
may also play a certain role and find its exemplification in the lack of belief that one may 
influence local environment, the lack of faith in effectiveness of civic initiatives (CBOS, 
2000), negative perception of the Polish political scene and political parties. Thirdly, macro-
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structural elements hindering civic engagement should be also taken into account: Poland still 
lacks well developed “new middle class” which is perceived as a social and financial 
supporter of non-governmental sector. And finally, legal52, financial and organizational 
support from the Polish state administration is still insufficient.  
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 For instance, tax law concerning NGOs. 
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Chapter 3 | Comparing Media Systems 
 
 
This Chapter offers a comparison of media systems in Germany and Poland based on the 
framework provided by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). Such a comparison sheds some light on 
the main similarities and differences between both countries’ media landscape showing the 
potential consequences for the functioning of the political communication in a given society. 
The following paragraphs are organized round outlining the main patterns of the Polish and 
German media system with particular attention given to the analysis of the newspaper market 
in the context of such dimensions as: newspaper industry, political parallelism, and 
journalistic professionalization.  
 
3.1. Three Models of Media and Politics 
 
Hallin & Mancini (2004a) were particularly interested in analyzing the historical development 
of media systems as institutions within particular social setting. More specifically, they 
intended to show what roles media played in political, social and economic life and how they 
interacted with other social institutions. The authors proposed a framework for comparing 
media systems and a set of concepts derived from comparative politics and political sociology 
showing its importance for the shape of media systems. In so doing Hallin & Mancini (2004a) 
identified three distinct models both by the geographical region in which they function and by 
the essential elements of their political system. These two aspects – geographical location and 
political setting – are seen as “crucial to understanding the distinctive characteristics that mark 
the media-politics relationship” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:69). Building on the survey of 
media institutions in eighteen West European and North American democracies, the authors 
propose the typology of media systems - the Polarized Pluralist, the Democratic Corporatist 
and the Liberal Model – based on four dimensions: (1) the development of media market, with 
particular emphasis on the development of a mass circulation press; (2) political parallelism, 
which describes the nature of relations between media and political parties; (3) development 
of journalistic professionalism, and finally (4) the degree and nature of state intervention in 
the media system. The main pattern of variation of four media system dimensions is 
summarized in Table 6. In this context it should be stressed that proposed models represent 
certain “ideal types” and do not intend to fully reflect the complexity of media landscape in 
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each analyzed country. The following paragraphs outline the essential characteristics of 
proposed typology which, in the next step, becomes a point of departure for the analysis of 
Polish and German media system.  
 
Table 6: Three Models of Media and Politics  
 Mediterranean or 
Polarized Pluralist 
Model 
___________________ 
France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain 
Northern European or 
Democratic 
Corporatist Model 
___________________ 
Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland 
 
North Atlantic or 
Liberal Model 
 
___________________ 
Britain, United States, 
Canada, Ireland 
Newspaper Industry Low newspaper 
circulation; elite 
politically oriented press 
High newspaper 
circulation; early 
development of mass-
circulation press 
Medium newspaper 
circulation; early 
development of mass-
circulation commercial 
press 
Political Parallelism High political 
parallelism; external 
pluralism, commentary-
oriented journalism; 
parliamentary or 
government model of 
broadcast governance – 
politics-over-
broadcasting systems 
External pluralism 
especially in national 
press; historically strong 
party press; shift toward 
neutral commercial 
press; politics-in-
broadcasting system 
with substantial 
autonomy 
 
Neutral commercial 
press; information-
oriented journalism; 
internal pluralism (but 
external pluralism in 
Britain); professional 
model of broadcast 
governance – formally 
autonomous system 
Professionalization Weaker 
professionalization 
Strong 
professionalization; 
institutionalized self-
regulation 
 
Strong 
professionalization; 
noninstitutionalized 
self-regulation 
Role of the State in 
Media System 
Strong state 
intervention; press 
subsidies in France and 
Italy; periods of 
censorship; “savage 
deregulation” (except 
France) 
Strong state intervention 
but with protection for 
press freedom; press 
subsidies, particularly 
strong in Scandinavia; 
strong public-service 
broadcasting  
 
Market dominated 
(except strong public 
broadcasting in Britain, 
Ireland) 
Adopted from: Hallin & Mancini (2004a:67)  
 
The Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model is characterized by relatively small press 
circulation and newspapers tend to be elite-oriented. Freedom of the press and the 
development of commercial media were introduced relatively late. Moreover, the very 
newspapers were often dependant on the state and subsidies. Political parallelism in the 
Mediterranean Model countries is high which finds its exemplification in intense coverage on 
political life, external pluralism and commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism. There can 
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be simultaneously observed a high degree of instrumentalization of the media by the 
government and political parties. Public broadcasting tends to represent the government or 
parliamentary models. The development of journalistic professionalism is not as advanced as 
in the other models and the autonomy of journalists is often limited or becomes a subject of 
conflicts. The Polarized Pluralist Model countries are characterized by a substantial degree of 
state intervention in the media system. The state regulates to the large extent the media 
landscape exerting a wide array of functions: from funding to regulation the media. 
Simultaneously the countries representing this particular model experienced periods of 
censorship during their development. And finally, many of them were subject to so-called 
“savage deregulation” (Traquina 1995 quoted by Hallin & Mancini, 2004a) which meant 
rapid transition from state controlled to commercial broadcasting. Hallin & Mancini (2004a) 
note that countries discussed under this model (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and, with some 
exceptions, France) are marked by lasting tradition of clientalism, delayed development of 
liberalism and strong influence of the state in society. Once democratic order was established, 
political parties continued to play an important role in the media system. These characteristics 
attributable to the Mediterranean countries can be also partly seen, as to be demonstrated in 
the next paragraphs, in post-Soviet countries such as Poland.  
 
The Northern European or Democratic Corporatist Model is characterized by early 
development of mass-circulation press and very high newspaper circulation. The history of 
the media landscape has been marked by strong position of party newspapers and media 
representing various social groups. Political parallelism in countries representing the 
Democratic Corporatist Model is high. Additionally there can be noted a medium level of 
external pluralism and commentary-oriented journalism. The latter one however is evolving 
as there is a growing emphasis on neutrality and information-oriented functions of journalistic 
work. The very journalistic professionalism is high and there can be observed a high degree of 
formal organization among journalists. The Northern European Model countries are 
characterized by a significant degree of state support but simultaneously the notion of press 
freedom and social responsibility of media are deeply rooted. The media culture is 
characterized by strong advocacy tradition that sees the media as vehicles for expression of 
diverse ideologies and high commitment to common norms. Public broadcasting systems 
represent the parliamentary or civic/corporatist models but the level of autonomy in 
broadcasting remains high.  
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As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a:74) “it is important to note that a number of sets of 
media system characteristics that are often assumed to be incompatible have historically 
coexisted in the Democratic Corporatist countries. Strong commercial media industries have 
coexisted with politically linked media and a high level of political parallelism; high political 
parallelism has also coexisted with a high degree of journalistic professionalization; and a 
strong liberal tradition of press freedom and freedom of information has coexisted with strong 
state intervention in the media sector as in other sectors of society”. Countries discussed under 
this model (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland) are characterized by an early development of liberalism. Nowadays 
they are marked by moderate pluralism and by consensus politics. The characteristics of the 
Democratic Corporatist countries are applicable to Germany which is to be analyzed at greater 
length in the next paragraphs.  
 
The North Atlantic or Liberal Model is characterized by early development of mass-
circulation press and high newspaper circulation (though it is lower than in Democratic 
Corporatist countries).  Political parallelism in countries discussed under this model (Britain, 
United States, Canada, and Ireland) is low and internal pluralism takes a dominant position. 
Common professional culture of journalism is strongly developed, but not formally 
institutionalized as in the Democratic Corporatist Model societies. Journalism tends to be 
information-oriented with the exception of Britain where stronger commentary inclinations 
can be noted. Strong emphasis is placed on limiting state intervention in the media system and 
political instrumentalization. The role of the state tends to be seen in negative terms and the 
free flow of information is understood as requiring the limitation of state involvement. Public 
broadcasting reflects the professional model and remains resistant from political influence. 
Finally, countries discussed under the Liberal Model are characterized by an early 
development of liberalism. The North Atlantic societies reflect moderate pluralism and often 
tend toward majoritarianism.  
 
Hallin & Mancini (2004a:70) visualized each model as one corner of a triangle with the 
various countries located as points depending on their proximity to a given media system type 
(see Figure 1). The placement of each country represents a tentative judgment about similarity 
or difference from the ideal types represented by the three models. In this context, Germany is 
showed as sharing many characteristics with countries classified as Democratic Corporatist. 
However the fact that it was placed toward the middle of the triangle suggests that it also 
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shares certain features with other types. As concluded by the authors (2004a:71) Germany 
“shares with the Polarized Pluralist countries a history of sharp ideological conflict, has a 
more confrontational political style than the smaller Democratic Corporatist states, and, as in 
the Polarized Pluralist countries, political parties play a particularly strong role in social life, 
as they do also in the media. Similar to the Liberal systems, it lacks press subsidies and tends 
to give strong emphasis to the privileged of private ownership in much media policy”. Poland 
is not located as point in a space defined by that triangle. However, as to be showed in this 
Chapter, the country can be located somewhere below Spain and Portugal sharing much of the 
characteristics of the Polarized Pluralist model. 
 
Figure 1: Relation of Individual Cases to the Three Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
Adopted from Hallin & Mancini (2004a:70) 
 
The comparison of media systems based on dimensions proposed by Hallin & Mancini 
(2004a) enables a detailed insight into the nature and structure of media system sphere, both 
in Germany and Poland. Moreover, such a comparison sheds some light on the main 
similarities and differences between Polish and German media landscape showing the 
potential consequences for the functioning of the political communication in a given society. 
The following paragraphs outline the essential features of Polish and German media 
landscape focusing on three dimensions: newspaper industry, political parallelism, and 
journalistic professionalization. Simultaneously, the analysis concentrates predominantly on 
Polarized Pluralist 
Democratic Corporatist Liberal 
● Greece 
Spain ● ● 
              Portugal 
● Italy 
● France 
● United States 
● Canada 
● Ireland 
● United Kingdom 
● Belgium 
● Austria ● Germany 
● Netherlands 
● Switzerland 
Norway ●  
                  ● Finland 
     Denmark● 
                     ● Sweden 
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newspaper market. Other media, such as television, radio and internet are given only marginal 
attention and are discussed mainly in the context of media consumption patterns and media 
credibility. This has a number of reasons. Firstly, the empirical part of the study scrutinizes 
newspapers’ reporting on politics. Thus more detailed examination of Polish and German 
titles, mainly in the context of political parallelism and journalistic professionalism, is needed 
to provide explanation to hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Secondly, newspaper market 
serves as useful illustration of how journalistic practices are affected by the political context 
but also how forces of globalization and commercialization dramatically transformed the 
media landscape.  
 
3.2. Media System in Poland  
 
The media system in Poland has not been included in the analysis conducted by Hallin & 
Mancini (2004a) as their research concentrates on eighteen countries of Western Europe and 
North America. However, what should be also taken into account is that media systems in 
countries like Poland still undergo a process of transformation. As a consequence providing a 
typology is difficult due to dynamic changes that continuously alter the media landscape. 
Additionally, as noted by Ociepka (2006) there is still a lack of literature in conference 
languages that could be used in analyses led by international scholars. However, the authors 
close their book with some remarks about the applicability of their models to the media 
systems functioning outside of geographical sphere of the conducted study, stating: “We do 
have some very tentative ideas about how our three models might relate to other systems (…) 
The Democratic Corporatist Model, we suspect, will have particularly strong relevance for the 
analysis of those parts of Eastern and Central Europe that share much of the same historical 
development, like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states” (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004a:205).  The need for expanding the framework proposed by Hallin & Mancini 
(2004a) has already created interest among scholars urging to focus on newly established 
democracies53.  
 
Indeed, Poland shares much of the history with states seen as Democratic Corporatist Model, 
but the period of communism has had a substantial impact on the relations between politics 
and the media in the Soviet bloc countries (Jakubowicz, 2007). For this reason similarities 
                                               
53
 For instance, in April 2007 media scholars in Wrocław organized a conference “Comparing Media Systems. 
West meets East” dedicated to extending media analyses to post-communist countries.  
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with the Democratic Corporatist societies are rather of secondary importance for the analysis 
of the Polish media system. Post-communist Poland develops according to a pattern that is a 
mixture of both the Northern European and the Mediterranean models. However, Poland 
shares a much broader array of characteristics of the Polarized Pluralist Model, which 
embraces states like Greece, Portugal or Spain. This Chapter focuses on showing these 
characteristics.  
 
Greece, Portugal and Spain began their transition to liberal democracy in the 1970s and in 
each case their historical experience included periods of dictatorship. The development of 
media markets in those countries was quite weak and the media system was largely dependent 
on the state, political parties or the Church, which were hindering its development as an 
independent actor. The Carnation Revolution in Portugal (1974), death of Francisco Franco in 
Spain (1975) and the collapse of military junta in Greece (1974) marked a new period in the 
history of the Western Europe, free from authoritarian rules. From the mid 70s the 
dictatorships in Europe could be found only in its Central and Eastern parts, inter alia in 
Poland.  
 
Similarly as Southern European countries - though nearly twenty years later - Poland entered 
the path towards democratization. In Poland, as in the other Polarized Pluralist Model 
countries, liberal institutions developed quite late. For a substantial period of time the Polish 
statehood did not exist and Polish society was under continuous foreign rule; after the II 
World War the country lost its independence becoming a Soviet satellite. Polish history is 
thus marked by frequent changes between occupation and sovereignty – dictatorship and 
democracy (Paczkowski, 2005). This had vital consequences, as discussed in the next 
paragraphs, for the development of the media system. The late transition to liberal democracy 
has produced specific patterns of relationship between the media and the political systems. 
These patterns currently undergo a process of transformation. As noted by Hallin & Mancini 
(2004a:90) “the forces of globalization, commercialization, and secularization (…) are 
transforming the media across Europe”. This notion is also applicable to Poland.  
 
3.2.1. Newspaper Industry in Poland 
 
The media history in Poland is similar to that of the Polarized Pluralist countries. In contrast 
to the Northern Europe, the Mediterranean Model countries developed a weak “reading 
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culture”. The development of newspapers in Southern Europe was rather tied to the 
aristocracy rather than to trade market. As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a:91) “a true 
mass-circulation press never fully emerged in any of the Mediterranean countries”. In Poland, 
the proliferation of mass circulation press and readership was largely influenced by the 
historical context. Three partitions of the country between its neighbors erased Poland from 
the European map and Polish regions dominated by foreign rule developed at fully different 
pace, in both economic and cultural respect (Radziwiłł & Roszkowski, 1997). As a 
consequence press market was subject to different press policies implemented by Prussia, 
Habsburg Empire and Russia. While Poland regained its independence in 1918 its sovereignty 
was again denied after the II World War. As a consequence neither the economic nor the 
political conditions for a development of free media markets were present until the collapse of 
Soviet regime. Beginning from the early 90s Polish media landscape experienced a dramatic 
change which could be observed in all media sectors, among others, on newspaper market.  
 
Filas (1999, 2000, 2001, 2003) examined the Polish press market highlighting the main stages 
of its evolution since the early 90s of the XX century. The first five years of the previous 
decade were marked by changing reading habits when Poles tried to adjust to the new media 
offer. Simultaneously, emerging titles fought for their position on the market. This was 
mirrored, among others, in a spectacular carrier of the Polish daily “Gazeta Wyborcza” which 
gained a dominant position among other newspapers. As observed by Bajka (2000:136) the 
position of the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, also on the advertising market, could be seen as 
exceptional on the European scale. Other regional titles had to compete both with local 
newspapers but also with local editions of the “Gazeta Wyborcza”. In this context it is 
remarkable that in Poland national titles have much stronger position than regional press and 
this trend was intensified in the last years. As noted by Nowicki (2007) Polish regional 
newspapers can be perceived as a “great loser” and its market share is continuously 
decreasing. This is partly caused by the fact that local press is not seen as an attractive 
alternative to more universal, more informative and more complex national dailies.  
 
The first period, as identified by Filas, was followed by the stage of “uncritical trying” (which 
started approximately in 1994) when Polish readers were confronted with an increasing 
presence of foreign publishers, mainly from Germany. Weekly magazines, just to give an 
example of “Pani Domu” (Springer Verlag) or “Naj” (G+J), very quickly gained new readers 
(Filas, 1999). This new readership was however quite specific as the culture of reading was 
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replaced by the culture of “looking”, which meant consumption of short and easy materials, 
enriched with numerous photos and advertisements. As stated by Filas (1999) longer and 
more demanding texts were no longer as attractive as it used to be the case in the past.  
 
The third stage, so-called “great selection” which embraced the period between 1998 and 
2000 resulted in filling the remaining niches on the press market and rising competition 
between investors from Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy and the United States. Overall, 
press market in Poland, similarly as other media sectors, undergoes a process of 
commercialization and internationalization (Jakubowicz, 2007). Fierce competition between 
media active on international markets resulted in a strong trend toward multinational 
conglomerates. In sum, as reported by Filas (2001) Polish readership in recent years 
resembled “waving”, occurring in two or three year cycles. The culmination of those circles 
correlated with the introduction of new offers which consequently which generated more 
interest. For instance, Filas (2005) analyzed changes in the readership of the press in Poland at 
the beginning of the 21st century and showed significant enlivening of the press market in 
2003 which was inter alia connected with launching a new tabloid “Fakt” (published by Axel 
Springer Poland, similar to the German “Bild”). The “Fakt”, despite many skeptical opinions, 
contributed to broadening the circle of readership of the daily press. Simultaneously, the new 
tabloid initiated a price war between other press titles and accelerated the introduction of new 
titles onto the market (e.g.: “Nowy Dzień” published by Agora). The spectacular success of 
the “Fakt” surprised even its own publishers who estimated that its circulation would not 
reach 200 000 copies (Filas, 2005:11). 
 
The processes of internationalization were accompanied by shrinking daily press market. As 
noted by Filas (2001) in the last years of the XX century only one third of Poles read dailies 
on a regular basis. However, in contrast to countries representing the Polarized Pluralist 
Model there are no major gender differences in reading habits in Poland (Izba Prasy, 2006). 
Furthermore, decreasing readership is accompanied by small popularity of subscription to 
daily newspapers (Nowicki, 2007). As a consequence publishers aim at maximizing sale 
figures rather than creating solid relations with the readers. This leads to loosening the contact 
with newspaper consumers whose reading habits become more random and irregular. Overall, 
the readership of daily newspapers can be divided into three major groups (Filas, 2001). The 
first group includes well educated and rather wealthy “elites” which choose the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza”, the “Rzeczpospolita” or smaller regional dailies. The second group embraces 
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“masses”, usually the readers of the “Super Express”54 which mirrors the needs of a statistical 
Pole (not well educated, lives in a small city or a countryside, has a rather poor material 
status). The third group, which is quite small and tends to diminish, readers with very clear 
political beliefs which are manifested in such dailies like “Trybuna”, “Życie”55 or “Nasz 
Dziennik” (see also Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Best-selling daily newspapers in Poland 1999 and 2005 according to daily sold circulation 
(data provided by ZKDP56, figures in thousand of copies ) 
Rank Title Publisher (foreign 
capital) 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
(I-IX) 
1 Fakt  
(tabloid) 
Axel Springer 
(Germany) 
 
- - - - (417,1) 535,5 512,9 
2 Gazeta Wyborcza 
 
Agora S.A. 
(Cox – USA) 
 
443,5 457,2 458,6 420,6 417,4 436,0 457,1 
3 Super Ekspress 
(tabloid) 
Media Express 
(AB Marieberg 
from Bonnier 
group – Sweden) 
 
375,5 371,1 334,7 299,5 273,8 231,2 215,4 
4 Rzeczpospolita Presspublica 
(Orkla Press, 
Norway) 
 
215,9 203,4 199,1 188,3 186,2 183,1 183,4 
          
? Nasz Dziennik  
Circulation is not controlled by ZKDP. 
Circulation declared by newspaper: approximately 160,0 
 
6 Trybuna Ad Novum 
(Poland) 
 
51,3 50,9 46,3 34,8 28,5 23,7 22,4 
Source: Adopted from Filas (2005:10).  
Legend: figures in brackets – data does not embrace the whole year |  „-” – a given newspaper was not published  
 
Low rates of readership and press circulation can be partly attributed to the material condition 
of the majority of Polish society, which is also mirrored in book-reading habits. The number 
of published books increased from 10242 in 1990 to 19192 in 1999. But simultaneously the 
circulation sank from 175562 copies in 1990 to 78078 in 1999, which means that it sank by 
55.5% (Patrzałek, 2002:7). Apart from that, the introduction of the VAT tax on newspapers in 
2001 might have contributed to lowering the level of readers as well.  
 
But most importantly, it is television that dominates most of the time devoted to media 
consumption. Between 1995 and 1999 the number of television channels in Polish doubled 
(Filas, 1999). According to media consumption analysis conducted by StarTrack in 2001 an 
                                               
54
 Since 2003 the dominant position of the „Super Express” was replaced by the new tabloid „Fakt”.  
55
 The „Życie” has been published – with breaks - until 2004.  
56
 ZKDP (Audit Bureau of Circulations Poland) does not monitor all published newspapers in Poland. However, 
it is regarded as provider of reliable information on the size of press market.  
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average Pole spent only 12 minutes a day reading daily newspapers, which was 3.6% of the 
total time devoted to media. Only slightly better were the findings concerning magazines, an 
average Pole spent approximately 3.8% of the total time devoted to media (cited by Filas, 
2003:9). It is television that takes a dominant position in Polish media consumption patterns. 
Television is the most accessible medium in Poland, and very often the cheapest one57. 
Simultaneously, television is an easily affordable leisure activity. According to analysis 
conducted by Czapiński (2005) in 2005 32% of Polish respondents could not afford going to 
the cinema, theater or museum. Only 38% could afford to buy a book, and it is generally 
estimated that between 35% and 50% of Poles were excluded from participating in cultural 
life for financial reasons. In this sense television is a popular means of spending free time. 
Overall, an average Pole spends 4 hours and 6 minutes (Okrój, 2006) in front of the TV screen 
a day, compared to 3 house and 40 minutes (Ridder & Engel, 2005) in Germany58. Popularity 
of television programmes is also mirrored in the high sales figures of the tv-guides on the 
weekly newspapers market (Filas, 2003:21). And finally, newspaper market faces competition 
from the rising role of new media, particularly internet. The internet access is continuously 
rising and is a privilege of approximately 40% of Polish households. Nevertheless, it is still 
ranked far beyond the average (54%) noted for the European Union (Smihily, 2007). Internet 
use shapes the patterns of media consumption59, especially among younger generations which 
do not have strong reading habits.   
 
3.2.2. Political Parallelism in Poland 
 
The media landscape in Poland, similarly as in the Mediterranean countries, is relatively 
strongly politicized and the level of political parallelism is seen as high. Furthermore, 
journalists tend to stress the need for a commentary function and newspapers represent 
distinct political identities60. Under the communist rule the media were expected to serve 
                                               
57
 According to TVP (2007), 60% of the individual recipients do not pay fee. Moreover, fees in Poland (49.3 
EUR per year) are much lower than in most EU countries (e.g. Austria – 244 EUR per year, Germany – 204 
EUR per year).  
58
 Overall, Germans from the new Lands and Poles from the Eastern part of Poland tend to watch television more 
extensively which can be partly explained by their poorer material status.  
59
 For instance, rising interest in new media, resulted in establishing e-editions of various press titles in order to 
gain new readers.  
60
 As indicated earlier, Chapter 3 discusses mainly the newspaper market. However, political parallelism is 
clearly visible in public broadcasting which tends to be politicized in the Mediterranean countries and also in 
Poland. Beginning from the 90s Polish public television has frequently faced accusations of having a clear 
political leaning. Additionally, every new government would interfere into the functioning of regulatory bodies 
such as KRRiTV. See: Jakubowicz (2007); Ociepka (2003).     
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political ends. Both press and television functioned as a platform for the articulation of 
communist policy. When Poland regained its independence in 1989 the media was of vital 
importance for the democratization processes. As a consequence, in Poland the press often 
played an activist role and mobilized the readership. This was especially the case at the 
beginning of the 90s. Polish journalists are often politically engaged; sometimes they become 
politicians during their professional carrier. One can refer to the words of Albert (1983) who 
described French journalism as “a journalism of expression rather than a journalism of 
observation” (quoted by Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:98). This is also true for Poland where 
precedence is often given to the commentary aspects that reflect the political roots of a given 
newspaper.  
 
As Hallin & Mancini (2004a:27) point out: “one of the most obvious differences among 
media systems lies in the fact that media in some countries have distinct political orientations, 
while media in other countries do not. Ask anyone who follows politics closely to give you a 
road map of the press, and, in many European countries, they are likely to move on fairy 
quickly to identifying newspapers by their political orientations”. The media in Poland are 
differentiated politically which means that there are no longer one-to-one connections 
between the media and concrete particular parties, but rather with general political tendencies. 
For example, the „Gazeta Wyborcza” is a paper of the right-center, not narrowly of the Civic 
Platform (PO). The „Trybuna” is a paper of left-center, not narrowly of the Social Democrats 
(SLD). Modern Polish newspaper is in a way an institution of an urban, democratic and 
capitalist social order.  
 
Pisarek (quoted by Bajka, 2000:58-59) proposes a typology of Polish journalists consisting of 
three groups: 1) fighters (bojownicy), 2) disc jockeys (diskdzokeje) and 3) craftsmen 
(rzemieślnicy). The first group embraces journalists who write positively only about issues 
they consider right. If they find certain matters wrong their journalistic coverage is fully 
negative. Fighters are usually round 40, have anticommunist affiliation, their political 
believes can be summarized as right-wing political orientation. However, this group embraces 
also old journalists who passionately support the post-communist forces. The second group 
includes young journalists who perceive their work as entertaining the audience; they are 
usually working in yellow journalism, sport newspapers and most of all – for radio stations. 
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And finally the third group is constituted by professionals with a very strong sense of media 
responsibility, the craftsmen represent mainly the older generations. As noted by Pisarek 
fighters and craftsmen dominated in the 90s of the XX century and were then gradually 
replaced by a new generation of disc jockeys.  
 
In this context it is noteworthy to discuss the profiles of the daily press to be analyzed in this 
study, namely: the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the “Rzeczpospolita” and the “Super Express”. While 
journalists writing for the tabloid “Super Express” can be regarded as Pisarek’s disc jockeys, 
the editorial offices of both quality newspapers are populated with both fighters and 
craftsmen, who influence the content and style of media reporting on politics.  
 
The “Gazeta Wyborcza” (Electoral Gazette) started in 1989 as an eight-page newspaper and 
the first issue sold 150 thousand copies61. Its founding was an outcome of Polish Round Table 
agreement (porozumienie Okrąglego Stołu) between the communist government and political 
opponents centered round the Solidarity movement. The title was prepared by opposition 
journalists, including its editor-in-chief Adam Michnik, who until the 90s worked for the 
underground press. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” was the first legally published independent daily 
title which soon emerged as the leader on the press market. Until now it remains one of the 
nation’s key opinion-forming publications in Poland. Media analysis led by Instytut 
Monitorowania Mediów showed that the title was most frequently quoted by media in Poland 
and with the record of 15 096 quotations (Agora.pl, 2007) it was ranked before other opinion-
making daily the “Rzeczpospolita”. For a long time, the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was the best-
selling daily newspaper in the country; however the leader position was overtaken by the 
tabloid “Fakt” which emerged in 2003. As showed in Table 7, the “Gazeta Wyborcza” is 
characterized by circulation which in 2005 reached nearly half a million copies. The title is 
published by Agora S.A. which is listed on Warsaw and London stock exchanges since 1999.  
 
When it comes to political sympathies of the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the newspaper’s profile 
becomes more complex. From the moment of its founding the title served as the spokesman of 
the Solidarity camp, especially before the semi-free parliamentary elections held in June 
1989. As such, it was and remains critical in its assessment of post-communist formations. 
Currently the daily can be seen as broadly center-left in tone and supportive to the mainstream 
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 As explained by the newspaper, due to the limited access to paper provided by the state.  
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political and economic changes started in the 90s. Nevertheless, the title has been also subject 
to criticism evoked by the type of coverage which was said to lack neutrality, objectivity and 
be adjusted to political stance of the editorial office. It was also claimed (Ziemkiewicz, 2006) 
that the “Gazeta Wyborcza” intended to monopolize public opinion and manipulated the facts.  
 
The “Rzeczpospolita” was reestablished62 in 1991 and published by French-Polish joint-
venture Presspublica S.A. In 1996 Orkla Media acquired 51% of shares of Presspublica S.A. 
The title soon emerged as reliable source of information and opinion-generating newspaper. 
Due to its thematic profile – mirrored in an expanded business and law sections – the daily is 
considered a leader in providing economic and legal information. Thus readers of the 
“Rzeczpospolita” are recruited mainly among managers and entrepreneurs and also valued 
employees of public administration, lawyers, specialists and freelancers. Its elitist character 
was, until 2007, demonstrated in its broadsheet format. Similarly as the “Gazeta Wyborcza” 
the title belongs to the most trusted and quoted Polish media, however its readership is 
smaller. As indicated in Table 7, on average the circulation of the “Rzeczpospolita” does not 
exceed 200 000 copies. However, the title is read by the majority of Polish managers and, 
most importantly, a large part of its circulation is sold in subscriptions. The political 
orientation of the “Rzeczpospolita” can be defined as moderately conservative. Though the 
title used to be rather critical towards post-communist formations in the past, it currently does 
not openly favor any party within Polish political landscape. Overall, the “Rzeczpospolita” 
can be characterized by more neutral journalism than the “Gazeta Wyborcza”.  
 
Finally, the “Super Express” was established on the wave of privatization of titles which 
belonged to RSW “Prasa-Książka-Ruch”. The newspaper was first published in 1991 and 
soon emerged as one of the best-selling Polish dailies. In 1995 the tabloid underwent a 
process of internationalization acquiring Swedish capital from Tidnings AB Marieberg from 
Bonnier group63. The position of “Super Express” was undermined by the emergence of the 
“Fakt” which dominated the press market. In 2005 the “Super Express” had a circulation of 
215 000 copies being the third biggest newspaper in Poland. The tabloid describes itself as a 
newspaper for those who do not expect serious articles. Instead “Super Express” tends to 
focus on life of ordinary people and is sensationalist in its content. As such, it can be 
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 The first newspaper of that title was first published in Poland already in 1920. After World War II the 
“Rzeczpospolita” was reestablished as an organ of the communist government. The title resumed its existence as 
an independent daily in the 90s.   
63
 In 2006 Swedish media group Bonnier sold its shares to financial investors.  
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compared to the “Bild”. Nevertheless, the Polish tabloid generally shows smaller interest in 
politics than its German equivalent.  
 
3.2.3. Journalistic Professionalization in Poland 
 
As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) the level of journalistic professionalism in the 
Mediterranean countries is lower when compared to the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist 
countries. The authors stress that “the political and literary roots of journalism were deeper, 
and the political connections persisted much longer. Limited development of media markets 
meant that newspapers were smaller and less likely to be self-sustaining. And state 
intervention, particularly in periods of dictatorship, interrupted the development of journalism 
as a profession” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:110). In contrast, Polish journalism has a strong 
advocacy tradition, neatly connected with the history of the institutional ties between the 
media and the political system. In the communist period, despite an official ideology that 
conceived the media as instruments of the party, Polish journalists developed strong 
professional culture (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). They had a strong sense of distinct identity 
and of a distinct role in society. They placed a high value on autonomy and had a sense of 
solidarity.  
 
However, the development of journalistic professionalization is hindered often by structural 
elements, such as, for instance, weak journalists’ organizations and limited membership in 
journalistic unions. In the early 90s of the XX century there were more than 11000 journalists 
in Poland. 10 years later their number doubled, some authors speak even of 25000 journalists 
(Bajka 2000:42). The only group that can be adequately measured is the one that embraces 
professionals who are members in various journalistic associations and institutions. It is 
estimated (Bajka 2000:42) that more than 10000 journalists belong to some journalistic 
associations, however about 40% of this group are journalists who retired. Until the 
introduction of the martial law nearly all Polish journalists were members of the same 
institution Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich, SDP), 
which was suspended and than solved in the early 80s. In 1982 the communist government 
founded a new association, Association of PRL64 Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy 
PRL) which was then renamed Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy RP in 1991. Simultaneously, 
                                               
64
 PRL stands for Polish People’s Republic and was the official name of Poland during the communist period. 
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Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich) functioned as an 
underground association and was officially reregistered in 1989. As reported by Bajka 
(2000:43) Association of Journalists of RP (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy RP) embraces 7500 
journalists whereas Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich) 
has approximately 1500 members. Other journalistic associations have much lower 
membership, e.g. Catholic Association of Journalists (Katolickie Stowarzyszenie 
Dziennikarzy) embraces approximately 500 journalists. Simultaneously the cooperation 
between journalists’ association is rather weak which stimulates the weakness of the 
journalistic environment. Divided associations are not viewed as a partner by the parliament 
and other state authorities (Bajka, 2000:44).  
 
The media transformation had also contributed to changes within the journalistic profession. 
In the early 90s of the XX century Polish journalism experienced a “generation shift”. More 
than 1500 journalists left their newsrooms at the beginning of the transition process. This was 
mainly due to the political reasons, in some cases, as reported by Bajka (2000) older 
generation of journalists had difficulties adjusting to the introduction of modern technologies 
(e.g. computerization). Also the abolition of censorship made the work of more experienced 
journalists difficult. As noted by Bajka (2000) experienced journalist could easily recognize 
new forms of censorship (owners, political forces, Catholic church etc.) which “did not make 
him/her feel better” (Bajka, 2000:45). Young journalists contributed to founding numerous 
editorial officies, e.g. local headquarters of the “Gazeta Wyborcza” or the “Super Ekspress” 
and entered emerging radio (RFM FM, Radio Zet etc.) and television (mainly TVN) stations. 
Many of those newcomers became professionals however many of them faced accusations 
concerning their lack of knowledge65, professionalism and responsibility (Bajka 2000).   
 
One of the most important patterns of development is the use of media by numerous actors to 
influence the political domain. Generally journalistic autonomy is lower in the Mediterranean 
countries compared with both Democratic Corporatist and the Liberal countries. According to 
survey conducted by Bajka (2000) among Polish journalists 7% of respondents claimed that 
they always write and say what they think. However, 93% of respondents stated that they 
usually express their own views but it happens that they have to promote the ideas of the 
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 In the early 90s of the XX century many newcomers did not finish journalism studies; some of them did not 
even graduated from universities. Nevertheless, graduates of journalism studies are currently a large part of the 
journalistic environment in Poland.  
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others which are partly or fully contradictive to their own views. Reasons for limiting freedom 
of expression varied. 42% of respondents mentioned the pressure of the media owners, chief 
editor-in-chief or direct supervisor. 19% claimed that they encounter internal censorship and 
were not allowed to write negatively about certain political forces or major advertisers. 11% 
of respondents mentioned auto-censorship whereas 8% of journalists stressed external 
pressure from politicians and state administration.  
 
As observed in OBP survey conducted in April 1991 the media in Poland was not perceived 
as independent from external influences by the Polish society. The respondents were asked to 
say whether journalists and editorial offices of newspapers, radio and television have the 
opportunity to express what they think or whether they have to obey certain decisions taken 
by political actors. The results of the OBP survey (Grzybczak, 2000:9) clearly indicate that 
journalists and editorial offices were not perceived as independent. Respondents stated that 
23.4% journalists working for newspapers, 14.9 journalists employed in radio and only 9.5% 
of journalists active in television could decide what to write or broadcast. In most of the cases 
it was stated that journalists could act more independently than in the past but the decisions 
concerning the main issues were still taken in political cabinets (33.7% for press, 38.3% for 
radio and 35.8% for television journalists). The group of respondents supporting the notion of 
very low media independence and substantial external influence was also high, 25.7% of 
respondents stated that it was the television that was strongly navigated by the politicians. The 
OBP survey also measured the level of implementation of “pluralism” in media content. 
56.6% of respondents claimed that certain organizations were still more privileged than the 
others. Only 21.4% stated that no discrimination existed.  
 
Nevertheless it was the media that belonged to the most trustworthy institutions in Poland at 
that time. In the OBP survey conducted in May 1992 the media achieved very good results. 
Measured on a 100-point scale (where “100” meant full trust and “0” stood for total lack of 
trust) public radio achieved 55.3, press 53.7, Telewizja Polska 53.6. This result was much 
better for the media than for political institutions – Polish government gained 30.8, president 
Wałęsa 32.6 and Sejm 35.1. Similar survey conducted two years later in June 1994 however 
showed slightly worse results which amounted to 53.4 for radio, 51.7 for Telewizja Polska 
and 49.9 for press. As noted by Grzybczak (2000:11) this lower trust in the media probably 
resulted from the media involvement in political conflicts, inter alia political quarrels between 
President Wałęsa and post-communist coalition. In sum, in the middle 90s Polish media were 
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perceived as moderately trustworthy among the society. This situation changed to some extent 
in 1999 when another OBP survey revealed (again using 100 point scale) that Telewizja 
Polska received 67.4, public radio 66.9, commercial television 65.4, and press 65.1. Finally, a 
study conducted by TNS OBOP in 2005 showed again that radio was considered the most 
trustworthy medium in Poland (Wirtualnemedia.pl, 2006), followed by television66, internet 
and finally, the press.  
 
Finally, the issue of journalistic professionalism is also neatly connected with the controlling 
function of the media. As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a:122) “an important phenomenon 
in the recent political history of the Mediterranean countries is the rise of political scandals, a 
phenomenon that reflects significant changes in the relation of the media to the state. The 
central role of the state in Mediterranean media systems has historically limited the tendency 
of the media to play the “watchdog” role so widely valued in the prevailing liberal media 
theory”. Similarly, Polish press has also increasingly acquired a controlling function via 
revealing political scandals, such as, for instance, Rywingate revealed by the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza”. The role of the Polish media thus became more central. “In all of the 
Mediterranean countries there is an increased tendency to frame events as moral scandals, and 
for journalists to present themselves as speaking for an outraged public against the corrupt 
political elite. These changes are not unique to the Mediterranean countries. They are 
connected with the growth of powerful, market-based media, with a cultural shift toward 
“critical professionalism” in journalism, and with a deeply rooted decline of traditional 
loyalties to political parties” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:124). These phenomena are also 
applicable to Poland where the media has also become more critical towards policy decision 
makers.  
 
3.3. Media System in Germany 
 
In the typology proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) the German media system has been 
classified as representing the Democratic Corporatist model. As such, the media in Germany 
was characterized by early development of mass circulation press, high degree of political 
parallelism that coexisted with high level of journalistic professionalization, and leaning 
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 In this context it should be stressed that commercial television TVN and Polsat are considered to be more 
trustworthy and more politically neutral that the TVP. The public channels are increasingly considered to 
represent the interest of the ruling government. See: CBOS (2006c).  
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towards advocacy model of journalist’s role perception. These aspects will be outlined at 
greater length in the paragraphs to follow. What should be also taken into account is the 
recent historical background. After the World War II, the German media needed to be revived 
from the devastating influence of the Nazi rule. Moreover, West Germany and GDR, 
dominated to the Soviet bloc, developed at fully different pace which is still mirrored in, for 
instance, different patterns of media consumption in old and new Lands. Overall however, the 
evolution of German media can be perceived as a success story. Its influence is well 
exemplified by the rising role of German conglomerates in newly established democracies, 
among them in Poland (Ociepka & Ratajczak, 2000; Jakubowicz, 2007). Finally, in contrast to 
Polish media landscape, German media is more mature as it experienced not a rapid but a 
gradual adoption to the processes of privatization, modernization and globalization.  
 
3.3.1. Newspaper Industry in Germany 
 
Similarly as other Democratic Corporatist countries, Germany is characterized by strongly 
developed mass-circulation press. The first daily in Germany (“Einkommende Zeitung”) was 
founded in Lepizig in 1650. In the beginning newspapers emerged, among others, in Cologne, 
Frankfurt which were situated among commercial routes and thus news was of importance for 
the economic and political growth. Early establishment of the press was then followed by a 
rapid spread of press in the nineteenth century. The development of middle class and the 
processes of industrialization strengthened mass-circulation press which served as instrument 
of public discourse. Additionally, the expansion of the press market in Germany was based on 
the early growth of mass literacy which can be seen in the context of the Protestantism that 
used printed word for religious, social and political advocacy. As a result the establishment of 
the press in Northern and Central Europe provoked a dramatic expansion of newspaper 
industry that would end with the Democratic Corporatist countries leading the world in 
newspaper readership” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a).  
 
Though the experience of the totalitarian regime influenced the shape of the media landscape 
in Germany (Wilke, 1999), this historical development of the newspaper industry is still 
mirrored in the contemporary media consumption patterns. German newspaper readers are 
well served: according to the World Association of Newspapers (2007) Germany is in fifth 
place in the world for newspaper sales and simultaneously offers the biggest newspaper 
market in Europe. Table 8 provides an overview of the best-selling dailies in Germany. More 
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importantly, German titles gather vast readership. According to Pasquay (2007) nearly three-
fourths of the German population over the age of 14 read a newspaper on a regular basis. 
Moreover, there are no major gender differences in newspaper consumption. Women read 
even slightly more local and regional subscription newspapers (63,2%) than men (62,0%). In 
contrast, male readers use more purchased and national newspapers (25,9% and 7.2% 
respectively) than female readers (15,9% and 4,4% respectively). Two other aspects of 
German press industry should be taken into account as well. Firstly, the vast majority of 
newspapers in Germany are regionally based which reflects the country’s federal structure 
and strong attachment to local press among the population (Schütz, 2005). As already 
indicated, this is not the case in Poland where the majority of readers prefer to buy national 
titles. Secondly, according to the WAN (2007) 64.2% of newspaper sales takes a form of 
subscriptions.  
 
Table 8: Best-selling daily newspapers in Germany (2005) 
Title Publisher Circulation 
(000) 
Readership 
(000) 
Bild Axel Springer AG 
 
3,829 12,270 
WAZ Mediengruppe* Zeitungsgruppe WAZ 
 
961 2,810 
Zeitungsgruppe Koeln** 
 
M.Dumont-Schauberg 592 1,110 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Süddeutsche Zeitung 
 
436 1,150 
Rheinische Post Rheinisch-Bergische Druckerei und 
Berlagsgesellschaft 
 
401 1,160 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Verlag Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH 
 
377 900 
Source: WAN (2007: 162) 
* Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung | Neue Ruhr Zeitung | Neue Rhein Zeitung | Westfalenpost | Westfälische Rundschau 
** Kölner Stadtanzeiger | Kölnische Rundschau | Express 
 
However, even though newspaper industry in Germany enjoys a fairly strong position, 
changes occurring within the German media system lead to the gradual transformation of all 
media sectors. Firstly, in the recent years newspapers have been hit by substantial losses in the 
advertising, a consequence of worsening economic situation in Germany (Röper, 2002). Even 
though the newspaper market shows signs of recovery, a return to the days back which were 
marked by solid position of German titles, should not be expected. Apart from the economic 
issues, changing patterns of media consumption should be taken into account as well. Firstly, 
German newspapers continuously lose young readers. The German readership of daily 
newspapers is composed of readers aged between 40 and 69 (between 76% and 84%), 
audience over the age of 70 (approximately 83%) and the 30- to 39-year olds (almost 70%). 
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To attract the interest of younger generations German publishing houses increasingly develop 
editorial offerings target at adolescents (Pasquay, 2007).  
 
Secondly, the overall readership of newspaper is also in decline. As reported by van Eimeren 
& Ridder (2005) while daily newspaper consumption in 1970 comprised 35 minutes, it sank 
to 28 minutes in 2005.  More importantly, German press has not increased its overall presence 
in media consumption habits. According to the authors an average German citizen spends 10 
hours a day with various media. Five years earlier, the media consumption comprised 502 
minutes a day compared to 346 minutes in 1980.  While one could note increasing daily use 
of television (125 minutes in 1980, 220 minutes in 2005), radio (135 minutes in 1980, 221 
minutes in 2005) and internet (13 minutes in 2000 compared to 44 minutes in 2005), 
newspapers partly lost its attractiveness. As a consequence in 2005 the television and radio 
comprised 74% of daily media budget, compared to 7% for internet and only 5% for 
newspapers. Therefore it is not surprising that press searches for new marketing strategies, 
such as attaching book series, CDs or DVDs with the aim to increase sales figures. Such 
undertakings were noted, among others, in the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, “Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung” or the “Bild”. Similar solutions were also introduced to the Polish 
newspaper market, for instance by the „Gazeta Wyborcza“ or the „Rzeczpospolita“.  
 
Thirdly, newspapers face rising competition, particularly from internet. Its rising share in 
media budget indicates emancipation from traditional print media. According to van Eimeren 
& Gerhard (2000) in 2000 already 28,6% of German population had internet access. Within 
five years this number more than doubled (57,9%). These findings indicate that Germans have 
more opportunities to go online than an average Pole. As stated by Oehmichen & Schröter 
(2003) the increasing focus on internet especially by younger German recipients may be 
viewed as an indicator of future use of media by other age groups. This is caused by the fact 
that it represents an “allround-medium” combining informative, entertaining and social-
networking functions. It can be expected that the convergence of media will lead to higher 
exposure to online services.  
 
3.3.2. Political Parallelism in Germany 
 
According to typology proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) states representing the 
Democratic Corporatist model indicate high level of political parallelism coexisting with high 
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level of journalistic professionalism. In Germany political parallelism is connected with a 
journalistic culture where the role of opinionated commentator is important (Donsbach & 
Klett, 1993). Role perceptions are of crucial influence of journalists’ professional behavior 
and this notion is also true for German media landscape. Following typology proposed by 
Patterson (1995) journalists generally play four roles that reflect their position in the 
communication sphere. Firstly, a role of signaler understood as an early warning system for 
the society. Secondly, a role of common carriers, providing the information channel between 
politics and public opinion. Thirdly, a watchdog function mirrored in monitoring activities. 
And finally, public representative role in which journalists act as spokesmen on behalf of the 
people. This fourth role is particularly important in the context of political parallelism. Using 
Janowitz (1975) dichotomy one may identify two different types of role perception, the 
gatekeeper and the advocate. Journalists following the advocacy model see their primary task 
in acting on behalf of this part of audience that either cannot articulate or pursue own 
interests. In contrast, gatekeepers assume that the audience members are able to satisfy their 
interest and filter the news solely on the basis of professional criteria.  
 
As to be showed in the next paragraphs, German journalists are more likely to follow the 
advocacy model of reporting. As noted by Donsbach & Patterson (2004:261) “from its 
beginning the German press was dominated by a strong belief in the superiority of opinion 
over news. Influential journalists, such as Joseph Goerres of Der Rheinische Merkur, 
promoted press freedom on the idea that journalists collectively would reflect public 
sentiment (Baumert 1928). The opinionated editor and commentator became the epitome of 
the journalistic profession (Engelsing 1966). German journalism was influenced by the 
continental ideology that objective or even neutral accounts of the reality are not possible 
(Janowitz 1975). Unlike the liberal consensus in America, European philosophy claimed that 
an individual’s Weltanschauung would always determine his or her interpretation of reality, 
which hindered the emergence of the type of objectivity that typified American journalism 
(Rothman 1979) (…) To the German journalist, objectivity is seen less as an issue of 
impartiality than as a question of getting to the “hard facts” underlying partisan debate. 
Although American journalists would describe this type of reporting as “subjective”, German 
journalists would defend it as more “realistic” and in this sense more “objective” than the 
American style”.  
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The journalists’ role perceptions in Germany become particularly clear in comparative studies 
which are unfortunately lacking for the Polish media landscape. An international survey of 
British and German reporters and editors by Köcher (1986) described German respondents as 
missionaries and the British as bloodhounds. The findings noted for journalists in Germany 
should be seen in the context of the development of the professional journalistic culture, 
particularly in the light of the historical development. For instance, the absence of press 
freedom until the XX century made German journalists more prone to perceive themselves as 
adversaries of the legal authorities. As such, they were more likely to present their opinion 
rather than limit to covering the news. A comparative study by Donsbach & Patterson (2004) 
confirmed this role perception among German journalists. In the early 90s the authors carried 
out a survey in five countries to measure the role perceptions and professional norms of 
journalists involved in daily news decisions about politics and public affairs. In contrast to 
British, Swedish and US journalists, German and Italian respondents were more likely to state 
that “championing values and ideas” was a vital aspect of their work, thus giving priority to 
more advocacy-oriented journalism. Additionally, they also perceived such professional 
norms as objectivity or neutrality as less important than their colleagues in other analyzed 
countries and their readiness to influence the political process was more visible. 
Simultaneously, the study showed that in Germany the leaning toward the advocacy role was 
also correlated with the influence of subjective beliefs on news decisions.  Finally, the 
findings proved that the European news systems were characterized by a closer connection 
between journalists’ partisanship and that of their news organization, particularly among 
Italian and German journalists who worked for the leading national papers.  
 
In this context it is noteworthy to outline the profiles of the leading daily newspapers to be 
analyzed in Chapter 7. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the 
“Süddeutsche Zeitung”, the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” and the ‘Bild” reflecting on 
their profiles and political orientations. If one were to adjust Pisarek’s typology to these three 
newspapers, the “Bild” editorial office would be recruited from disc jockeys, similarly as in 
the Polish “Super Express”. Simultaneously, the German quality titles would be prepared by 
craftsmen characterized by high journalistic professionalism.  
 
The “Süddeutsche Zeitung” (South German Newspaper) was founded soon after the World 
War II and was the first title to receive a license of the U.S. military administration in 
Bavaria. The title published by the Süddeutscher Verlag with an average of 1 150 000 (WAN, 
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2007) readers per day is the leader among national subscription newspapers in Germany. 
Simultaneously, the title is characterized by the highest circulation among quality newspapers 
amounting to about 436 000 sold copies per day (WAN, 2007). The readers of the newspaper 
generally belong to the upper well-educated groups of German society, functioning as 
multipliers and trendsetters. In this context it is also noteworthy to stress that overlapping of 
the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” readers and readers of other national daily newspapers is small and 
lies between 2% and 9% (Mediadaten “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, 2007). Thus the share of 
Germans reading exclusively this quality newspaper is high. The editorial stance of the 
“Süddeutsche Zeitung” can be summarized as center-left.    
 
The “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (Frankfurt General Newspaper) first appeared in 
1949. Its founders intended to create a title that would be nationally and internationally 
available, modeled after the “Frankfurter Zeitung” closed by the Nazis in 1943. The 
“Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” is published by F.A.Z. GmbH, the majority of which shares 
is owned by FAZIT Stiftung. It is worth mentioning that its editorial policy is exercised not 
by single agent but jointly by five editors. Currently the newspaper has a daily circulation of 
about 377 000 (WAN, 2007) and is also said to be the German newspaper with the widest 
circulation abroad (FAZ.NET, 2007). The readership of the title is estimated at 900 000 
(WAN, 2007). The readers of the title, similarly to the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, belong to 
highly educated groups within German society. The political orientation of the title can be 
described as rather conservative, right of the center.  
 
The “Bild” (Picture Newspaper) was firstly published in 1952 by Axel Springer AG which is 
today the biggest newspaper publishing house in Germany and also one of the key 
international media enterprises. The “Bild” remains the best selling daily in Germany and 
Europe with a circulation reaching 3 829 000 copies and the readership embracing 12 270 000 
readers (WAN, 2007). The tabloid is also ranked as one of the biggest newspapers worldwide 
(WAN, 2005) due to its vast readership. Additionally, the title remains the most often quoted 
German daily (Media Tenor, 2006). The “Bild” can be characterized by content focusing on 
gossips, crime stories and intensive coverage on political sphere. Compared to the Polish 
“Super Express” the German tabloid is more likely to use scandalizing methods (e.g. via 
publishing a picture of topless woman on its cover) and more engaged in reporting on politics. 
Though the motto of the newspaper states that the “Bild” is “independent and non partisan” 
(unabhängig, überparteilich) the tabloid is characterized by a conservative stance. The title 
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was traditionally perceived as a supporter of CDU, however slightly moved toward centrism 
in the recent years.  
 
3.3.3. Journalistic Professionalization in Germany 
 
Germany is characterized, similarly as other countries representing the Democratic 
Corporatist model, by strong development of journalistic professionalism. Indeed, German 
journalistic organization quite early developed into well-functioning and unified institutions 
with high level of membership (Schönbach, Stürzebecher, Schneider 1998). The Verband 
deutscher Journalisten- und Schriftstellervereine appeared already in 1895. Currently there 
are two major professional organizations representing journalistic community. German 
Journalists Association (Deutscher Journalisten Verband, DJV) acts as a professional 
association, trade union and service center for journalists. As such, it represents interests 
specific to the journalistic profession and monitors developments on the media market. 
Currently, DJV comprises approximately 40 000 members, which is said to make it one of the 
largest national journalists’ trade unions (DJV, 2006). The second journalistic organization is 
the German Journalists Union (Deutsche Journalistinnen und Journalisten Union, DJU) which 
also aims at promoting professional, social and legal interest of journalists. Simultaneously, it 
engages into media regulations and provides ongoing training to its members.   
 
The current number of journalists in Germany is estimated at approximately 48 000 people 
whose main occupation (so-called hauptberufliche Journalisten) is journalism (Weischenberg, 
Malik & Scholl, 2006). Simultaneously, the majority of them finds employment in 
newspapers (35,4%) and magazines (19,5%), followed by radio (16,5%) and television 
(14,9%). What is also important is that the number of freelancers has decreased in the recent 
years. In 1993 this group comprised 18 000 individuals compared to 12 000 journalists in 
2005. This phenomenon can be dated back to the media crisis in Germany which resulted in 
dismissals in media environment. Secondly, there are also increasingly more professionals 
who are not able to secure own income based solely on journalistic activities. This group 
either partly works in other sectors or is forced to work for more media. For instance, as stated 
by Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl (2006), in 2005 an average German journalist worked for 
more than three different media outlets. In contrast, in 1993 the majority worked only for one 
or two media.  
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According to already quoted survey by Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl (2006), a decade ago 
journalism in Germany was classified as a young profession. In 1993 more than half of the 
journalistic environment was under 36 years of age (52,7%). Currently, the majority of 
German journalists is recruited from people aged between 36 and 45 (39,6%), followed by 
28% of those above 45 years of age. According to the study only one third (32,4%) is under 
36 years of age with most of young professional working for online media. Simultaneously, it 
is noteworthy that journalists in Germany are overall well educated, more than two third of 
them received higher education degrees which also serves to promote a distinct professional 
identity. As concluded by the authors, the access to the editorial office without a diploma is 
nowadays hardly possible. In this context it should be also mentioned that overall the German 
media have been at the forefront of training media in such areas as, for instance, investigative 
journalism or media management in the newly emerging states of Central Europe (Benfield, 
2003).  
 
High level of journalistic professionalism is also mirrored in legal regulations concerning the 
media environment. In Germany, a press code (Pressecodex) exists since 1973. Its main task 
is to give fundamental guidelines regarding journalistic reporting. These guidelines have been 
continuously updated to insure its applicability to the changing media environment. In this 
context it is noteworthy to stress that the Polish press law introduced in the communist period 
still awaits being expanded and updated. The Pressecodex obliges German journalists, among 
others, to provide a plurality of opinion and to present accurate information. Under the press 
code it is the German Press Council (Presserat) that is assigned the role of a self-regulatory 
body. The concept of the German Press Council is based “on the established professional 
ethics of journalistic principles and the responsible actions of publishers, editors and 
journalists. The critics of the German Press Council see a weakness in this concept; the 
German Press Council sees its strength anchored precisely in this concept. The metaphor of 
the toothless tiger continues to be strained to this day within this context. Particularly the 
enforcement of its decisions is questioned by the critics, as the voluntary undertaking to 
publish public reprimands, as stated under figure 16 of the Press Code, is not always adhered 
to” (Deutscher Presserat, 2006). Nevertheless, in fundamental role of the German Press 
Council remains based on the principle of self-regulation.  Since its foundation in 1956, the 
Presserat – which is also one of the oldest institution dedicated to the self-regulation of media 
in Europe - continually developed a catalogue of rules that were to serve editors and 
publishers. Overall, strong press councils that exist in the majority of Democratic Corporatist 
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countries reflect the tendency to treat media as social institutions and not simply a private 
business.  
 
Another vital aspect of journalistic routines is the level of journalists’ autonomy. Overall, both 
the Democratic Corporatist and the Liberal countries are characterized by high journalistic 
independence (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). As reported in an international survey (Donsbach & 
Patterson 1992 quoted by Hallin & Mancini, 2004a) German journalists were the least likely 
to claim that pressures from senior managers and editors were a vital limitation on their work. 
Only 7% of German respondents mentioned such influence from senior editors compared with 
14% in the United States, 22% in Britain and 35% in Italy. German journalists were also the 
least likely to state that the news they prepared was altered by other people in the newsroom. 
Overall journalistic activities in Germany are exercised with minimal external interference. 
Additionally, the findings delivered by Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl (2006) indicated that 
German journalists saw only very limited external (institutionalized) influence on their work.  
 
Journalistic professionalization raises also the question of media credibility among the 
population. According to data presented by BDZV (2002) German respondents perceived the 
daily newspapers as the most credible source of information (41%), followed by public 
television (31%) and public radio (11%). What is interesting, overall private broadcasters 
were seen as less credible. Similar outcomes were delivered in 2004. Again, daily press was 
ranked as the most credible medium (43%). Simultaneously, the credibility of public 
television and public radio sank to 27% and 10% respectively (BDZV, 2006). Again, private 
broadcasters were ranked as credible by only 2% (radio) and 6% (television) of the 
respondents. Internet services were perceived similarly as private television broadcasters. 
These findings remain in contrast to the Polish media landscape, where the highest credibility 
is enjoyed by radio, followed by television, internet and finally, the press. Furthermore, 
private broadcasters in Poland, as mentioned earlier, are considered to be more trustworthy 
than public media as they are more independent from political influence.  
 
In this context one should also refer to the sources of information for German citizens. As 
noted by Ridder & Engel (2005) German media have clearly assigned functions. Television is 
generally used as a source of information (90% of respondents), as entertainment provider 
(83% of respondents) and has a relaxing function (79% of respondents). Similar tasks are 
attributed to radio stations, where primary role is seen in entertainment (90% of respondents), 
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followed by informative (84%) and relaxing (78%) functions. In this context, the use of daily 
newspapers is motivated mainly by desire to obtain information (98% of respondents) and by 
need for conversation with the others (79%). Furthermore, German respondents generally do 
see the need for reading daily newspapers even if they also inform themselves using other 
media, such as television or radio (BDZV, 2007). This phenomenon is particularly attributable 
to the older generations. Still, the surveys show that generally in the recent years the need for 
reading daily press is sinking.  
 
3.4. Conclusions 
 
Overall, the development of Polish media system shows tangibly that Poland shares much of 
the characteristics attributed to the Polarized Pluralist model. In this context the development 
of newspaper industry serves as a suitable example. Poland is characterized by relatively 
small press circulation which is neatly connected with a weak “reading culture”. Since the 
early 90s Polish readership resembled “waving” (Filas, 2001) with the periodical enlivening 
of press market. Moreover, only about one third of Poles read daily newspapers on a regular 
basis. Nevertheless, in Poland, unlike other countries discussed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) 
under the Polarized Pluralist model, there are no gender differences in reading habits. In sum, 
the weak “reading culture” is influenced by the historical background, material condition of 
the society and, more increasingly, rising role of internet. In contrast, the newspaper industry 
in Germany is characterized by early development of mass-circulation press which from the 
beginning served as an instrument of public discourse and tool for religious, social and 
political advocacy. In that respect the German media system is very similar to the Northern 
European model proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). Additionally, the fact that nearly 
three-fourths of Germans regularly read newspapers marks sharp difference compared to the 
Polish readership. Moreover, German titles are also far ahead when it comes to the newspaper 
circulation. This is well exemplified by the “Bild” which belongs to one of the most often 
read newspapers in the world (WAN, 2005). Even if one the differences concerning a 
population in both countries are taken into account, the cleavage between Poland and 
Germany is still visible. The best selling Polish tabloid the “Fakt” has a circulation reaching 
half a million copies, which is eight times less than the average circulation of the “Bild”. 
Moreover, German newspaper market indicates strong readers’ attachments to local titles, a 
phenomenon that should be viewed in the context of the federal structure of the country. In 
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Poland, readers are more accustomed to national titles and far less willing to subscribe to 
newspapers than in Germany.  
 
Political parallelism observed in Polish media again confirms phenomena represented in 
other countries discussed under the Polarized Pluralist model. Firstly, freedom of the press 
and the development of commercial media in Poland were introduced relatively late. Again, 
this resulted from specific historical background, particularly long periods of either non-
existence or foreign dominance. What should be stressed is that Polish media system is 
characterized by advocacy-oriented journalism. As indicated earlier, in Poland the press often 
played an activist role and precedence was given to the commentary aspects of reporting. 
Even the very name of one the leading newspapers – the Electoral Gazette (the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza”) –  highlights its initial task of being a spokesman of the Solidarity movement 
during the semi-free parliamentary elections held in 1989. Overall, Polish media since the 
collapse of the Soviet regime continuously provided a platform for emerging democratic order 
which further strengthen the advocacy model. In Germany, political parallelism is also neatly 
connected with the prevailing journalistic culture. As indicated in the earlier paragraphs, 
German newspapers are characterized by a commentary-oriented journalism and leaning 
toward the advocacy model of reporting. The role of opinionated commentator and public 
representative has been repeatedly confirmed by research studies (e.g. Köcher, 1986; 
Donsbach & Klett, 1993; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004). Again, the development of the 
professional journalistic culture in Germany should be seen in the light of the historical 
development which made journalist more prone to influence the political discourse.  
 
Finally, Chapter 3 delivered a mixed picture concerning the development of journalistic 
professionalism in analyzed countries. In that respect Poland cannot be clearly assigned to one 
of the models proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). On the one hand, journalistic 
professionalism is limited by structural elements such as lack of cooperation in journalistic 
environment where divided associations are not perceived as a serious partner by state 
authorities. On the other hand, Polish journalists developed a strong professional culture 
which resulted from their distinct identity under the communist rule and high value placed on 
autonomy. Thus, when it comes to journalistic professionalism, Poland is rather closer to 
countries representing the Northern European model. Still, the Polish example is not as 
advanced as in Germany. In that respect the German media market is marked by strong 
development of journalistic institutions as DJV or DJU, which promote professional interests 
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of journalists and have much higher membership rates. Moreover, as showed by research 
studies German journalists are also less likely to experience different types of influence on 
their work when compared to their Polish counterparts. Poland is still characterized by 
relatively high degree of instrumentalization and journalists experience different forms of 
internal and external pressure. These findings should be seen in the context of lasting tradition 
of clientalism and delayed development of liberal institutions.  
 
Though Polish and German media systems differ to the large extent, they both do experience 
common trends associated with the forces of globalization, homogenization and 
commercialization that transform the media across Europe. Firstly, the media consumption 
patterns in both countries indicate that it is television that is perceived as the key source of 
information which monopolizes the highest percentage of media use. Obviously, when 
examined more closely, one can detect that the position if public and state television in both 
countries is different. Public television is seen as less credible than private broadcasters in 
Poland whereas the German example proves the opposite. This however, should be seen in the 
context of higher degree of instrumentalization of state television in Poland. Secondly, media 
in both countries face increasing competition from internet, though the very access to internet 
again is quite different in both countries. Overall, the forces of globalization increasingly 
contribute to the importance of electronic media but also transform the journalistic profession 
as such. This phenomenon is expressed, among others, in the “generation shift” observed 
within the journalists’ environment and need for adaptation to more competing media 
industry. Thirdly, though this aspect has not been discussed at greater length in this Chapter, 
both countries are also characterized by a process of internationalization which leads to the 
creating of supranational media conglomerates. However, while German media is a driving 
force expanding its influence to other countries, Poland is rather subject to external, among 
others German-based, influence (Jakubowicz, 2007).  
 
In the typology proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) geographical location and political 
setting were seen as key variables that mark the interdependencies between politics and 
media. The comparison between Poland and Germany suggests that it is primarily the political 
framework and not the geographical proximity that qualifies countries under examination as 
representing a given model. The importance of political system characteristics is particularly 
important in transition countries where the media development is either accelerated or 
hindered by the political setting. In that respect one can refer to the distinction between 
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leaders, laggards and losers proposed by Gati (1996) to describe countries that experience a 
process of transformation. In his typology Poland was ranked as a leader, which managed to 
establish a fairly stable political environment and introduce positive changes within media 
sector. Still, while over the last decade certain countries joined the first group, the others have 
fallen back to either the second or the third category due to political system shortcomings. 
Thus the functioning of the political sphere provides a first prerequisite on the way to joining 
the leaders. This is also applicable to countries representing the Democratic Corporatist 
Model where favorable political setting made media function as vehicles of diverse 
viewpoints much earlier than in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Chapter 4 | Hypotheses 
 
 
This Chapter proposes a number of hypotheses which explore the political communication 
patterns in Poland and Germany. As indicated in the Introduction, the study scrutinizes 
political communication seen from the perspective of two different players: the political 
parties and the media during the time of parliamentary campaigns. The hypotheses are 
formulated separately for party spots, and separately for media coverage. In other words: they 
are structured according to the medium and not according to the analyzed phenomena. There 
are two reasons which explain the structuring of Chapter 4. Firstly, analyzed media belong to 
two different actors and thus comparing them according to the same set of hypotheses would 
provide difficulty. Secondly, the number of similar phenomena analyzed in both spots and 
media reporting is limited. The author refers to three items (focus on leaders, negativity, 
theme spectrum) that are scrutinized in both party commercials and media coverage. Other 
hypotheses formulated in this Chapter reflect medium-specific characteristics. For instance, 
the analysis of party advertising includes, among others, the question of incumbent and 
challenger strategies (Trent & Friedenberg, 1983) applied in commercials. Therefore party 
commercials and media reporting are discussed separately as two case studies. As a 
consequence Chapter 5 discusses the design of the study, independently for both types of 
media. The results of empirical examination of party ads are reported in Chapter 6, whereas 
media coverage is presented in Chapter 7.  
 
4.1. Hypotheses: Party Spots 
 
One of the questions that arise when analyzing party spots is how the mediatization of politics 
is reflected in commercials prepared by political players. As stated in Chapter 1, recent 
changes in political communication are often perceived as the “Americanization” of 
campaigning (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Practices including professionalization of spots, 
increasing negative advertising, personalization and emotionalization build the core repertoire 
of this tendency (Schulz, 1997). The study proposed six hypotheses to show similarities and 
differences between the transition country (Poland) and the established democracy (Germany) 
and examine whether party spots were becoming increasingly similar in their format and 
substance.  
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4.1.1. Professionalization 
 
H1: German spots are more professional than Polish spots 
 
Professionalization of party spots can be seen as signum temporis in a modern political system 
of Western democracies. The production of political ads shows increasing higher filmic 
quality, more akin to commercial advertising (Hodess, Tedesco, Kaid, 2000). The hypothesis 
to be tested is that German spots take professionalization further than Polish spots as far as 
formats and production techniques are concerned. This is neatly connected with the fact that 
political campaigns in Germany follow the postmodernist model of campaigning67, whereas 
Polish campaigns are still seen as an example of modernist campaigning, which is a less 
professionalized one (Dobek-Ostrowska & Wiszniowski, 2002). German spots use more 
modern production techniques (e.g.: videostyle, computer-related tools), spot’s dynamics is 
higher, spot’s sequences are shorter and thus the overall professionalization level is likely to 
be higher than in Poland. Moreover, German parties can afford higher campaign expenditures 
than Polish parties which might also find its exemplification in the professionalization level. 
Simultaneously, the issue of experience in conducting advertising campaigns as well as 
overall parliamentary experience of political groupings should be taken into account. It can be 
expected that German parties will profit in that respect to the larger extent than the Polish 
political scene established in the 90s. Finally, the overall assessment of professional standard 
might be also influenced by formal constraints referring to the length of commercials.   
 
4.1.2. Negativity 
 
H2: Polish spots use more negative appeals than German spots 
 
Negative campaigning, as a trend associated with the process of mediatization outlined in 
Chapter 1, characterizes spots both in Germany (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Holtz-Bacha, 
2000) and Poland (Cwalina, 2000). However, though negative campaigning is usually treated 
as a sign of professionalization (Hodess, Tedesco, Kaid, 2000), it may be also a parameter 
indicating how political advertising is embedded in a specific historical and political 
                                               
67
 Party campaigns are characterised by high professionalization, continuous modernization, high expenditures, 
activity of external experts etc. Modernist model of campaigning is a less advanced one. 
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framework. And for this reason even though party campaigns in Poland are less professional 
than in Germany, the content of Polish commercials might be more negative in terms of 
attacks on political opponents.  
 
The answer to this phenomenon is complex and embraces several reasons emerging from the 
political system characteristics. Firstly, the level of political culture in Poland is still low and 
corruption scandals among political elites, as noted in Chapter 2 are common. This leads to 
the situation when parties try to undermine the opponents’ position by stressing negative 
characteristics. Secondly, there can be still observed animosities based on historical 
background (post-Communists vs. post-Solidarity parties), which are used to attack 
opposition and strengthen voters’ identification with a given party. Thirdly, Poland as a 
transition country undergoes a process of “socialization” with Western Europe which led in 
the recent years to the redefinition of fundaments of Polish policy. This also found its 
exemplification in political parties, which were divided by such issues as membership in 
NATO, enlargement of UE, internationalization of markets etc. Different understanding of 
these matters, as indicated in Chapter 2, opened a cleavage between competing groupings 
leading to negative appeals. Fourthly, formal criteria may also be responsible for the spots’ 
content. Polish spots are much longer than German commercials, which leaves “enough 
space” for all types of appeals and may “encourage” politicians to use negative repertoire. 
Fifthly, substantial economic contrasts within Polish society make citizens prone to negative 
appeals which show who is “guilty”68. Finally, Poland is characterized by instability of 
political coalitions. During two legislation periods proceeding 2005 elections there were two 
minority governments, both resulted from break down between coalition partners.  
 
4.1.3. Focus on Leaders  
 
H3: German spots focus on leaders more than Polish spots 
 
The influence of “media logic” on “political logic” may be observed in the greater interest in 
leader-centered campaigns (Mazzoleni, 1987). Therefore the process of mediatization may 
lead to increasing personalization of political campaigns (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). The author 
analyzes whether this phenomenon finds its exemplification in Polish and German ads. The 
                                               
68
 This was confirmed by the support for Polish populist parties such as Self-Defense, League of Polish Families 
or Law and Justice, which offer easy catechisms for the society.   
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hypothesis formulated in this study states that German commercials are more personalized. 
This can be explained by the fact that major political players concentrate their messages round 
future Chancellor candidates, and smaller parties like Bündnis ‘90/The Greens or Liberals 
fight for second votes and often embody their programme in own leaders. Polish spots are still 
less person-centered for a number of reasons. Firstly, political parties in Poland do not 
concentrate their campaigns round potential candidates for Prime Minister Office. Secondly, 
Polish parties often create alliances for the time of campaigning (e.g.: AWS, AWSP, 
SLD/UP) which then makes showing one particular candidate problematic. Instead, party 
spots tend to show a few political leaders. The closest similarity with German spots, which is 
to be tested in the empirical party, is likely to be observed to some extent during the 2005 
campaign when parliamentary and presidential elections overlapped and presidential 
candidates were also widely present in party spots are leaders of a given party. Thirdly, 
possible differences concerning personalization may be also a result of Polish spot’s length 
which leave much space for a presentation of more than one candidate.   
 
4.1.4. Emotionalization 
 
H4: German spots use more emotionalization than Polish spots 
 
Emotionalization, as outlined in Chapter 1, is an effective persuasion technique applied by 
political players (Kaid, 2004). In this respect spots can be categorized according to whether 
the dominant type of appeal or proof offered in the commercial is logical or emotional (Kaid 
& Holtz-Bacha, 1995). The hypothesis to be tested is whether German spots are more likely to 
use emotional proof, relying on this form of persuasion than it is the case in Poland. It is to be 
examined whether German politicians deliberately refer to the emotional aspects of voters’ 
behavior to gain their votes. Since German spots are much shorter the content of commercials 
might be more prone to emotionalization. German party spots must not exceed 90 seconds and 
thus politicians might be more willing to “condensate” their messages and concentrate on 
short emotional appeals aimed at the recipients. In contrast, ads produced by Polish parties are 
much longer, often filled with similar talking head formats that evoke viewers’ emotional 
sphere to the lesser extent. Furthermore, German spots are more professional than Polish 
commercials which may also lead to the situation when the use of music, special effects and 
the overall video-clip-like spot will have a larger influence on viewers’ emotions.  
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4.1.5. Theme Spectrum 
 
H5: Polish and German spots embrace theme spectrum that reflects topical themes 
 
Yet another question related to party commercials is whether there are differences between 
themes discussed in party spots. It can be expected that both German and Polish parties will 
include appeals for voting in their ads. Secondly, the social-economic context will also affect 
content of party spots. As showed in other studies, spots’ in Germany devote much space to 
issues of economy and employment (Holtz-Bacha & Kaid 1993, 1996; Holtz-Bacha, 2000). 
These economic and social matters, as the main long-term issue, are likely to appear at the top 
of agenda in Poland as well. Thirdly, it can be expected that German ads will pay more 
attention to political candidates as a separate theme and concentrate on their leaders to the 
larger extent than Polish parties due to the differences in the functioning of the political 
system69. Fourthly, it can be assumed that a theme’s agenda of Poland, as a transition country, 
will be defined by great variety of issues relating to transformation and positioning of 
political system. Thus Polish political ads may refer to, for instance, problems concerning 
emerging political culture, which finds its exemplification in addressing such themes as the 
relations between the state and politics. Fifthly, German ads will be marked by a stronger 
presence of environment issues and migration matters, which result from the profiles of the 
parties (mainly the Greens) and the percentage of citizens foreign origin who live in Germany. 
These two themes will be present to far limited extent in Polish ads, since none of the 
analyzed Polish parties pronounced environmental issues as essential for the country and 
Poland has a very small percentage of immigrants. And finally, it can be expected that foreign 
policy will be discussed at greater length in Polish than in German ads. Such political events 
as NATO and EU accession are likely to be mirrored in the parties’ programmes. 
 
4.1.6. Incumbent/Challenger Strategies 
 
H6: Polish and German incumbents/challengers differ partly in their strategies 
 
Finally, as stated in Chapter 1, one can observe a trend towards a homogenization of political 
communication practices. Thus the study scrutinizes whether this notion is also true for party 
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 See also earlier paragraphs relating to the focus on leaders.  
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spots in Germany and Poland. Research on American political advertising has identified 
patterns of strategies attributable to candidates running as incumbents and as challengers. As 
showed by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) the most consistent strategies used across countries 
for incumbents were emphasizing accomplishments and stressing the competency of the 
government office occupied. Challengers on the other hand consistently called for change, 
took the offensive on issues, and attacked the record of opponents. This analysis utilizes 
categories adjusted from Trent & Friedenberg (1983) study, which will be decribed in detail 
in Chapter 5, to asses whether such strategies have any consistency in Germany and Poland.  
 
4.2. Hypotheses: Media Coverage 
 
Having formulated hypotheses related to party spots the study made a step further to compare 
media coverage on political communication in German and Polish media. In so doing the 
analysis intended to show whether journalists report about parliamentary campaigns in a 
similar manner and where potential differences could be found. Fomulated hypotheses are 
embedded in the context of media changes in political reporting, which finds its 
exemplification in, for instance, rising coverage on the parliamentary campaign, increasing 
focus on leaders and negatity in depicturing. Finally, the study scrutinizes whether differences 
inherent to the nature of the media system in Germany and Poland, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
are mirrored in distinct political sympathies of the newspapers. The analysis proposes four 
hypotheses to reflect the phenomena indicated above: 
 
4.2.1. Coverage on Party Campaigning 
 
H1: German and Polish media coverage concentrates on party campaigning 
 
The hypothesis to be tested is that during the “hot phase” of parliamentary campaign media 
reporting in both Germany and Poland concentrates on party campaigning. In this context it 
should be noted, that the focus on party campaigning as a distinct theme has been confirmed 
for German coverage by Wilke & Reinemann (2000, 2003, 2006) in their analysis of 
subsequent Bundestag elections. The authors found that German elections had become more 
visible in media coverage as their competitiveness increased. Political candidates competed 
for the attention of the media and such mediatized events like Duells (Wilke & Reinemann, 
2003; 2006) increased the volume of reporting related to the campaign itself. The fact that 
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campaigning has become more competitive resulted in its higher news value and was thus 
more likely to appear in the newspapers. So far there has been no empirical evidence whether 
this trend is applicable for Poland as well. However, it can be expected that the same trend 
will be observed in Polish elections. Polish parties increasingly make use of media which 
offers a broader platform to appeal to the group of potential voters. Additionally, between the 
first analyzed campaign held in 1997 and the elections which took place in 2005 political 
candidates increasingly used new emerging media, such as private broadcasters, internet 
platforms, thus increasing the quantity of their activities, which could influenced the overall 
coverage on party campaigning. 
 
Secondly, the emphasis on the political campaigning might be also influenced by the expected 
outcomes of the elections (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000). As noted in Germany, media coverage 
was more extensive in campaigns, in which the results of the elections were less predictable, 
which was mirrored both in opinion polls and the percentage of voters who did not know 
which grouping to choose. The results of the campaigns were least predictable in 2005 and the 
number of voters who did not which party to choose was particularly high (Holtz-Bacha, 
2006). In case of Poland, the results of the elections held in 2005 were more unexpected than 
those held in two earlier campaigns. During the 1997 parliamentary elections the results of the 
opinion polls indicated the dominance of right-wing AWS, which was confirmed by the 
voting outcomes. Similarly, four years later, the polls suggested that post-communist SLD 
would win the elections, which was then showed by the results of the popular vote. In 2005 
however, the forecasts suggested the victory of Civic Platform but it was Law and Justice 
which achieved the highest support. 
 
Thirdly, the emphasis of a given campaign is also partly influenced by the intensiveness and 
importance of the campaign itself. In this context, the 2005 German parliamentary 
campaigning was particularly dynamic which was due to at least two factors. The legislative 
period was shortened which resulted in a debate whether this was a legally justified solution. 
Additionally, for the first time in Bundestag elections a female candidate competed for the 
Chancellor position, which also had high news value (Holtz-Bacha, 2006). In Poland the 2005 
campaign was particularly intensive since political candidates as Donald Tusk, Lech 
Kaczyński or Andrzej Lepper were participating in both parliamentary and presidential 
elections. Thus the overall focus on politics, especially political leaders, was very high.   
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4.2.2. Focus on Leaders  
 
H2: Personalization is more visible in German than in Polish media coverage  
 
The second hypothesis to be examined states that personalization was more visible in German 
than in Polish media coverage. This assumption is based on the differences inherent to the 
political system of both countries which are likely to lead to more personalized reporting in 
German newspapers. Major German parties focus their election campaigns on Chancellor 
candidates and because of that elections tend to resemble plebiscites for the preferred 
Bundeskanzler (Vetter & Gabriel, 1998). This speaks in favor of more personalized news 
coverage. Research studies (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000, 2003, 2006) did not find increasing 
personalization in German newspapers. Through Chancellor candidates appeared more often 
in analyzed titles from the beginning of the 80s, the intensiveness of personalization depended 
on the leaders’ constellation and the political context of the campaign itself.  Still, German 
reporting is likely to be more leader-focused than in Poland. This can be explained by the 
nature of the Polish political system. Political campaigning is in general not centered round 
Prime Minister candidates and thus Polish newspapers were less leader-centered. The 
openness of the party system, as discussed in Chapter 2, results in an emphasis on parties 
rather than of individuals. The closest similarity to German newspapers is likely to be 
observed during the 2005 campaign when parliamentary and presidential elections overlapped 
and media coverage concentrated on few top politicians. Therefore it can be expected that 
personalization of Polish media coverage in this particular period would be more intensive.  
 
4.2.3. Negativity 
 
H3: Negativity is more frequent in Polish than in German media 
 
The third hypothesis states that negativity in depicturing is more frequent in Polish than in 
German media. Negativity in portraying political issues and parties was detected in Polish 
newspapers in their reporting on the 1997 party campaign (Trutkowski, 2000). Subsequent 
coverage on the 2001 and the 2005 campaigns has not been empirically tested so far. In 
Germany, a longitudinal study by Wilke & Reinemann (2000) proved that since 1980 the 
evaluations of Chancellor candidates became more negative, with the exception of depicturing 
Helmut Kohl in 1990. This trend was also observed in the 2002 and 2005 press coverage 
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(Wilke & Reinemann, 2003; 2006). Similar findings were brought by Semetko & Schönbach 
(2003) who analyzed coverage on party campaigning in the ‘Bild” in the period 1990-2002. 
The authors found increasing negativity towards political parties. This was particularly 
mirrored in the 2002 media coverage, when the tabloid increased the volume of commentary 
pieces with negative assessment of SPD and Gerhard Schröder.  
 
In this analysis negative coverage is understood as relating to tone of depicturing in general 
and as tone of depicturing of concrete themes. It can be expected that negativity in depicturing 
comprising both levels will be more frequent in Poland than in Germany. This is attributable 
to the reasons that have already been articulated in previous paragraphs related to party 
commercials. Firstly, negativity in media coverage might result from the evaluation of 
problems inherent to the transition processes. While Germany faces problems related mainly 
to the financial and social sectors, Poland is affected by instabilities brought by the 
transformation processes. These transformation processes include, among others, financial 
and socials policies but also, for instance, still fragile relations between the state and politics 
or dilemmas related to foreign policy. Secondly, the Polish party system is still characterized 
by relatively high openness. Recent years were marked by strong presence of such radical 
groupings as Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, which were viewed critically by the 
media, especially by quality newspapers. It can be expected that these groupings will be 
depictured in a negative manner throughout the whole analyzed period and thus influence the 
overall tone of articles.  
 
4.2.4. Media’s Political Sympathies 
 
H4: Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies 
 
One of the most obvious differences among media systems lies in the fact that media in some 
countries have distinct political orientations, while media in other countries do not (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004a). Research studies suggest that German newspapers pronounce, to varying 
degree, its political preferences in depicturing political parties and Chancellor candidates (e.g. 
Wilke & Reinemann, 2003; 2006; Semetko & Schönbach, 2003). Thus, the empirical part of 
this analysis should examine whether this phenomenon is also applicable to the analyzed 
titles. In Poland, Trutkowski (2000) observed distinct political sympathies in media coverage 
prior to the 1997 elections. It can be expected that Polish newspapers will also have clear 
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leaning towards political groupings in subsequent campaigns. Poland has a strong advocacy 
tradition (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a) neatly connected with the history of the institutional ties 
between the media and the political system (Hadamik, 2004; Jakubowicz, 2003). Leading 
press which emerged after 1990 was from the start quite clearly assigned to concrete political 
groupings (Jakubowicz, 2003). Thus it can be expected that the coverage on post-communist 
groupings will be more negative than on the post-Solidarity formations which is to be verified 
in Chapter 7. 
 
Overall, Chapter 4 proposes a number of hypotheses which examine political communication 
seen from the perspective of two different players: the political parties and the media during 
the time of three parliamentary campaigns. In the explanation of proposed hypotheses both 
political and media system characteristics are seen as responsible for the patterns of political 
discourse. The following Chapter focuses on the design of the study showing the 
methodological framework which provides the basis for the empirical examination of political 
advertising and newspapers’ coverage.   
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Chapter 5 | Design of the Study  
 
 
This Chapter outlines the design of the study. Firstly, it is explained why the content analysis 
that has been chosen as an empirical tool for analyzing political communication. In the second 
step, selected sources for content analysis are presented together with the explanation which 
criteria led to their selection. Thirdly, Chapter 5 describes the coding instruments and applied 
variables which are used to verify hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Finally, information 
on coders’ recruitment, training process and results of achieved reliability is provided.  
 
5.1. Method and Aims of Content Analysis 
 
Riffe, Lacy & Fico (2005:25) define quantitative content analysis as „the systematic and 
replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric 
values according to valid measurement rules and the analysis of relationships involving those 
values using statistical methods, to describe the communication, draw inferences about its 
meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and 
consumption”. Quantitative content analysis is reductionist in nature (Brosius & Koschel, 
2001; Wirth, 2001), where sampling and measurement procedures reduce analyzed 
communication phenomena to manageable data that can be scrutinized statistically. 
Additionally, content analysis is intended to provide an objective description (Berelson, 1952; 
Krippendorff, 1980).  
 
The advantages of quantitative content analysis make it a very useful research tool for 
conducted study. Firstly, it is a non-obtrusive, non-reactive measurement technique (Merten, 
1995). Conclusions can be drawn from content evidence without having to obtain access to 
communicators. Secondly, content analysis makes longitudinal studies feasible due to the 
collected materials that outlive the events described in the communication content. Certain 
data is historically situated which makes for example repeating surveys over time not possible 
as the individual perception of a given event might change over time (Neuendorf, 2002). 
Thirdly, the quantitative content analysis permits measurement of large volume of data that 
would be logistically (and often financially) difficult as in case of experiments or surveys. 
Fourthly, this empirical method is virtually unlimited in its applicability, to put it in Holsti’s 
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(1969:15) words “the range of possibilities is limited only by the imagination of those who 
use such data in their research”.  
 
In the extensive body of literature on content analysis, one can find a number of studies 
confirming the popularity of this method. In their meta-analysis of research trends in mass 
communication Kamhawi & Weaver (2003) show that content analysis and surveys belong to 
the most commonly used empirical tools. In the field of communication studies, content 
analysis has been the fastest-growing technique over the last 20 years or so (Riffe & Freitag, 
1997; Merten & Großmann, 1996). This may be taken as an illustration of the usefulness of 
this empirical tool. As noted by Neuendorf (2002) perhaps the greatest explosion in analysis 
capability has been the rapid advancement in computer text analysis software with a 
corresponding proliferation of databases.  
 
5.2. Selected Sources for Content Analysis 
 
Chapter 4 provided a set of hypotheses that investigate the political communication seen from 
the perspective of the political parties and the media during the time of parliamentary 
campaigns. In order to answer these hypotheses the study examined two different sources – 
party spots and media coverage. The following paragraphs explain the reasoning which led to 
selection of these sources. Firstly, party spots were analyzed. Party broadcasts generally 
belong to the core repertoire of research material in numerous projects related to analyzing 
political communication (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Kaid, 2004). The commercials were 
particularly useful for analysis as they show how the process of mediatization of politics is 
reflected in political campaigning. Moreover, party spots represent “pure” messages sent by 
political parties and the content of commercials is not affected or abridged by journalists-
gatekeepers. Finally, party broadcasts show how parties themselves anticipate and express 
political culture in their own country and how their campaigning might be influenced by 
political system characteristics.  
 
Party spots are not the only object of analysis in studies related to political communication 
seen from the perspective of political parties (Kaid, 2004). Still, this project did not include 
other tools used by the parties during their campaigning. Radio spots and internet platforms of 
parties were not taken into account due to their availability: available data was either very 
limited or did not longer exist at all. This issue was particularly mirrored when collecting 
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internet resources, most of them (especially from earlier campaigns) were removed from 
WWW. Generally, so far there has been much less increase in research using internet as an 
object of analysis compared to other media. Some of the reasons may include the difficulty of 
conducting internet studies (McMillan, 2000) but also still fairly limited reach in such 
countries like Poland.  Another issue that arose while collecting resources for content analysis 
was also the question of comparability between both countries. This found its exemplification 
in the exclusion of political posters from the analysis. While political posters had a long 
tradition in Germany (Lessinger, Moka & Holtz-Bacha, 2003; Holtz-Bacha & Lessinger, 
2006), they were barely present in Poland because political parties usually presented only 
formats limited to showing the candidates’ faces. Thus billboard campaigns were excluded 
due to substantial differences between Germany and Poland in that respect.  
 
The analysis of party spots was followed by examination of media coverage of parliamentary 
elections in newspapers. Again, press titles are commonly used in empirical studies related to 
political communication. According to Kamhawi & Weaver (2003) mass communication 
studies tend to focus on traditional broadcast and print media. Analysing media coverage 
enables showing how the media present the political scene and whether the processes of 
mediatization of politics can be detected. Additionally, newspapers are especially useful as 
they reflect the changes occurring in the media sector over the last decade. This was 
particularly relevant in case of Poland where the press landscape changed to the large extent 
in the last years (Jakubowicz, 2007) with changes being reflected in both format and content 
(Filas, 1995; Filas, 2001).  
 
The empirical part related to media coverage did not include television news or internet 
materials. That was again due to resources availability; internet data and television news 
concerning earlier campaigns (especially in Poland) did not exist70 or are no longer available 
(e.g. internet platforms were removed from the serves, television news from the 90s were no 
longer stored in archives). And since this study intended to compare political communication 
that occurred over time in the last three parliamentary campaigns research material embracing 
all analyzed campaigns was needed. As a consequence newspaper coverage and party spots 
became the object of examination as it enabled a comparison between both Germany and 
Poland over the last decade. Nevertheless, while conducting this study television news 
                                               
70
 One should bear in mind that the first Polish internet portal Wirtualna Polska emerged in 1995.  
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showed during the 2005 campaigns were recorded by the author and will be used in future 
comparisons, when the data can be collected by the researchers on the day of emission of a 
given programme.  
 
5.2.1. Party Spots 
 
Content analysis was used to examine the style and content of the German and Polish party 
spots. The Polish sample consisted of 143 ads showed during free broadcast time in public 
television. The analyzed spots were presented in the last weeks prior to the 1997, 2001 and 
2005 parliamentary elections in Poland. The data was collected from the Pracownia 
Dokumentacji i Badań Życia Politycznego, a research laboratory of University of Wrocław 
engaged in documenting political life in Poland.  
 
As provided in Table 9, the number of spots per campaign varied. This was caused by two 
factors. Firstly, the number of parties participating in a given elections was not equal. 
Secondly, parties presented the same spot more than once which led to the reduction of the 
analyzed sample. The analysis concerning the 1997 parliamentary elections included spots 
produced by AWS, UW, ROP, SLD and PSL. The analysis comprising the spots prepared for 
the 2001 parliamentary campaign included commercials presented by AWSP, UW, SLD/UP, 
PSL, PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense. Finally, the empirical material referring to the 2005 was 
composed by spots produced by SLD, PSL, PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense.  
 
Table 9: Analyzed Polish party spots 
 1997 Campaign 2001 Campaign 2005 Campaign 
Number of spots 37 58 48 
TOTAL 143 spots 
 
Thus the analysis of the Polish spots included only those produced by the parties which 
managed to get their representatives into Sejm in a given parliamentary campaign. Exception 
was made with reference to two parties, AWSP and UW – both parties (AWSP was a 
successor of AWS) won the election in 1997 but did not manage to get elected four years 
later. This exception was made due to the fact that one of the hypotheses related to party spots 
compares the communication strategies of political incumbents and challengers (Trent & 
Friedenberg, 1983). This would not be possible if both AWSP and UW were excluded.  
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The German analysis embraced 37 ads. The data was collected from the archives of two 
German institutions, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 
The selection of party spots was based on the same criteria as in case of Poland. The analysis 
included the commercials prepared by the parties which were successful in a given 
parliamentary election securing a parliamentary representation in Bundestag. Thus coded 
material comprised spots prepared by CDU, CSU, FDP, SLD, the Greens, PDS in all three 
analyzed campaigns in 1998, 2002 and 2005. Table 10 provides an overview of the analyzed 
German commercials.  
 
The size of the German sample was much smaller when compared with the Polish data. This 
sheds some light on the substantial difference in political advertising in both countries. In 
Germany, political parties did not produce different spots for each time slot provided by the 
German public television stations. Polish parties however usually presented a number of 
different spots adjusted to their number of free time slots. As a result most of the German 
spots were repeated which had an impact on the size of the sample. This problem is not new 
in the political advertising research. Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) collected 67 spots of 21 
German parties participating in the 1990 Bundestag elections, however the final sample 
comprised only 37 different spots. The reduction of analyzed research material was caused by 
the repetition of the spots. Similarly, Jakubowski (1998) collected 130 spots showed in public 
television by 22 German parties campaigning during the 1994 Bundestag elections. However, 
the final sample consisted of only 31 different spots. Again, the German parties tended to 
show the same ads throughout the whole campaign. Due to the much smaller number of spots 
and the fact that both public television stations ARD and ZDF showed the same spots, the 
German sample was extended. The total number of 37 spots thus comprised both commercials 
shown in public and commercial television.  
 
Table 10: Analyzed German party spots 
 1998 Campaign 2002 Campaign 2005 Campaign 
Number of spots 10 10 17 
TOTAL 37 spots 
 
The number of analyzed spots in both countries was considerably different. However, this 
difference resulted from the inherent style of party campaigning in both countries. 
Nevertheless conducted study is the first attempt to bring together any comparable data on 
Germany and Poland. Similar problems also did occur in other comparative projects. Kaid & 
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Holtz-Bacha (1995) compared political advertising across cultures in 6 countries with samples 
ranging from 8 broadcasts from British parties to 81 American spots. Even if this study was 
extended to all Polish and German parties participating in a given election the problem of 
disproportion would persist. That is due to the fact that even smaller Polish parties tend to 
present more than one spot instead of showing the same clip more than once.  
 
5.2.2. Media Coverage 
 
A systematic, quantitative content analysis of the press coverage in German and Polish daily 
newspapers was conducted to show the media coverage on parliamentary elections campaigns 
in both countries. The coverage over a period of last four weeks prior to the selected 
parliamentary elections was coded. Within those four weeks every second day was analyzed. 
The German media included following periods: 31.08.1998 – 26.09.1998, 26.08.2002 – 
21.09.2002 and 22.08.2005 – 17.09.2005. The Polish media embraced newspapers published 
between 25.08.1997 – 20.09.1997, 27.08.2001 – 22.09.2001 and 29.08.2005 – 24.09.2005. 
This four-week period, during which also public television shows party broadcasts, is 
generally regarded as the “hot phase” of the election campaign (Kaid, 2004; Wilke & 
Reinemann, 2000). The last month before the polling day is seen as a time of the most 
intensive party campaigning with the largest volume of campaign oriented articles in the press 
(Kaid, 2004). 
 
The selection of newspapers was based on the criterion of comparability between both 
countries. Thus three German daily newspapers were the objects of investigation: the 
“Süddeutsche Zeitung”, the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ) and the “Bild”. The first 
two papers were selected for four reasons. Firstly, both the FAZ and the “Süddeutsche 
Zeitung” belong to the group of German quality newspapers (Kindelmann, 1994). Secondly, 
both newspapers are an example of high journalistic professionalism and are used as a 
yardstick by journalists in other media (Kepplinger, 1998; Kepplinger, Brosius & Staab, 
1991). Thirdly, both newspapers belong to the leading titles in Germany. Of four major 
German newspapers (the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, the “Frankfurter Rundschau”, the 
“Die Welt”, the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”) it is the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” that has the biggest 
readership estimated at approximately 436 000 copies sold per day (WAN, 2007). As leading 
media they also act as opinion multipliers among the society and Leitmedia for other 
information providers (Kindelmann, 1994). Fourthly, editorial stances reflect the political 
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spectrum of Germany. Arranged on the political scale, the FAZ is center-right and the 
“Süddeutsche Zeitung” is center-left (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). Therefore they should 
indicate if there are differences between left and right newspapers.   
 
The German media sample included also the “Bild”, a national newspaper but a tabloid. It has 
a readership of nearly 4 million – the highest circulation of a daily newspaper in Germany at 
all (WAN, 2007). As the result all three German newspapers represent both serious and 
sensationalist/tabloid outlets on a national level. Therefore, a comparison between different 
types of newspapers and the way they react to the mediatization processes was made possible.  
 
The selection of Polish newspapers was based on the similar criteria. Three Polish daily 
newspapers were the objects of investigation: the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the “Rzeczpospolita” 
and the “Super Express”. The first two titles were selected for the same reason as the German 
FAZ and the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”. Firstly, both the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the 
“Rzeczpospolita” are regarded as quality newspapers. The “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the first 
legally published independent daily is currently one of the largest newspapers in the country 
with a circulation of half a million copies. It started 1989 as an eight-page newspaper 
prepared by opposition journalists who until then worked for the underground press connected 
with Solidarity and is now one of the nation’s key opinion-forming publications. The 
“Rzeczpospolita” is also regarded as a opinion-generating newspaper, and also a leader in 
providing legal and economic information. Both the “Rzeczpospolita” and the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza” are widely quoted by foreign media and seen as credible source of information 
(IMM Reports, 2007). Secondly, both titles are seen as representing high professional skills 
among journalists. Thirdly, both newspapers belong to the group of the best selling dailies 
(Filas, 2005) and are seen as opinion-forming Polish media. Nevertheless, their editorial 
stances reflect the political spectrum in a rather similar manner, favoring post-Solidarity 
parties to post-communist groupings. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” however, generally tends to 
pronounce its political sympathies more openly than the “Rzeczpospolita” and many of its 
journalists were active in opposition movements in the 80s. 
 
The Polish media sample also embraced the “Super Express” which can be perceived as an 
equivalent of the German “Bild” and is currently the second largest tabloid in Poland. The 
study did not include the biggest tabloid “Fakt”, which is often described as a literal copy of 
the “Bild” (both newspapers have the same publisher, which is Axel Springer Verlag) as the 
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newspaper did not exist in 1997 during the analyzed period. Again, selection of newspapers 
enabled comparison between high quality and sensationalist titles. The Polish media sample 
was thus comparable with the German sample as selected newspapers perform similar role in 
a media landscape of a given country. 
 
Table 11: Analyzed Polish newspapers 
 1997 Campaign 2001 Campaign 2005 Campaign 
Gazeta Wyborcza 125 86 137 
Rzeczpospolita 132 106 129 
Super Express 56 67 81 
Total 313 259 347 
 
All articles were coded according to the guidelines provided in coding instruments which is to 
be discussed at greater length in the next paragraphs. The sample consisted of 919 Polish and 
1277 German articles. The Polish newspapers were obtained from the Library of University of 
Wrocław, which has an archive comprising paper version of all analyzed titles. The German 
newspapers were collected from two institutions. Technical University of Dresden provided 
the coders with part of the newspapers which were used in previous project conducted in the 
Institute for Media and Communication (IfK). The remaining newspapers were coded in the 
Library of Technical University of Dresden (SLUB), where coders used both papers editions 
and archived microfilms.  
 
Table 12: Analyzed German newspapers 
 1998 Campaign 2002 Campaign 2005 Campaign 
FAZ 146 134 148 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 157 181 191 
Bild 89 122 109 
Total 392 437 448 
 
The number of articles coded in both countries varied. That is due to two factors. Firstly, the 
Polish “Super Express” generally published less articles related to politics than its German 
equivalent71, especially during the 1997 campaign, when sometimes in a given newspaper 
only one article was coded. Secondly, during the Polish 2001 parliamentary campaign the 
September agenda was largely defined by articles related to the terrorist attack on the World 
                                               
71
 Overall the “Bild” published more articles related to politics than the “Super Express” which was also 
confirmed in the empirical analysis.  
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Trade Center. This also resulted in a lower number of coded articles72. The samples were 
composed as showed in Table 11 and Table 12.  
 
5.3. Coding Instruments 
 
The quantitative content analysis embraced two types of coding books. In the following 
paragraphs the essential features of coding instruments will be presented. Coding book 
prepared for spot analysis was based on studies of Polish, US, German, French and English 
political commercials (Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Trent & Friedenberg, 
1983, Trutkowski, 2000). All variables were coded on the spot level meaning that every spot 
was taken as a single unit of analysis. No variables were coded on a sequence level. 
Researchers using this second methodological procedure, derived among others from the film 
analysis, divide party spots into sequences (or scenes) which are understood as continuum of 
place, time and action. Coding on sequence level has already been applied to other analysis of 
German spots by Holtz-Bacha (2000). This study did not use sequence level coding because 
Polish spots are often very long, which would result in a larger volume of coded sequences, 
especially when compared to Germany. Therefore, for the reason of comparative analysis, 
categories were coded on the spot level. In this context it should be however mentioned that 
coding on spot or sequence level is equally valid and both procedures can be applied in 
studies that aim at comparisons.  
 
In each of investigated election campaigns the same set of variables referring to party spots 
was coded, which enabled a comparison over time. Formal variables included the name of the 
party that produced a given spot, year of a given campaign and the length of a particular 
commercial (in seconds). In the next step all content variables which assessed inter alia the 
professionalization level of spots, negativity level in depicturing candidates and issues, the 
extent of personalization, and the emotionalization level were analyzed. Additionally, the 
coding instrument examined theme spectrum and incumbent/challenger strategies (Trent & 
Friedenberg, 1983) presented in commercials (see Table 13). These variables will be 
presented at much greater length in the next paragraphs showing how they match the 
hypotheses posed in the research study. The coding book concerning party spots is attached as 
Appendix A. A team of intensively trained coders analyzed the spots using described coding 
                                               
72
 Many articles were related to stories of individuals involved in the 11th September tragedy and were thus not 
coded. 
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book. The uniformity of approach within the coders was checked through reliability tests, 
results of which are outlined in the last part of this Chapter.  
 
Table 13: Party spots – Coding Scheme  
FORMAL  
VARIABLES 
  name of the producer 
  year of a given campaign  
  spot’s length   
 
CONTENT 
VARIABLES 
 
 
professionalization   professionalization level 
  use of special effect 
  changes of camera perspectives 
 
negative appeals   negativity level 
       type of criticism 
  stressing honesty 
 
focus on leaders  
 
   spot’s format 
   number of presented candidates 
         centrality 
         personalization level 
               coverage on private life 
 
emotional appeals   emotionalization level 
 
theme spectrum    up to 5 themes coded in a given ad; 
selection from 10 theme blocks 
 
incumbent and 
challenger strategies  
  variables adopted from Trent & 
Friedenberg (1983) 
 
 
The coding instrument concerning media coverage was based on earlier studies of political 
reporting (Noelle-Neumann, Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1999; 2005; Trutkowski, 2000). The 
final coding book included selected variables from the Kampa projects conducted by 
Technical University of Dresden, University of Mainz and Allensbach Institute (Noelle-
Neumann, Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1999; 2005). For both German and Polish media 
coverage three separate coding books (one for each campaign in each country) were prepared. 
This gave the total number of six coding instruments. All coding books included the same 
categories. However the differed in the selection of answers in case of some variables. To 
give an example: the spectrum of coded actors representing CDU in 1998 included the 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however in 2001 it was Edmund Stoiber and in 2005 it was Angela 
Merkel who took this position. The same procedure was applied to the analysis of photos as 
each campaign embraced a separate list of political players that were coded in a given 
campaign (see Appendix B for details).   
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Table 14: Media coverage – Coding Scheme  
FORMAL  
VARIABLES 
  coded medium 
  article number 
  publication date 
  publication page 
  style 
 
  theme spectrum (up to 3 themes) 
  prominence of placement 
 
  personalization 
  photos’ analysis: candidate’s appearance 
                                   impression of appearance 
                                   “plus-minus” impression 
 
Negativity in articles 
  tone of article 
Additionally in articles where conflicts were articulated: 
  extent of dramatized reporting 
  conflict-oriented vs cooperation depicturing 
 
Negativity in themes 
  tone of a given theme 
  forecast for a given theme 
 
CONTENT 
VARIABLES 
& PHOTO 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
  tendency of depicturing of political parties 
  responsibility for failures/achievements 
 
The coders analyzed all newspapers’ sections related to national politics as well as the certain 
additional sections of newspapers which were neatly connected with the national politics. In 
order to assess the relevancy of a given article for the analysis, the headline and the lead of the 
article were read in detail and the rest of the text was just skimmed through by the coders to 
determine whether the article was to be scrutinized. The analysis did not include statistics and 
graphics or readers’ letters. However, if a given graphics or statistics showed information 
related to party campaigns (e.g. results of polls, diagrams with possible outcomes of elections, 
possible coalitions etc.), they were coded as well. The graphics in that case were coded not as 
photos but as a text, similarly as articles. The coders analyzed articles related to the theme 
blocks: political parties; party leaders, parliamentary campaign itself (strategies used by 
parties, political advertising, role of political consultants etc.); economic and finance policy; 
social policy; relations between the state and politics (relations between political institutions, 
lustration, political scandals, bribery etc.); domestic security, foreign policy, environmental 
issues and finally, immigration policies.   
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Coding books prepared for newspapers analyses included both formal and content categories 
(see Table 14). The formal categories included the coded medium, number of the article in a 
given newspaper, date of publication, page number on which a given article was published, 
source of information (journalist, information agency, multiple sources etc.), prominence of 
placement (coded on a four point scale) and style (news, reportage, comment or 
interviews/documentation).  
 
The content variables were coded on two different levels: partly on the article level and partly 
on the theme level. Categories related to a given article as a whole (independently of the 
presented theme) included, among others, tone of a given article, tendency of depicturing of 
political parties, personalization (up to three main actors could be identified per article). 
Additionally, in articles where conflicts were discussed, the coders analyzed the extent of 
dramatization and whether the media concentrated on conflict-oriented or cooperation-
oriented depicturing. Finally, the coders analyzed whether political parties were blamed for a 
given problem or whether they were praised for political actions. These categories are 
explained in the next paragraphs where the hypotheses are presented. The other part of 
categories was coded on the theme level. If themes referred to party leaders, parties or 
political campaigning coding on theme level did not take place. For other topics depicturing 
of a given theme and forecast for a development of a given theme was coded. Collected data 
was transferred into the SPSS programme for the purpose of statistical analysis.  
 
5.4. Applied Variables 
 
The following paragraphs outline variables formulated in coding instruments. Firstly, 
variables used in coding party spots are presented. In the next step, categories applied in 
media coverage are provided. The presentation of variables is structured according to the 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4.  
 
H1: German spots are more professional than Polish spots 
 
The coding instrument measured the professionalization level. Coders analyzed the overall 
impression of the whole spot. The distinction was made between high, medium and low 
professionalization level based on spots’ dynamics, applied music (e.g. whether it sounded 
amateur or whether it was tailored to the spot’s dynamics etc.), frequency of sequences (e.g. 
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whether spots appeared to be static or more video-clip oriented) and extent of visual effects. 
Thus high professionalization level was coded, for instance, in case of spots that resembled 
modern video clips and were underpinned by mobilizing music. Additionally the coders 
evaluated the overall use of special effects, and changes of camera perspective. For both 
categories high, medium and low level could be selected. 
 
H2: Polish spots use more negative appeals than German spots 
 
The coding instrument measured the negativity level. High negativity referred to spots which 
were dominated by negative appeals on a verbal or visual level. The negativity could be also 
increased by using specific music that stimulated the feelings of fear or anxiety. For instance, 
high use of negative appeals would be coded for a commercial which shows images of 
unemployed people underpinned by melody evoking sadness among viewers. Medium 
negativity was noted for the spots where negative coverage constituted less than a half of the 
spot. Low negativity referred to commercials where negative attacks were visible only in a 
very limited number of sequences. Finally, the fourth category embraced ads that did not 
contain any negative messages. Simultaneously the study focused on the type of criticism 
exerted. The coding instrument made a distinction between four different types of negative 
appeals. The coders analyzed whether political parties attacked the policies of their opponents 
(e.g. party X contributed to the increase of unemployment by 10% etc.) or whether they 
concentrated on their opponents’ character (e.g.  party Y is a party of bandits, deeply 
corrupted etc.). The third type of criticism referred to the appeals when parties used both 
program and character-oriented attacks. Finally, the fourth type was related to the criticism 
that could not be attributed to any particular party but remained present, e.g. on the visual 
level or by use of music which evokes feelings of anxiety.  
 
In this context it should be also stressed that the negativity level and the type of criticism are 
tightly connected with a political culture of a given country. This political culture can be also 
scrutinized using other indicators, such as central values stressed by political candidates in 
their ads. According to Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) honesty is one of the main character 
qualities stressed by the parties. Thus the coding instrument measured also whether Polish and 
German politicians stress their honesty as a quality necessary for public office. In so doing 
the study scrutinized whether political parties in both countries tended to strengthen own 
credibility. It can be expected that Polish candidates will pronounce own honesty to the larger 
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extent than its German colleagues. Polish society continuously lacks trust in politics, does not 
perceive political players as reliable decision-makers (CBOS, 2006b) and has little knowledge 
related to politics. These phenomena are also applicable to Germany to some extend. 
However, civic participation among German population in political life is generally seen as 
high (Gabriel & Holtmann, 2005). As a consequence Polish political players might stress own 
honesty to appear more trustworthy. 
 
H3: German spots focus on leaders more than Polish spots 
 
In order to measure the extent of personalization the coding instrument used a number of 
categories. Firstly, presentation formats (spots with candidates or without candidates) were 
analyzed. Secondly, the number of politicians (together with their names) presented in spots 
with candidates was noted. In the next step, the coders evaluated up to three politicians. 
Selection of candidates was based on their position in a party. If more than one candidate was 
noted the analysis would always include the leader of a given party (if he/she was presented). 
In the next step, candidates that were presented in the longest time spectrum were evaluated. 
Having selected up to three politicians, the coders evaluated the level of centrality for each of 
them (whether he/she appear only in a few sequences or whether the spot concentrated only 
on him/her). Then, the level of personalization (whether the commercial concentrates on the 
personal characteristics or focuses on the political issues) was measured. High personalization 
was coded for spots that discussed character features of a given candidate. Medium level was 
used for commercials in which candidates were presented in the context of both their political 
programme and their personality. Finally, low level was coded in ads in which the emphasis 
was put mainly on the political issues. Additionally, in ads where personalization was noted, 
coders also examined the extent of coverage regarding private life which again included 
high, medium and low level.  
 
H4: German spots use more emotionalization than Polish spots 
 
The coding instrument measured the emotionalization level on a four point scale. A high level 
of emotionalization was assigned to the spots where emotional appeals dominated in visual, 
verbal and music domains. For instance, high use of emotional messages would be coded for a 
commercials resembling music-clips that aim at evoking viewers’ feelings and refrain from 
using rational arguments. A medium emotionalization level referred to the spots in which the 
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extent of both emotional and logical components was similar. A low level was noted for 
commercials where logical arguments dominated. Finally, the fourth category referred to the 
ads where no emotionalization was noted. 
 
H5: Polish and German spots embrace theme spectrum that reflects topical themes 
 
The coding instrument intended to determine the main subjects of the campaign 
advertisements and provide an accurate guide to the thematic spectrum. In each ad coders 
could select up to five topics. The coding instruments included themes divided into following 
subcategories: political candidates, party campaigning issues, economic and financial policies, 
social policies, relations between the state and politics, social condition of the country, 
domestic security, foreign policy, environment issues and migration/minorities matters.  
 
H6: Polish and German incumbents/challengers differ partly in their strategies 
 
The coding instrument, as mentioned above, used categories adjusted from Trent & 
Friedenberg (1983). Incumbent strategies were represented by the following variables: 
mentioning offices, stressing competence and the office, mentioning the position of 
Chancellor (only for German spots), emphasizing own accomplishments, consulting world 
leaders, using endorsements by other parties, using endorsements by others (ordinary people, 
experts, idols etc.). Coding challenger strategies included following categories: calling for 
change, taking the offensive on issues, emphasizing optimism for the future, speaking to 
traditional values, and attacking the record of opponents. The incumbent and challenger 
strategies were coded as to their presence or absence in a given spot. The only exception was 
made to the evaluation of endorsements understood as statements delivered by both well-
known individuals (artists, scientists etc.) and ordinary citizens with the aim of showing the 
support for a given party. This strategy was first coded as to its presence or absence in a given 
ad. In the next step, the coders could choose between large, medium and low use of 
testimonials. It can be expected that Polish ads will use testimonials to the larger extent. 
Poland is defined by substantial fluctuations among political players (Paszkiewicz, 2004). 
Polish political players are often unknown among society, which is partly a result of changing 
party’s name, frequent foundation of alliances just before election time and high number of 
politicians who switch from one party to another. As a consequence they may tend to use 
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idols and experts (Trutkowski, 2000) trying to overtake their popularity and become more 
recognizable.  
 
The variables discussed above will be used in the empirical analysis of party advertising. The 
following paragraphs present the set of categories that is to be utilized in the assessment of 
media reporting. Again, the overview of proposed variables is structured according to the 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. 
 
H1: German and Polish media coverage concentrates on party campaigning 
 
In order to test whether there can be observed an increasing emphasis on elections the coding 
instrument evaluated the theme spectrum. For each article coders could select up to three 
different themes discussed in a given journalistic piece. The topics were divided into eleven 
categories and included: political parties, political leaders, party campaigning, economic 
issues, social policies, relations between the state and politics, domestic security, foreign 
policy, environmental issues and finally, immigration policies. The theme political leaders 
was coded only for candidates mentioned in the coding instrument73. Additionally, for the 
2005 media coverage in Poland theme presidential elections was coded. In this context it 
should be also mentioned how the topics were coded. If a given article reported 
predominantly about party campaigning and only marginally about other issues, the coders 
selected only one theme. However, if other topics were also discussed at greater length, they 
were coded as well. For instance, if a given journalistic piece reported on both campaigning 
activities and simultaneously portrayed a given political leader, two themes party 
campaigning and political leaders were coded.   
 
In the next step, the coding instrument assessed the prominence of placement of articles 
related to party campaigning. Since the number of stories was limited by space, the 
prominence of placement suggested the news value of a given article. Measured on a four 
point scale, the coders indicated where the articles were placed. Articles published as the main 
articles on the cover or as longer comments on the cover were coded as indicating the very 
high prominence of placement. High prominence was noted for shorter articles published on 
the first page or as opening articles on the next page. Thirdly, medium prominence of 
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 The coding book comprised only party leader or leaders of a given electoral alliance. The same procedure was 
used in the assessment of personalization. See next paragraphs and Appendix B for details.  
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placement was assigned to single-column articles on the first page or shorter article on the 
next pages. Finally, low prominence was noted for single-column articles published beginning 
from the second page. For instance, if an article appeared as a short journalistic piece on the 
fourth page of the newspaper, it was assigned the lowest prominence of placement.  
 
H2: Personalization is more visible in German than in Polish media coverage  
 
The coding instrument measured the extent of personalization of party leaders. This category 
was coded only in articles presenting certain candidates mentioned in the coding instrument 
(see Appendix B for details). The coding book comprised party leaders or leaders of a given 
electoral alliance74. If a given article included references to more than one of coded 
politicians, then the extent of personalized reporting was coded for each of them. The 
category measured the level of personalization using a five point scale ranging from clearly 
politics-oriented articles to clearly person-oriented ones. For instance, if a given journalistic 
piece focused on the political programme of a given candidate the articles was assessed as 
politics-oriented. If however a candidate was showed mainly in the context of his personality, 
his features of character, it was coded as person-oriented.  
 
In this context it should be stressed that the selection of coding periods, which included only 
four weeks prior to each campaign, and the number of newspapers limited the use of 
categories related to personalization. It would be undoubtedly interesting to show in detail 
which person-oriented features were highlighted by the media and whether Polish and 
German coverage differed in that respect. Such a comparison however would require a larger 
sample and thus much longer coding period and/or additional title would be needed. Instead, 
the analysis proposed the evaluation of pictures showing coded political leaders. Picture 
analysis embraced the evaluation of the way candidates were presented indicating features 
describing appearance such as, energetic, trustworthy, loved by voters, easy going, spreading 
good humor, feeling insecure, likeable, serious, capable to achieve his/her goals etc. All 
features were coded using a five point scale ranging from “fully correct” though ambivalent to 
“fully incorrect”. For instance, if a photo showed Donald Tusk dressed in a more causal way, 
his appearance would be coded as easy going. Additionally the coders examined so-called 
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 It should be remembered that certain political groupings, for instance, Civic Platform, did not have formal 
structures in 2001 and operated as an electoral alliance under the leadership of three funding fathers Tusk, 
Płażynski and Olechowski.  
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“plus-minus” appearance stating whether the depicturing of head and hands of a given 
candidate showed him/her in a positive or negative light. As demonstrated by research studies 
(Petersen & Jandura, 2007; Petersen, 2006) individual elements or “signals” in visual news 
coverage, such as head position, may lead to assigning different characteristics to presented 
candidates. For instance, if Gerhard Schröder was showed among cheering crowds waving to 
the voters, the picture would be assessed as representing “plus” appearance. 
 
H3: Negativity is more frequent in Polish than in German media 
 
The coding instrument analyzed the tone of a given article. The category used a five point 
scale ranging from clearly positive/optimistic to clearly negative/pessimistic journalistic 
pieces. For instance, clearly positive tone was coded in articles when the reader had an 
impression that described themes were positive or promised optimistic outcomes in the future. 
If a given article left overall a positive impression however reflected journalistic concerns as 
to its future development is was assessed as rather positive. If the negative aspects dominated, 
the article was coded as either rather negative or clearly negative.  
 
Additionally, in articles in which conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were 
articulated the coding instrument measured whether a given article presented these in a 
dramatized manner or whether it minimized possible risks and dangers related to it. For 
example, if an article discussed conflicts among future coalition partners and showed that 
these animosities were likely to have a negative impact on the functioning of the future 
government, the coders assessed it as dramatized one. Simultaneously the coding instrument 
measured whether in this group of articles journalists used cooperation or conflict-oriented 
depicturing. This last category was measured on a five-point scale, ranging from clearly 
conflict-oriented to consensus-oriented depicturing. For instance, if a given journalistic piece 
showed the animosities between certain groupings and stressed their inability to find 
compromise, it was coded as conflict-oriented depicturing. 
 
In the second step, in order to evaluate the media coverage in a more profound manner, the 
coding instrument measured the negativity related to themes articulated in a given article. 
Thus the extent of negative evaluations was coded not on the article level, but on the theme 
level. Using a five point scale the coders coded the tone of a given theme ranging again from 
clearly positive to clearly negative assessment. For example, if an article showed positive 
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effects of the foreign policy of Polish government, the theme was coded as depictured in a 
positive manner. In the next step, the coder evaluated the forecast for a given theme. Thus, if 
foreign policy was evaluated positively, but the journalist indicated his/her concerns as to the 
future outcomes of diplomatic efforts, the forecast was coded as either ambivalent or rather 
negative depending on the intensity of the journalistic evaluations.   
 
H4: Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies 
 
In order to assess whether media coverage is in favor of a particular party the coding 
instrument measured tone of depicturing of political parties. The tendency was coded for the 
whole article and reflected whether parties were presented in a positive or negative manner. 
The assessment embraced only those parties which gained parliamentary seats in the analyzed 
elections. In Poland, the analysis concerning the 1997 parliamentary elections included media 
depicturing of AWS, UW, ROP, SLD and PSL. The analysis of the newspapers’ coverage 
referring to the 2001 parliamentary campaign included AWSP, UW, SLD/UP, PSL, PO, PiS, 
LPR and Self-Defense. Similarly, as in case of spots, AWSP and UW were included into the 
study in 2001. These two groupings did not gain any seats in Sejm 2001 but the results of their 
depicturing were needed to compare media coverage on government parties in the whole 
analyzed period. Finally, media depicturing in 2005 included evaluations of SLD, PSL, PO, 
PiS, LPR and Self-Defense. In Germany, the analysis of tone of presenting political parties 
embraced CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, the Greens and PDS in three analyzed campaigns. Again, 
the category used a five point scale ranging from clearly positive to clearly negative tone of 
depicturing. Positive tone was noted if a party was showed in a context of its positive or 
successful performance, for instance, if the article suggested that a given party was likely to 
achieve good results on the polling day.  
 
Again, in this context it would be useful to assess the depicturing of concrete parties in a 
context of single themes. However, the selection of analyzed periods and the number of 
analyzed newspapers was limited to apply categories reflecting the tone of depicturing of 
political actors according to the discussed topics. Instead, the coding instrument assessed 
whether parties were blamed for certain negative developments or whether they were praised 
for positive changes. Thus in articles where negative processes were articulated, the coders 
used a five point scale to assess whether the articles showed that a certain party was 
responsible for failures. In a similar manner, in articles where positive results were presented, 
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the coders assessed whether a concrete political grouping was responsible for achievements. 
For instance, if the article presented negative outcomes of the economic reforms and 
suggested that these occurred due to reforms introduced by SLD, the party was assessed as 
responsible for failures in financial policies.  
 
5.5. Reliability 
 
Carmines & Zeller (1979) define reliability as the extent to which a measuring procedure 
delivers the same results on repeated trials. When research material is coded by human coders 
this is mirrored in intercoder reliability understood as level of agreement between two or more 
coders. As noted by Neuendorf (2002) in content analysis, reliability is paramount. The author 
refers to the study by Riffe and Freitag (1997) to show that the practice of reporting reliability 
coefficients is still insufficient. Riffe and Freitag (1997) examined 486 content analysis 
studies published in Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly from 1971 through 1995 
and found that only 56% of the studies reported intercoder reliability figures. Another 
assessment of 200 content analyses in the communication literature conducted by Lombard, 
Snyder-Duch & Bracken (2002) showed that among analyzed articles only 69% discussed 
intercoder reliability while only 41% of those where intercoder reliability was provided 
reliability variable by variable.  
 
Reliability is measured by the results of conducted pretests which indicate whether the coding 
scheme is understood in a same manner by coders. This study used the Holsti’s (1969) 
method to calculate the intercoder reliability coefficients: 
 
Holsti’s (1969) method:  PAo = 2A / (nA + nB) 
Where PAo stands for proportion of observed agreement, A is the number of agreements between two coders, 
and nA and nB are the number of units coded by coders A and B respectively. Thus this statistic ranges from .00 
(no agreement) to 1.00 which marks complete agreement.   
 
The necessary pretests were conducted with trained Polish and German coders. Altogether 
five coders were recruited for coding process. Data regarding German party commercials and 
media coverage was coded by three students of the Technical University of Dresden, and the 
author. All selected German coders are currently enrolled at the Institute of Media and 
Communication (IfK) and participated also in other empirical analyses. The process of 
candidates’ selection was run through the email postings of the Institute of Media and 
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Communication which informed the students about the project. Simultaneously, data 
concerning Polish party spots and media reporting was coded by two students representing 
University of Wrocław, Wrocław University of Economics, and the author. In this context it 
should be stressed that Polish universities do not offer full programmes in communication 
studies. Courses related to media constitute still only a part of studies of politics, international 
relations, Polish philology or economics. Recruited Polish coders did not possess experience 
in coding research material and were thus trained intensively. As demonstrated by the results 
of the pretests in the following paragraphs, results obtained by Polish students were 
comparable to those achieved by German coders.  
 
The training itself was organized in a form of intensive sessions in which coders worked 
together on provided sample material. Due to the fact that coders worked with different 
coding books for spots and newspapers the training was divided into sessions dedicated only 
to a given type of coding instrument. Therefore coders were first instructed how to analyze 
spots and reliability tests were conducted. In the second step, the coders concentrated on the 
coding book for newspapers and after training the pretest concerning articles and photos was 
applied. Collected figures, as indicated in the next paragraphs, are within a range that denotes 
a high level of reliability (Früh, 2001).  
 
5.5.1. Pretest: Party Spots 
 
The party commercials were coded by trained Polish and German coders. Intercoder 
reliability was computed using Holsti’s formula and averaged 1 for formal categories. Table 
15 shows intecoder reliability for selected textual categories related to party spots. These 
figures prove high level of reliability (Merten, 1995; Rössler, 2005). The overall results of 
German coders were slightly better than the intercoder reliability of Polish coders. This might 
be due to two factors. Firstly, German spots were coded by experienced students who have 
already participated in empirical projects. Polish coders were not previously involved in 
projects requiring content analysis. Secondly, the assessment of Polish spots was in general 
more difficult. For instance, German coders did not have any doubt while assigning 
professionalization level of a given commercial. However, Polish students were confronted 
with ads that integrated sequences using quite different professional standards. Thus the 
overall assessment of Polish commercials was more problematic.  
 
 132 
Table 15: Party Spots - Intercoder reliability for selected categories 
Category Polish coders  German coders  
Professionalization level 0.87 0.9 
Use of special effects 0.87 0.9 
Changes of camera perspectives 1.0 1.0 
Negativity level 0.87 1.0 
Type of criticism  1.0 0.9 
Personalization level 1.0 1.0 
Coverage on private lives 1.0 1.0 
Centrality of political actors 0.87 0.9 
Stressing honesty 0.87 1.0 
Emotionalization level 0.87 0.9 
Incumbents and challengers 
strategies  
between 0.87 and 1.0 between 0.8 and 1.0 
 
5.5.2. Pretest: Media Coverage 
 
Intercoder reliability calculated for articles and photos was also computed using Holsti’s 
formula and averaged 1 for formal categories. Table 16 indicates obtained values across 
textual categories. Again, achieved intercoder reliability marks a high level of agreement 
between the coders. The overall results of German coders are slightly better than the 
intercoder reliability of Polish coders which again can be due to their coding experience. 
 
Table 16: Media Coverage - Intercoder reliability for selected categories  
Category Polish coders  German coders  
Tone of article 0.80 0.96 
Tone of depicturing of political parties 0.79 0.75 
Personalization 0.80 0.91 
Conflict-oriented vs cooperation depicturing  0.76 0.88 
Theme spectrum 0.77 0.81 
Tone of a given theme 0.77 0.90 
Forecast for a given theme 0.77 0.94 
Extent of dramatized reporting 0.76 0.87 
Photos/Energetic 0.80 0.88 
Photos/Trustworthy  0.73 0.88 
Photos/Loved by Voters 1.0 1.0 
Photos/Easy Going 0.77 0.75 
Photos /Spreading good spirit 0.87 0.88 
Photos /Feeling insecure 0.80 0.83 
Photos /Likable  0.73 0.75 
Photos /Serious 0.87 0.88 
Picture/Having the ability to achieve his/her goals 0.87 0.80 
 
The party commercials were coded on provided questionnaires and then rewritten on Excell 
while coding of media coverage was conducted directly in Excell sheets. In the next step, 
obtained research material was transported and evaluated using the SPSS. Following 
institutions provided funding for the project: Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung, Deutscher 
Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD), Stiftung für deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit. 
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The empirical phase of the study was additionally supported by Förderverein des Instituts für 
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International Communication Association (ICA) travel grants. 
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Chapter 6 | Results: Comparing Party Spots 
 
 
This Chapter evaluates the results of the empirical analysis of party spots. One of the 
questions that arise when analyzing party ads is how the mediatization of politics is mirrored 
in commercials prepared by political groupings. Practices including, among others,  
professionalization of spots, increasing negative advertising, personalization and 
emotionalization build the core repertoire of this tendency (Schulz, 1997). The study proposes 
six hypotheses to examine the features of party advertising in Poland and Germany. Due to 
high disproportion in a number of broadcasts available in each country, the evaluation 
concentrates on a comparative perspective and the whole analyzed period, not single 
campaigns. This is also reflected in figures: the findings reporting a given phenomenon 
embrace the whole analyzed period in both countries. Finally, it is important to bear in mind 
that the analysis includes all spots produced by the parties, thus no statistical tests are used in 
this Chapter to confirm the hypotheses. Obtained results are interpreted on the basis of 
differences inherent to political systems in both countries.    
 
6.1. Professionalization 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the comparison between Germany and Poland relates to 
the professionalization level of party commercials. As indicated in Chapter 5, the coders 
measured whether spots were prepared in a professional manner, marking high, medium or 
low standard of a given ad. High professionalization was coded for commercials showing 
advanced production techniques as well as the unity between visual and verbal level. Medium 
professionalization was coded for spots indicating minor shortcomings whereas low level was 
reserved for ads which left an impression as being prepared by amateurs. Additionally, the 
study evaluated the overall use of special effects and changes of camera perspective. For each 
of these two categories, high, medium and low level could be selected. In this context it 
should be reminded that the assessment of professionalization was based on a spot level. This 
is particularly important for Polish ads since their professionalization level was frequently not 
consistent due to their length. In many cases commercials were dominated by talking-head 
formats which weakened the overall spot’s dynamics. As a consequence Polish ads achieved 
high professional standards not as often as German ads. As indicated below, the findings 
confirmed the hypothesis H1 which stated that: 
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H1: German spots are more professional than Polish spots 
 
The comparison between German and Polish spots indicated substantial differences in use of 
professional standards. Overall, 89% of analyzed German spots showed high 
professionalization whereas 11% represented medium one. None of German commercials was 
evaluated as having low standards (see Figure 2). Medium professionalization was found only 
in part of the ads showed in the 1998 campaign by CDU and the Liberals. For example, in one 
of the spots Christian Democrats showed changing pictures of German landscape indicating 
the positive changes brought about by the CDU/CSU/FDP government. However the last 
sequences presented static images of the Chancellor Helmut Kohl which did not match the 
dynamics of the first part. In this context it is also important to say that the professionalization 
level was evaluated from the today’s perspective. Part of the ads broadcast a decade ago used 
less advanced production techniques. However, during the 1998 campaign already 60% of 
German ads were coded as highly professional. Overall, German party spots showed 
increasing filmic quality, rising amount of special video techniques (e.g. computer graphics, 
superimpositions, slow- and stop-motion techniques etc.). All ads showed in both the 2002 
and 2005 campaigns marked high professionalization level. Nevertheless these findings 
should be seen in the context of party commercials chosen for the empirical evaluation. If the 
study was to include spots produced by smaller German parties (Splitterparteien) low 
professionalization level would also be detected.    
 
The results concerning Polish spots indicated that overall only 28% were seen as highly 
professional, compared to 49% with medium and 23% with low professionalization level (see 
Figure 2). Similarly to Germany, the ads showed in the earlier campaigns were less 
professional. The largest number of spots showing low professionalization was broadcast in 
1997 and amounted to 47%, compared to 53% of spots with medium professionalization. 
None of the spots was coded as highly professional. Already in 2001 the number of spots 
lacking professional standards decreased to 26% and high professionalization was noted in 
case of 36% of ads. Medium professionalization was coded in one third of the spots broadcast 
during that campaign. Finally, in 2005 party broadcasts achieved either medium (60%) or 
high (40%) professionalization level. Within the last decade Polish ads underwent a 
metamorphosis from unprofessional commercials to modern productions. However, they still 
showed a rather limited number of formats as the spots were dominated by candidates’ 
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statements. None of Polish parties experimented with new formats, a strategy that was 
frequently used in Germany. In part of the ads, German parties limited the presence of their 
candidates and concentrated on transmitting their messages in an innovative manner. For 
example, one of the commercials produced by the social-democratic SPD in 2002 resembled a 
movie film from the 50s. The ad showed a traditional housewife subordinated to her husband 
and who devoted her life to cleaning and ironing. The advertisement was illustrated with a 
comment “This is the programme presented by Mr. Stoiber for our future”. This sarcastic 
remark referred to the Chancellor candidate from the rival camp CDU/CSU and aimed at 
mobilizing the electorate which did not share that vision of Christian Democrats.  
 
Figure 2: Professionalization level in Polish and German ads 
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 Basis:  n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads 
 
In this context it is interesting to investigate what led to differences in professionalization 
level in both countries. Firstly, the length and formats of spots had vital consequences for the 
assessment of professionalization level. German spots were limited to 90 seconds and showed 
higher filmic quality, more akin to commercial advertising. Polish ads lasted even up to 8 
minutes dominated by monotonous talking-head formats which affected the assessment of 
production techniques and was mirrored inter alia in frequency of changing camera 
perspectives. Nearly 60% of German spots use formats with frequently changing camera 
perspectives, 22% with medium and 18% with low changes. Polish commercials did not 
follow the same patterns of production, as only about one quarter of spots was coded as 
representing frequent changes in camera perspectives compared to 49% spots with medium 
and 25% with low use of changing camera perspective (see Figure 3).  
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  Figure 3: Frequency of changing camera perspective in Polish and German ads 
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  Basis:  n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads 
 
Another issue that should be taken into account is the problem of experience in advertising 
campaigns. The study showed that 60% of German spots used a lot of special effects 
compared to 27% in Poland. The medium level was noted in case of 22% of German ads and 
49% of Polish commercials (see Figure 4). Thus it can be said that both countries did make 
use of innovative technologies in their advertising. The problem that arose in this context was 
how given effects matched with a given spot. Interestingly, the analysis showed that in part of 
Polish ads where medium or high level of special effects was coded, the overall 
professionalism level was assessed as low. For example, Self-Defense used either high (39%) 
or medium (61%) level of special effects but only 11% of its commercials were coded as 
highly professional. The party made use of modern techniques but was incapable of creating 
synergies between single production techniques.  
 
In this context the parliamentary experience of a given grouping was not without significance. 
German Bundestag parties could build on their own experiences in leading parliamentary 
campaigns75 and were characterized by centralized campaigning headquarters (Timm, 1999; 
von Webel, 1999). In Poland, one needs to make a clear distinction between political 
newcomers and parties with longer historical background. For example, all spots presented by 
the radical Self-Defense in 2001, when the party entered Sejm for the first time, represented 
low professionalization. Low professional standards resulted partly from limited financial 
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 Such groupings like CSU/CSU or SPD showed political ads already in the 50s.  
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resources and limited organizational skills required for conducting mass-mediated campaigns. 
Simultaneously, political groupings with parliamentary experience like post-communist SLD 
showed medium professional standards already in 1997. In general, Polish parties which 
emerged in the 90s needed time to acquire necessary credentials for conducting efficient 
campaigns. As reported by Siegel & Jarzębowicz (1997) during the 1997 parliamentary 
campaign political candidates experienced “suffering in front of cameras”, needed hours to 
record short statements and parties’ experts had difficulty fulfilling their responsibilities.  
 
  Figure 4: Use of special effects in Polish and German ads  
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  Basis:  n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads 
 
One important issue that should be taken into account is also the overall number of 
commercials prepared by each party. Polish parties generally presented a number of different 
spots, whereas German groupings tended to limit their presentations to one or two spots, 
which might have led to higher standards. However, Polish parties increasingly appreciated 
the importance of television advertising in their campaign budgets. To put it into figures, 
according to a Polish regulatory body National Broadcasting Council KRRiT (2001) party 
expenditures on television spots during the election campaign in 2001 reached more than 
5000000 PLN. In 2005 the expenditures on party commercials amounted to more than 
33000000 PLN (KRRiT, 2005). During this last campaign nearly all parties invested in paid 
ads in private TV stations which was not the case during the 2001 parliamentary elections. 
Rising expenditures, especially those concerning private channels, indicate growing 
professionalization of party campaigns and simultaneously show rapid proliferation of 
different communication channels. These expenditures constituted a substantial income for 
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TV stations. According to TNS OBOP (quoted by eGospodarka.pl, 2005) Polish TV 
broadcasters earned 17 million PLN during the election campaign in 2005 between 1 March 
and 7 September. PiS spent the largest sum, 7.3 million PLN76, while its main opponent PO 
only less than a half of this amount – 3.5 million PLN. The third position was occupied by 
LPR which spent 3 million PLN on television advertising. Especially the 2005 elections in 
Poland showed intense advertising activities which were clearly visible from the first weeks 
of the campaign, not only on TV screens. The size of radio campaigns in 2005 was also 
unprecedented. According to the article published in the “Rzeczpospolita” on 23rd September 
2005, in Polish radio stations “Jedynka” and “Trójka” PiS bought 195 spots for 324 000 PLN, 
SLD 49 advertisements for 102 000 PLN, PO paid 78 000 PLN for 45 spots. Simultaneously, 
the intensity of Polish parliamentary and presidential campaigns led to the situation where 
some radio stations did not want to participate in advertising. The example of this 
phenomenon was the biggest private radio RMF FM which did not allow any political 
advertising at all. According to Anna Kozłowska, FMF FM spokesman, the radio audience 
was tired of politics (Murawski, 2005).  
 
6.2. Negativity 
 
This study intended to show how negativity in presenting political issues and parties resulted 
from both campaigns’ professionalization but also marked how party broadcasts reflected 
specific historical and cultural backgrounds. Measuring negativity was based on the 
assessment of negative messages on both verbal and visual level. Additionally, coders 
evaluated music presented in a given spot to determine whether it evoked positive or negative 
feelings. High negativity was coded for spots which were dominated by negative appeals on 
verbal or visual level. Medium negativity was noted for the spots where negative coverage 
constituted less than a half of a broadcast. Low negativity referred to commercials where 
negative attacks were used only in a very limited number of sequences. The last category 
embraced spots that did not contain any negative messages.  
 
In the next step, in ads where negativity was coded, the type of criticism was examined. The 
type of criticism was classified into four subgroups showing whether political parties attacked 
the policies of their opponents, whether they concentrated on their opponents’ character or 
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 The advertising campaign was very fruitful. Kaczyński brothers gained both presidency and Prime Minister 
Office.  
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whether parties used both program and character-oriented attacks. Finally, the fourth type of 
criticism was related to the negativity that could not be attributed to any particular party or 
political candidate but remained present, e.g. on the visual level in a given spot. The findings 
indicated that two third of ads in both countries contained negative appeals. Thus, measured 
by the overall extent of negativity, the hypothesis H2 was not confirmed:  
 
H2: Polish spots use more negative appeals than German spots 
 
The study showed that 30% of analyzed German ads used high level of negativity. In 19% of 
commercials - medium and in 16% low level of negative appeals was noted. The remaining 
35% of German spots did not use any negative campaigning (see Figure 5). In this context it 
is interesting to point out which German parties used negativity in their commercials and 
whether there was any general pattern of advertising among political groupings. Firstly, 
German politicians did not usually personally attack political rivals. This strategy could be 
observed, for instance, in spots broadcast by CDU/CSU in 2001. The commercials referred to 
high unemployment and bankruptcy among German companies, however negativity was not 
attributed to any concrete party and negative appeals were used mainly on the visual level 
showing the images of unemployed workers, sad women waiting for a bus on a rainy day etc. 
None of the Christian Democrats’ candidates was used to comment on the negative 
developments in Germany. Instead an actor’s voice-over was used. In many ads negativity 
was transmitted, as indicated in the next paragraphs, by visual elements or use of humor or 
sarcasm. Among analyzed ads, only part of them explicitly mentioned concrete political 
opponents using more person-oriented attacks.  
 
Secondly, in some spots German parties did not present any candidates but used formats close 
to music clips that evoked feelings of anxiety. For example, in 1998 the socialist PDS 
presented a music-clip that showed an old factory where some people were privileged 
whereas the rest did not have perspectives for the future. This inequality was visualized in a 
form of anonymous workers standing on two parallel escalators, only part of them was 
moving to the next floors and the rest stood motionless. The ad showed a young woman 
dressed in red (a clear allusion to PDS) who ran through the factory and then switched on the 
other escalator for those who could not get to the next floor. In 2002 PDS again produced an 
ad in a form of music-clip which told a story of social inequality in Germany. The commercial 
contained a number of sequences showing poverty, lack of opportunities for certain groups of 
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the society, the problem of unemployment. Similarly as in 1998, music used in the ad and the 
clip’s lyrics intensified the impact of the visual elements.  
 
  Figure 5: Negativity level in Polish and German ads 
30%
19%
16%
35%
17% 18%
29%
36%
high medium low none
Germany
Poland
  
  Basis:  n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads 
 
Finally, negative German ads often used humorous elements. The commercials produced by 
the Greens in 2005 provided a good example in that respect. In one of the spots the party 
leader Joschka Fischer was pictured in a restaurant with an actor Ottfried Fischer. To their 
surprise the waitress brought them Saumagen, the favorite meal of the former Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl77, that both seemed to dislike saying: “Not again!” thus warning against another 
CDU/CSU-led government. Kohl was also an object of criticism and sarcasm in earlier 
campaigns, just to give an example of spots produced by SPD in 1998. The ad showed a 
spacecraft and the process of evacuation to the future. The moment Kohl entered a time-
machine, the energy to transport him was lacking. The spot ended with a statement: “Not 
everyone is suitable for the future”, a clear remark that the times of the Chancellor were gone 
and that new social-democratic change was needed.  
 
Overall, German ads often brought negative information in an interesting, provocative 
manner. Thus German commercials were more likely to become synecdoches (Devlin, 1995: 
199) – small parts that stood for the whole of the campaign. This was particularly true for the 
one of CDU’s broadcasts presented in 2005. Christian Democrats produced highly negative 
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 Saumagen is a German dish popular in the Palatinate. Kohl was known for serving Saumagen to foreign 
guests, such as for example Margaret Thatcher or Bill Clinton.  
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ad, with negativity presented on both visual and verbal level as well as music provoking 
feelings of insecurity. CDU explicitly accused SPD/Green government of “bad” policies and 
visualized negative results of reforms in a form of a ball that rolled through a table destroying 
everything on its way. The process of devastation could only be stopped by CDU and this was 
embodied in the hand of Chancellor candidate Angela Merkel who caught the ball in the 
precise moment when it should have fallen down from the table.   
 
The analysis of Polish spots showed that 36% of spots did not use any negative appeals. 
Overall, only 17% of Polish spots proved high negativity, compared to 18% with medium 
negativity and 29% with low level of negative messages (see Figure 5). Though the 
hypothesis H2 was not confirmed since Polish and German parties used negativity in about 
two third of the commercials, the study found substantial differences in the type and extent of 
negative appealing between both countries. Firstly, the analysis of Polish ads showed that 
certain political groupings continuously used negative appeals. Overall, a radical grouping 
Self-Defense did not produce any spots without negative appeals. In the 2001 campaign 67% 
of its commercials used high and 33% medium negativity. Four years later, the percentage of 
ads containing high level of negative messages increased to 78% whereas in the remaining 
spots medium negativity was coded. These results can be explained by the party’s profile. 
Self-Defense appealed to frustrated voters, who did not see any perspectives for the future and 
searched for new political alternatives. The party benefited from the high dissatisfaction with 
the political elite in Polish society and used commercials to attack both the selfishness of its 
rivals and unsatisfactory results of introduced reforms.  
 
Secondly, negative appeals in Polish ads referred to a broader theme spectrum than in 
Germany. In both countries negative messages frequently appeared in the context of economic 
reforms and social inequality (two third of the spots). However, in Poland political groupings 
were also partly divided by such issues as membership in NATO, enlargement of UE, 
internationalization of markets etc. Different understanding of these matters opened a 
cleavage between competing groupings. For example, LPR used high or medium negativity in 
the context of all spots where the issue of foreign policy was articulated. LPR, as a 
conservative right-wing party, promoted isolationism and opposed Polish accession to the 
European Union. The party capitalized on fear in Polish society indicating that enlargement of 
the European family would lead to marginalization of Poland. This argumentation was 
strengthened by presenting European integration as a consent to abortion, euthanasia or gay 
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marriages, all of which were unacceptable for the party and also for many Poles. The party 
stressed the need for patriotism, Polish sovereignty and conservative social values. 
 
Another theme that was frequently used in negative appeals was the problem of the relations 
between the state and politics in Poland. The analysis showed that in 70% of spots where 
negativity appeals were used Polish parties stressed the issue of poor condition of democratic 
institutions and practices. As indicated in Chapter 2, the level of political culture in Poland is 
considered low and corruption scandals among political elites constitute a common problem. 
Thus political players frequently addressed the issue of corrupted elites and malfunctioning of 
the representative democracy in Poland, the problem of the so-called de-communization and 
of opening the archives of the communist secret police. This strategy was particularly visible 
in commercials presented by Law and Justice in both the 2001 and the 2005 campaigns, when 
its leaders continuously called for moral renewal. In 2005 the party frequently appealed for 
establishing of the “IV Rzeczpospolita”78 that would be closer to ordinary people and capable 
of solving their problems.   
 
  Figure 6: Type of criticism in Polish and German ads 
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  Basis:  n= 24 German ads | n = 91 Polish ads 
 
Thirdly, the results become more complex when the type of criticism present in negative 
appeals is examined (see Figure 6). The study revealed substantial differences between both 
countries in that respect. Overall, 38% of German commercials in which negativity was noted 
                                               
78
 The term “Rzeczpospolita” stands for The Republic of Poland. “III Rzeczpospolita” is the expression used by 
scholars to describe the period after changes introduced in 1989 when the Soviet empire collapsed. The 
expression “IV Rzeczpospolita” was used in a mark a new beginning in Polish politics.  
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were policies-oriented compared to 21% of Polish spots. German parties used twice as much 
criticism that was both policies and character-oriented. What is interesting, the study showed 
that only 12% of German ads attacked character features of opponents compared to 63% of 
Polish spots that used this strategy. One of the most striking examples was offered by 
commercials produced by the populist Self-Defense in 2001. Spots representing this party 
were focused on its charismatic leader Andrzej Lepper, negative appeals came directly from 
the mouth of the politician who openly insulted both rivalry camps and individual political 
actors79. Another tactics used by Polish parties, mainly right-wing groupings, was based on 
showing the division between post-Solidarity and post-communist formations. Stressing 
animosities based on historical background was used to attack opposition, polarize and 
strengthen voters’ identification with a given party. In one of the spots produced by the post-
Solidarity grouping AWSP in 2001 Leszek Miller, the leader of the post-communist 
government, was presented as the heir of Marx and Lenin, which was a clear allusion to his 
political background.  
 
High number of ads containing negative appeals in Poland enabled a comparison of used 
types of criticism over the analyzed three Polish parliamentary campaigns. The study showed 
that policies-oriented criticism increased to 45% over a decade, whereas character-oriented 
criticism decreased from 73% in the 1997 parliamentary campaign to 52% in the 2005 
parliamentary campaign. This could suggest that even though party advertising was largely 
focused on negative appeals, the type of criticism increasingly concentrated on political 
issues. These outcomes can be seen as an element of improving political culture in Poland 
where political parties attack political programmes and not candidates themselves.  
 
The issue of political culture can be also analyzed using other parameters, such as central 
values stressed in party commercials that evoke credibility and trust. The coding instrument 
measured whether Polish and German politicians stressed their honesty as a distinct image 
quality needed for participation in public life. Overall 56% of Polish ads stressed candidates’ 
honesty as a quality needed for parliamentary work. Among Polish parties honesty was 
mainly highlighted by such groupings as Self-Defense, the majority of its candidates 
                                               
79
 Among political leaders attacked by Self-Defense, Leszek Balcerowicz was frequently the target of open 
assaults. Balcerowicz, former Minister of Finance, introduced “Shock Therapy” at the beginning of the 90s, 
which led to rapid transition from the communist economy to the capitalist market economy. Introduced 
measures, though having a positive effect on the Polish economy in a long run, divided the society. Such 
political parties like Self-Defense profited from the temporary hardship caused by reforms and frequently 
centered its parliamentary campaigns round the slogan “Balcerowicz musi odejść” (“Balcerowicz has to leave”).  
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presented themselves as honest and simultaneously accused political rivals of lacking this 
feature. In all three analyzed campaigns the party leader Lepper continuously repeated that he 
would not led the voters down and that they could trust in him. While describing other 
political groupings Lepper frequently accused them of being corrupted and lacking honesty 
and credibility. Other political parties, like League of Polish Families or Law and Justice did 
not verbally attack their opponents but candidates emphasized their own honesty (36% of 
candidates from LPR; 40% of PiS candidates).  
 
Very often stressing of honesty was mentioned in the context of renewal political life in 
Poland, in terms of a moral revolution among elites. This was particularly pronounced in 
Civic Platform which called for changes in Polish political landscape and honesty was 
stressed by 65% of its candidates. The issue concerning relations between the state and 
politics generally remained one of the main themes discussed in commercials in Poland and 
was stressed overall in 61% of the spots throughout the three analyzed campaigns. Honesty 
was often not only articulated as a feature of a given candidate but also explicitly mentioned 
for the political grouping she/he represented. The results of the elections held in 2005 showed 
tangibly that voters’ were more likely to cast a ballot for those groupings that addressed the 
problem of corruption and uncontrolled elites. The issue concerning relations between the 
state and politics was frequently outlined in spots produced by LPR (69%), Self-Defense 
(70%) and PiS (67%).  
 
These results were in sharp contrast with the German spots. Only 3% of candidates presented 
in commercials stressed the issue of honesty as an important character quality. However, the 
results of the study should be seen in the context of elements of political system, especially 
relations between the state and politics need to be taken into account. The fact that Polish 
politicians stressed their honesty as an image quality can be well explained by the overall 
attitude of the society towards the world of politics as outlined in Chapter 2. According to the 
Batory Foundation (2005), Poles perceive politics as the most corrupted domain of all 
spheres. Simultaneously, Poland’s administrative bodies are also seen as corrupted. As a 
consequence it should not be surprising that parties highlighted this issue in their 
programmes. In Germany the problem of corruption among elites is far less pronounced 
which is also mirrored in the reports issued by Transparency International (2006) that 
classified Germany as a country free from corruption.   
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6.3. Focus on Leaders 
 
Another interesting aspect of the comparison between Germany and Poland referred to the 
level of personalization of party spots. The study assessed whether and how party broadcasts 
in both countries differed in terms of presentation of their candidates. Firstly, the coding 
instrument measured presentation formats and the number of politicians showed in a given 
commercial. In the second step the centrality level (whether a given spot concentrated on one 
or more politicians) was estimated. Finally, the level of personalization was coded. High 
personalization was coded for spots that concentrated on features of character of a given 
candidate. Medium level was used for evaluation of commercials in which candidates were 
presented in the context of both their political programme and their personality. Low level 
was applied to spots in which the emphasis was put on the political issues and not on the 
candidate. Additionally, in ads where personalization was noted, coders also evaluated the 
extent of coverage regarding private life of candidates marking it as high, medium or low. The 
findings indicated that Germany ads tended to concentrate on leaders whereas in Poland 
political groupings showed a greater number of candidates. Thus the hypothesis H3 was 
confirmed: 
 
H3: German spots focus on leaders more than Polish spots 
 
Poland and German generally differed in formats used in political advertising. All Polish ads 
used formats with candidates. In Germany, 73% of ads used formats with politicians but as 
much as 27% did not present any political players. Instead German parties introduced ads that 
operated through symbols and metaphors. For example in one of the spots SPD presented a 
series of images showing different generations in Germany. Each sequence of images was 
accompanied by a description of their dreams, for instance, the images of children were 
followed by a sentence “children want to have a joyful childhood” and images of young 
people were presented with a comment “Germans want to work”. The ads finished with a 
short visualization of the SPD’s logo. No candidates were presented. This strategy was also 
used by other parties, inter alia FDP or PDS. In Poland this type of advertising was not used 
and all ads showed political leaders.  
 
Furthermore, German spots were more centered round one political leader than Polish 
commercials. In 89% of German spots only one political candidate was showed, compared to 
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7% of spots showing 2 candidates. Only one commercial presented three candidates, however 
it was a spot produced by SPD which showed the images of three political rivals Angela 
Merkel, Guido Westerwelle and Edmund Stoiber. In other spots Social Democrats 
concentrated only on the Chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder. None of the analyzed 
German spots presented more than four politicians (see Figure 7). This can be explained by 
the nature of political competition in Germany. The biggest German parties typically focused 
on a Chancellor candidate. Thus Schröder embodied the programme of Social Democrats 
throughout all analyzed campaigns. In case of CDU/CSU, the campaign held in 1998 
concentrated on Helmut Kohl, four years later on Edmund Stoiber and in 2005 on Angela 
Merkel. Other parties that were represented in Bundestag also concentrated on their leaders. 
Joschka Fischer served as an icon for the Greens, Guido Westerwelle appeared as the leader 
of FDP, Gregor Gysi was showed as the head of PDS. Thus, the centrality of candidates was 
very high (78%) and the majority of ads that showed political leaders concentrated their 
messages round a given political actor (see Figure 8). For example, in one of the spots 
produced by SPD in 2002 the party showed Gerhard Schröder actively engaged in reforming 
the country and symbolizing changes introduced by the red-green government. Medium 
centrality was found in 19% of German spots whereas low centrality was nearly absent (3%).  
 
Figure 7: Number of candidates presented in Polish and German ads 
 
Basis:  n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads 
 
In each spot coders evaluated the personalization level for up to three candidates80. Obtained 
data should be approached with caution as the analysis included only those spots where 
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 As indicated in Chapter 5, the selection of candidates was based on their position in a party. If more than one 
candidate was noted the analysis would always include the leader of a given party (if he/she was presented). In 
the next step, candidates that were presented in the longest time spectrum were evaluated.  
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candidates were presented and thus the number of commercials was more limited. The results 
concerning the personalization level showed that German ads did not concentrate much on the 
personality of their candidates. High personalization was observed only in 29% of ads, 
compared to 19% that showed medium level and 52% that either used low personalization or 
this strategy was not applied at all (see Figure 9). The strategy of personalization was 
particularly frequently used in SPD’s ads that were capitalizing on Schröder’s telegenic 
personality. One of the examples was the 1998 SPD spot showing the party leader wandering 
along the sea shore and talking about his political ideas and aspirations for Germany. While 
major political parties concentrated their messages round future Chancellor candidates, 
smaller parties like the Greens or Liberals fought for second votes and often also embodied 
their programme in their own leaders. This strategy was used in part of the commercials 
prepared by the Greens: the party personalized its campaign using the slogan “Zweitstimme 
ist Joschka Stimme”81. In this context it is important to stress that none of the German ads 
referred to private life of the candidates nor showed images of their families.  
 
  Figure 8: Centrality of candidates in Polish and German ads 
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  Basis: n = 31 coded German candidates | n = 335 coded Polish candidates 
 
By contrast, Polish ads were much less leader-focused and the emphasis was rather on the 
team of political players rather than on one individual (see Figure 7). Only 24% of all Polish 
spots showed one political candidate compared to 18% showing two candidates and 19% 
                                               
81
 “The second vote is for Joschka”. This slogan was a clear allusion to the voting system in Germany. As 
indicated in Chapter 2, during German elections voters cast two ballots. Thus smaller parties deliberately 
concentrate on campaigning for the second vote, as the first vote is usually reserved for large political parties like 
CDU or SPD.  
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presenting three politicians, whereas 39% of all spots presented more than three political 
leaders. Similarly, candidates were usually not the main element of the spot, high centrality 
was noted for 26% of candidates, in majority of spots dominated medium centrality (56%) 
while its low level was coded in 18% of the commercials (see Figure 8). The fact that Polish 
spots were less person-centered had a number of reasons. Firstly, political parties in Poland 
did not concentrate their campaigns round potential candidates for the Prime Minister 
Office82. Secondly, Polish parties frequently entered political alliances for the time of 
campaigning, which in such cases, made showing one particular candidate problematic. 
Instead parties tended to show a few political leaders. The differences might also be a result of 
the length of Polish spots that left much space for a presentation of more than one candidate. 
The closest similarity with German spots was observed during the 2005 campaign. This was 
caused by the fact that both parliamentary and presidential elections overlapped and 
presidential candidates were widely presented in spots are leaders of a given party.  
 
  Figure 9: Personalization level in Polish and German ads 
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  Basis:  n = 31 coded German candidates | n = 335 coded Polish candidates 
 
The study showed that Polish ads did not use personalization techniques to a large extent (see 
Figure 9). High personalization level was noted in case of 11% of candidates, medium level of 
person-oriented depicturing was found in 16% of spots. The majority of commercials (73%) 
indicated low personalization level. In spots where personal aspects of a given candidate were 
stressed, usually the issue of political background was articulated. Thus one of the main 
characteristics being ascribed to a given candidate was his/her life of service for Poland. One 
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 In Poland, the process of political bargaining and building coalition alternatives is discussed once the results of 
the elections have been announced. Thus Polish parties usually do not specify during campaigns which candidate 
is likely to become Prime Minister. In Germany however, the Chancellor office is traditionally reserved for a 
candidate from one of the two major camps - either Christian Democrats or Social Democrats.  
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of the commercials produced by Law and Justice in 2001 serves as a good example. The ad 
showed Lech Kaczyński talking about his life, his parents who had fought in the Warsaw 
Uprising and about values they had taught him. The strategy of personalization was used as 
Kaczyński, as a former Minister of Justice, enjoyed very high trust and popularity among the 
citizens. Thus the party could profit from his image and used personalization techniques. 
However, similarly as in Germany, Polish ads generally refrained from the coverage on 
private life of their candidates. There were only few exceptions to this rule, mainly in ads 
produced in 2005 when some of party leaders were also participating in presidential 
campaigns. In one of the spots, Civic Platform used the image of its leader Donald Tusk who 
talked about his family, about his past and involvement in the Solidarity movement. In 
general, the sphere of private life of political players remained rather absent in party spots.  
 
6.4. Emotionalization 
 
Finally, the assessment of emotionalization in party spots delivered a very interesting picture 
of advertising patterns in both countries. In order to evaluate whether the dominant type of 
appeal in party broadcasts was logical or emotional in their nature, the coders measured the 
emotionalization level on a four point scale. High level of emotionalization was noted in spots 
dominated by emotional appeals on visual or verbal level as well as by the use of music that 
evoked emotional sphere. Medium emotionalization level was coded in spots where the 
proportion of both emotional and logical components was similar. In ads where logical 
argumentation was dominant, low emotionalization level was noted. Finally, the fourth 
category referred to party broadcasts where no emotionalization was found. The findings 
confirmed the hypothesis H4 which stated that: 
 
H4: German spots use more emotionalization than Polish spots  
 
The results of the study indicated that overall 68% of German party spots used high level of 
emotional appeals. In 27% of German ads medium emotionalization was noted and only 5% 
contained a low level of emotional appeals (see Figure 10). The fact that German commercials 
were limited to 90 seconds had a crucial impact on the assessment of the emotionalization 
level. In the majority of spots where high emotionalization was noted images melt seamlessly 
into one another and emerged as a whole picture. The analyzed German advertisements 
frequently set up a story or a sequence of events that reinforced the emotional appeal. 
 151 
Additionally, the ads used music that had a powerful emotional and activating value. To give 
an example, in 2002 the Social Democrats presented a number of images showing their 
candidate Gerhard Schröder in a series of successful scenarios. The ads showed the 
Chancellor working actively in his office, meeting the crowds and ready for new challenges. 
The commercial was accompanied by the modern music which had a mobilizing and 
emotional influence.   
 
  Figure 10: Emotionalization level in Polish and German ads 
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  Basis:  n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads 
 
The assessment of Polish advertisements showed substantial differences. Only 11% of the ads 
used high emotionalization level. In 47% medium use of emotional appeals was noted, 
compared to 27% that transmitted a limited number of emotional messages. Finally, in 15% of 
the commercials no emotionalization was found (see Figure 10). In this context one could ask 
what led to a much limited use of emotional appeals in Poland. Firstly, the length of the ads 
should be taken into account. In many cases, Polish parties seemed to find it difficult to fill 
the whole ad. For instance, during the 2001 campaign Civic Platform presented part of each 
commercial in a form of music-clip. This music-clip showed images of children, a woman 
meeting with her family, landscapes full of tranquility accompanied by emotional melody. 
However, high emotionalization level was substantially weakened by the subsequent part of 
the ad that presented talking-head formats. Thus, the coders assessed this type of commercials 
as showing medium use of emotional components. In general, the study showed that higher 
emotionalization was noted in spots that were shorter. The only exception to this rule was 
found in the commercials produced by Self-Defense, a radical grouping that extensively used 
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negative and simultaneously emotional appeals to attack political rivals. Overall, 28% of its 
ads used high emotionalization and 72% a medium one even though the spots typically lasted 
approximately 4 minutes.  
 
Simultaneously, emotionalization in Polish spots was often evoked in a different manner than 
in Germany. In Poland, part of the political parties appealed to the voters stressing the issues 
of national heritage, patriotism and religious beliefs. This was reflected inter alia in spots 
produced by the League of Polish Families. In one of the broadcasts showed in 2001 LPR 
presented Poles during the holy mess in Częstochowa, a place of special religious cult in 
Poland. The picture used computer techniques showing that people were holding banners with 
the party’s name during the ceremony. In so doing LPR intended to show its Christian profile. 
In the next sequences candidates talked about the programme of their party referring to such 
values as the country, God, independence, faith and the Polish nation83. However, the 
assessment of emotionalization was weakened by the spot’s format which combined talking-
heads formats and lacked dynamics.  
 
6.5. Theme Spectrum 
 
The study examined the theme spectrum discussed by party commercials. In each ad coders 
could select up to five topics. The coding instruments included themes divided into following 
subcategories: political candidates, party campaigning issues, economic and financial policies, 
social policies, relations between the state and politics, social condition of the country, 
domestic security, foreign policy, environment issues and migration matters. The findings 
indicated that theme spectrum in both countries embraced issues that reflected current 
political themes. Thus the hypothesis H5 was confirmed: 
 
H5: Polish and German spots embrace theme spectrum that reflects topical themes 
 
Overall, German spots usually discussed fewer themes than Polish commercials. On average 
approximately three topics for each German ad were coded. In Poland, usually four (or even 
five) themes were discussed. These results should be seen mainly in the context of the spots’ 
length that organized the thematic spectrum. Thus it was not surprising that party 
                                               
83
 Religious symbols were also commonly exploited by such groupings as Self-Defense, which was mirrored in 
use of pictures showing John Paul II on political brochures of the candidates. 
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commercials in Germany concentrated on a fewer number of issues. In general, if a given 
German ad was to devote the whole ad to a given issue it could not exceed the limit of 90 
seconds, which was the maximum length prescribed by legal regulations. In Poland, 
articulating even a single theme could occupy more space than the total length of German ads. 
For instance, in some commercials produced by the right-wing AWSP in 2001 the party 
discussed the results of introduced reforms. The spot showed a television studio in which 
representatives of the AWSP talked about their achievements in a form of a dialog with a 
journalist. Each interview lasted approximately 2 or 3 minutes. Political parties in Germany 
did not have an opportunity to present their themes in such detailed way. For example, in one 
of the spots produced by Social-Democrats in 2002, the party showed the process of 
reforming the country by SPD/the Greens government and visualized it in sequence of 
pictures of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder working in his Berlin office. The ad was limited to 
61 seconds.   
 
The findings indicated that German parties tended to talked about the candidates more often 
than Polish spots (see Figure 11). Overall, 24% of the commercials in Germany were coded as 
referring to the political candidates84. In Poland, approximately 17% of the advertisements 
focused on candidates85 as a distinct theme. Simultaneously, party campaigning issues 
dominated the theme spectrum in both countries. This theme was discussed in 97% of German 
ads. In general, if in a given commercial fewer themes were articulated, party campaigning - 
as a topic - would be continuously repeated, mainly in the form of persuasive appeals to vote 
for a given party. Moreover, smaller parties the Liberals and the Greens additionally centered 
their appeals round campaigning for the second vote. For instance, in one of the ads produced 
by the Liberals in 2005 the FDP concentrated for campaigning solely on the Zweitstimme. The 
advertisement showed two friends looking at an attractive woman sitting in a bar. One of 
them asked her whether she had any plans for the evening. His voice however did not attract 
her. In a second attempt the man used his second voice (translated in German as 
Zweitstimme). This time the voice automatically caught the attention of a woman, who 
responded to the questions with a smile. The ad produced by the Liberals was a straight 
appeal to use the Zweitstimme during the elections and vote for FDP.  
 
                                               
84
 It should be remembered that, as already mentioned, 27% of the German ads did not show any politicians, 
whereas all Polish ads used formats with candidates. 
85
 The analysis of thematic spectrum was not limited only to party leaders, but to all candidates presented in a 
given commercial.   
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In Poland, virtually all ads included party campaigning issues. Polish parties however did not 
only appeal to the voters to cast a ballot. Apart from that party campaigning frequently 
included the presentation of a given political party, stressing its historical roots, its political 
tradition. This strategy could be explained by the fragility of Polish political landscape where 
parties undergo the processes of fragmentation and thus need to “introduce” themselves to the 
voters86. This phenomenon could be observed, for instance, in the commercials produced by 
Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, which emerged as political newcomers in 2001. In 
none of the German spots candidates recalled the history of their grouping, as each political 
party had its firm position on the political scene.  
 
  Figure 11: Theme spectrum in Polish and German ads 
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  Basis: n = 118 coded themes (Germany) | n = 587 coded themes (Poland) 
 
Generally, both German and Polish parties devoted much space to the issues of economy and 
social policy. In Germany, 73% of ads highlighted the issues related to economy, mainly taxes 
and unemployment. This issue was articulated by all major German parties, whereas the 
Liberals tended to discuss this theme at greater length, especially in the context of tax law. In 
Poland, the economic matters appeared in 86% of the advertisements. Simultaneously social 
issues were often articulated in both countries. However the findings indicated that the aspects 
of social policies were more often stressed by Polish parties (76%) than German groupings 
(60%). In Poland, especially Self-Defense tended to concentrate on social matters. In 
                                               
86
 Polish ads tended to place subtitles with a name and surname of candidates to insure they were identified 
correctly. This strategy was also frequently applied to the main political leaders of major Polish parties. In 
Germany, none of the ads placed subtitles with candidates’ names.  
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Germany, this theme was mainly exploited by the post-communist PDS and Social 
Democrats. These results should not be surprising given the economic situation in both 
countries. In Germany, the issue of fighting unemployment was continuously one of the main 
political themes. In Poland, political parties devoted much space to economic matters which 
was also a long-term issue, particularly sensitive to the transformation processes. The findings 
of the study did not differ in that respect to analyses conducted in other countries, which also 
stressed thematic spectrum related to economy and social policy (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; 
Holtz-Bacha, 2000).   
 
Simultaneously, the theme agenda in Poland was frequently defined by a greater variety of 
issues relating to transformation and positioning of political system. Thus Polish political ads 
referred, for instance, to the problems concerning the relations between the state and politics. 
In sharp contrast to Germany 61% of Polish ads pronounced this theme indicating, among 
others, moral depravation of elites, extensive corruption, political scandals etc. As indicated 
earlier, negative appeals in Polish commercials were frequently used in the context of this 
concrete theme. German spots generally did not address the issue of the relations between the 
state and politics and this topic was articulated only in 5% of the ads. Additionally, the study 
also found a difference in addressing the overall social condition of the country. This theme 
was stressed in 29% of Polish ads compared to 11% of German commercials. And finally, 
political parties in Poland barely addressed such issues as migration/minorities (3%) and did 
not mention environmental issues. This could be attributed to the fact that the percentage of 
minorities in Poland is marginal and thus parties did not need to appeal to any specific groups 
of immigrants. In Germany, the population of foreigners, for instance Turkish origin, is 
relatively high and thus migration matters appeared on the thematic agenda (8%). And finally, 
German ads were marked by a presence of environment issues (16%) which were mainly 
stressed by the Greens. As already indicated, Polish spots did not pay any attention to this last 
issue.  
 
6.6. Incumbent/Challenger Strategies 
 
Finally, the study analyzed whether political parties in Germany and Poland followed 
incumbent and challenger strategies in their campaigning. The coders utilized categories 
adjusted from Trent & Friedenberg (1983) study to determine whether these strategies were 
consistently applied in Germany and Poland. Thus the coding instrument examined whether 
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incumbents mentioned political offices, tended to emphasize own competence and 
accomplishments. Additionally, the coders assessed whether incumbents made use of 
testimonials delivered by ordinary citizens or other political parties and whether or appeared 
in circle of prominent foreign political players. The assessment of challengers included 
measuring whether they called for changes, took the offensive on issues or attacked the record 
of political opponents. Simultaneously, the coders measured whether challengers stressed 
optimism for the future and appealed to traditional values. The results indicated that Polish 
and German parties used part of the incumbent/challenger strategies in a different manner. 
Thus the hypothesis H6 was confirmed:  
 
H6: Polish and German incumbents/challengers differ partly in their strategies 
 
The analysis of incumbent parties included 20 German and 43 Polish spots. The findings 
showed that overall only 45% of German commercials mentioned political offices compared 
to 88% of advertisement produced by incumbents in Poland (see Table 17). Among German 
incumbents one needs to make a distinction between bigger parties like SPD and CDU/CSU, 
which were more likely to show government offices, especially while presenting their 
Chancellor candidates. Smaller parties like the Greens or the Liberals usually did not make 
use of this strategy to the larger extent. Simultaneously, Polish incumbents were also more 
likely to mention their competence for the government office (88%) than their German 
colleagues (50%). In Poland political incumbents mentioned their political accomplishments 
in nearly all commercials, whereas this strategy was used only in two thirds of the ads 
produced by incumbents in Germany. In this context however it should be remembered that 
spots produced by German incumbents varied in format, part of the ads did not present any 
political candidates. Two strategies (mentioning political offices, stressing competence for the 
government office) were mainly noted in German commercials which showed party leaders, 
whereas accomplishments were articulated also in ads that did not show any candidates.  In 
contrast, Polish incumbents presented politicians in all commercials which led to higher 
percentage of ads stressing political offices, own accomplishments and competence. This 
strategy was frequently used, for instance, by PSL which presented a number of political 
candidates reporting on their achievements on the local level and their work for Polish 
farmers.   
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Additionally, Polish ads of incumbents used other people to speak for candidates (65%). The 
reasons of testimonials’ popularity in Poland can be traced back to the political system 
characteristics. As indicated earlier, Polish elites were often quite unknown to society. Thus 
Political players might have used both ordinary citizens as well as idols, experts in order to 
improve their own status by becoming more recognized. Actors, musicians and sportsmen 
usually had little or no reputation as politicians. However, they were always welcomed by 
political parties that supported the assumption that well-known faces would attract people and 
that their support for a given grouping will encourage citizens to cast a ballot. Among German 
broadcasts very limited number of ads used different testimonials to appeal to the voters. For 
example, only the Greens showed a popular actor Ottfried Fischer who urged to vote for the 
grouping of Joschka Fischer. In Poland, the strategy of presenting well known artists was far 
more popular. This found its exemplification in the several ads produced by such groupings 
as, for instance, UW which during the 2001 campaign profited from the support of film 
director Andrzej Wajda and actors such as Marek Kondrat or Piotr Machalica. The main 
similarity found between political incumbents in both countries is that political parties 
generally refrained from showing the candidates in circle of prominent foreign politicians and 
only one fifth of the spots in each country applied this strategy. Both German and Polish 
incumbent parties also did not present any testimonials delivered by other parties.  
 
Table 17: Strategies Used by Polish and German Incumbents (in %) 
 Poland 
n = 43 
Germany 
n = 20 
Incumbent strategies 
 
mentioning political offices 
competency and the office 
consulting with world leaders 
using other people to speak for candidates 
emphasizing accomplishments 
 
 
 
88 
88 
25 
65 
97 
 
 
45 
50 
20 
20 
55 
Challenger strategies 
 
calling for changes 
emphasizing optimism for the future 
speaking to traditional values 
taking the offensive on issues 
attacking record of opponent 
 
 
 
16 
97 
63 
14 
65 
 
 
10 
85 
20 
10 
50 
 
In this context it is also interesting to examine whether Polish and German incumbents 
imported challengers’ strategies and whether they differed in that respect. The findings 
indicated that incumbents in both countries repeatedly stressed optimism for the future and 
 158 
called for changes. However, Polish incumbents attacked the record of opponents more often 
than German incumbents (65% compared to 50%). One of the most striking findings to 
emerge from the study is that part of Polish incumbents also attacked the record of own 
government coalition partners. This could be observed in the ads produced by PSL, which 
also blamed its former coalition partner SLD for insufficient reforms. In Germany, the 
incumbent parties refrained from attacking own coalition partners and tended to concentrate 
on political challengers from the rivalry camps.  
 
Polish incumbents stressed traditional values in 63% of spots compared to 20% of German 
spots. These findings should be seen in the context of still relatively strong position of 
Catholic Church in Poland. For instance, political incumbents AWSP in 2001 stressed the 
importance of traditional values, such as Christian faith, family etc. Other political incumbent 
PSL used the same rhetoric to appeal to the farmers which were perceived as a rather 
conservative group within Polish society. In Germany, traditional values were mostly stressed 
by Christian Democratic parties in 1998 and were far less pronounced in the subsequent 
campaigns.  
 
Table 18: Strategies Used by Polish and German Challengers (in %) 
 Poland 
n = 100 
Germany 
n = 17 
Incumbent strategies 
 
mentioning political offices 
competency and the office 
consulting with world leaders 
using other people to speak for candidates 
emphasizing accomplishments 
 
 
 
20 
20 
9 
30 
37 
 
 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Challenger strategies 
 
calling for changes 
emphasizing optimism for the future 
speaking to traditional values 
taking the offensive on issues 
attacking record of opponent 
 
 
 
100 
98 
91 
100 
62 
 
 
100 
94 
47 
82 
71 
 
The analysis of challenger parties included 17 German and 100 Polish spots87. The findings 
showed that Polish and German ads of challengers used a number of the traditional 
challengers’ strategies in a similar manner (see Table 18). Overall, challengers called for 
                                               
87
 This high number of ads resulted from the large number of political challengers in Poland which managed to 
get elected during the analyzed period. As indicated in Chapter 2, the openness of the political system (Mair, 
2002) in a transition country such as Poland is much higher than in the established democracy.  
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changes in all their spots (100%), took the offensive on issues (82% German spots and 100% 
of Polish spots), and attacked the record of opponents (71% German spots and 62% Polish 
spots). In both countries challengers stressed optimism for the future (94% German spots and 
98% Polish spots) and hold out a promise of a better tomorrow. Both countries however 
differed to the large extent in pronouncing traditional values. This strategy was noted in 91% 
ads of Polish challengers compared to 47% of German broadcasts. For instance, none of the 
Polish parties showed acceptance for homosexuals as the German PDS.  
 
And finally, it is also worth discussing whether political challengers borrowed the traditional 
incumbent strategies. The results indicated that Polish challengers used incumbent strategies 
more often than German challengers. Polish ads mentioned political offices and stressed 
competence for the office (20%), a strategy that was not applied in any of the spots produced 
by German challengers. Simultaneously, Polish challengers often outlined their 
accomplishments (37% of spots). Again, this strategy was not used in German ads. These 
results should be seen again in the context of the political system characteristics. Many 
challenger groupings in Poland were based on previous incumbent political parties. For 
instance, the fragmentation of AWSP led some of its members to the electoral committees of 
new founded Law and Justice or Civic Platform. Thus newly established parties, which 
competed from the challenger position, stressed their competence for the office and own 
accomplishments. This could be observed, for example, in the ads produced by Law and 
Justice in 2001. The party implemented typical challenger strategies, called for changes but 
simultaneously presented the achievements of its leader Lech Kaczyński, a former Minister of 
Justice in the AWS/UW government. Finally, challengers in Poland made use of others 
speaking for the candidates (30%) though testimonials were in general more pronounced by 
the Polish incumbents.  
 
6.7. Conclusions 
 
The results of the study indicated that party advertising was largely influenced by political 
system characteristics. Firstly, the electoral regulations allowing party commercials 
constituted the basic prerequisite for broadcasting party ads in both Germany and Poland. 
Moreover, the legal measures regarding the length of the broadcasts should be also 
considered. As showed in the study, the duration of presented advertisements influenced 
virtually all formulated hypotheses. For instance, the fact that German ads were forced to 
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transmit their appeals within 90 seconds was demonstrated in theme spectrum. While Polish 
parties outlined their programme in a profound manner, German groupings could only briefly 
mention the essential political goals. But simultaneously, the shortness of German broadcasts 
worked rather in their favor in the assessment of professionalization level. Longer 
commercials produced in Poland were frequently perceived as less professional by the coders. 
In this context the fact of shortening political ads in Poland in 2007, as indicated in Chapter 2, 
might lead to substantial differences in style and content of party advertising in the future. In 
sum, the electoral law constituted the basis for Polish and German political players giving 
them the opportunity to address voters via mass media.  
 
Secondly, political advertisements were shaped by the patterns of competition observed 
within the party system of each analyzed country. At the most basic level, the parliamentary 
experience of a given party influenced the maturity of its party campaigning. For instance, 
SPD conducted campaigns that were more professional than those prepared by Social-
Democrats in Poland. However, within the Polish political landscape SLD was frequently 
more effective than other Polish parties which had weaker organizational structure and made 
their first steps of the political scene. Another example that demonstrated the importance of 
party system characteristics was mirrored in the differences regarding the exposure of 
political leaders in both countries. The German party system was more focused on political 
candidates, especially those competing for the Chancellor office. Simultaneously, the Polish 
party system was less prone to concentrating on a single candidate but rather o political 
groupings as such. Yet another example that illustrated the importance of the party system 
was neatly connected with the incumbent and challenger strategies used by political actors in 
both countries. For instance, the fact that political parties, as indicated in Chapter 2, were 
often unknown to society resulted partly in a higher popularity of testimonials. Polish 
candidates, in contrast to their German counterparts, were more willing to use the images of 
both ordinary Poles or various idols and experts to improve own recognition among the 
voters.  
 
Finally, political broadcasts in Poland and Germany cannot be understood without referring to 
specific historical and cultural background. For instance, this was well mirrored in the ads 
which aimed at evoking voters’ emotions. While German viewers were confronted with 
commercials that frequently evoked emotions by the use of video-clip formats, Polish 
recipients were more often exposed to presence of national and religious symbols, a strategy 
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applied mainly by the right-wing parties. Moreover, the use of these symbols might indicate 
that certain parties in Poland did see such aspects as Christian values as yet another way to 
strengthen voters’ identification with a given grouping. This aspect is neatly connected with 
the issue of political culture and will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 8 that 
summarizes the outcomes of the study in light of theory and presented hypotheses. 
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Chapter 7 | Results: Comparing Media Coverage  
 
 
This Chapter reports the results of content analysis of media coverage. Firstly, it is showed 
whether newspapers concentrated on party campaigning in their reporting. Then the analysis 
reflects findings concerning the extent of personalization found in the media. In the next step, 
negativity found in articles is evaluated. The evaluation is conducted on two levels, on the 
level of article and on the level of presented themes. Additionally, on the article level, the 
degree of dramatization as well as the extent of conflict-oriented or cooperation-oriented 
depicturing is addressed. Finally, the study shows how Polish and German media tended to 
portray the political groupings. The same pattern of evaluation is applied separately for 
Poland and Germany and then followed by a direct comparison aiming at showing the 
differences and hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 are tested.   
 
7.1. Coverage on Party Campaigning  
 
In the following it is discussed whether media coverage on party campaigning in Poland has 
changed over time. The results are reported separately for Poland and Germany in order to 
show changes in reporting in the analyzed period. This country-based evaluation shows 
percentage of articles related to party campaigning and their prominence of placement. 
Simultaneously the overall theme spectrum is analyzed in detail to show the dominant focus 
of both Polish and German media. In the next step, media reporting in both countries is 
showed in a comparative perspective, indicating whether there could be observed differences 
in theme agenda and whether Poland and Germany differed in the extent of depicturing party 
campaigning.  
 
In order to evaluate the theme spectrum in each of the analyzed Polish media coverage, coders 
could identify up to three topics that were predominantly discussed by a journalist in a given 
article. The results indicated that press reporting in the last four weeks prior to the polling day 
generally favored similar themes in analyzed periods. The findings showed that in all three 
coded periods the highest percentage of articles referred to party campaigning. However, 
there is no evidence to confirm that media coverage on party campaigning increased over 
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time. On the contrary, the percentage of articles referring to election campaigns decreased 
from 52% in 1997 to 41% in 2001 and only slightly increased to 43% in 2005.  
 
These findings have a number of reasons. Firstly, both the 2001 and the 2005 elections in 
Poland occurred under specific circumstances. As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the 
coders analyzed the articles published four weeks prior to elections, which meant that the 
analysis of articles published in 2001 embraced a period between 27th August and 22nd 
September. Thus the sample automatically comprised newspapers that reported on the events 
of 11th September and the terrorist attack on the United States. This was also mirrored in the 
percentage of articles related to the foreign policy. In 1997 foreign policy issues were 
discussed in 2% of the articles, then increased to 7% in 2001 and decreased to 4% in 2005. 
The significance level of .012 shown for Pearson’s chi-square indicated that media reporting 
on foreign policy was more intensive in 2001 than in other periods. The events of 11th 
September resulted also in a smaller number of articles coded in 2001 (n=259) compared to 
coverage in 1997 (n=313) and media reporting in 2005 (n=347). The lower number of articles 
resulted from the fact that in 2001 the Polish media presented stories of individuals who were 
in the United States during the attack on the World Trade Center88. As noted by Wilke & 
Reinemann (2000) the intensity of media coverage is defined by other competing themes that 
are of equivalent interest to the public. In Poland the media reporting in 2005 was marked by 
an event of high news value - presidential elections that were scheduled for 9th October 2005 
and overlapped with the Sejm elections. Thus, 13% of articles published in 2005 concentrated 
on presidential elections and media reporting on the race to the Belweder constituted one of 
the most frequently discussed issues.  
 
However, there could be observed a trend towards placing articles related to party 
campaigning on the first pages. The coding instrument used a variable prominence of 
placement to evaluate this phenomenon. Articles published as the main journalistic piece on 
the cover or as longer comments on the cover were coded as indicating very high prominence 
of placement. High prominence was assigned to shorter articles published on the first page or 
as opening articles on the next page. Medium prominence of placement was coded for single-
column articles on the first page or shorter article on the next pages. Finally, low prominence 
was noted for single-column articles published beginning from the second page. Since the 
                                               
88
 Articles referring to stories of individuals were not coded.  
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number of stories was limited by space, the prominence of placement suggested the news 
value of a given article. The findings indicated that political campaigning issues appeared 
increasingly on the cover or as a main article on the following page. As showed in Figure 12, 
the number of articles indicating very high or high prominence of placement increased over 
time. In the 1997 media coverage 31% of articles were published in that manner compared to 
38% in 2005. Kruskal-Wallis-Test showed that these differences were significant (p=.036). 
However, in 2001 only 26% of articles related to party campaigning were placed on the first 
page or as a main article on the following page. This result can be attributed to the events of 
11th September when the covers were dominated by images showing the American tragedy. 
The dominance of media reporting on the terrorist attack in the United States was visible in 
both quality and tabloid press.  
 
 Figure 12: Prominence of placement (very high or high) of Polish articles related to politics 
31%
26%
38%
campaign 1997 campaign 2001 campaign 2005
 
  Basis n=162 [1997 media coverage] | n=107 [2001 media coverage] | n=148 [2005 media coverage] 
 
Among other themes discussed by Polish press, certain pattern stood out. Overall all titles 
devoted much space to social themes and economic policies. Media coverage on social 
policies remained rather stable over time and constituted about 9% of theme spectrum in each 
analyzed period. Simultaneously, a large number of articles discussed issues related to 
economic and financial policies, which amounted to 13% in 1997 and 12% in 2005. In 2001 
economic matters were presented at much greater length (26%) which can be partly explained 
by the fact that the economic development deteriorated at that time and a larger volume of 
information concentrated on outcomes of economic reforms. According to the report issued 
by Polish NIK89 (2002) the dynamics of economy in Poland in 2001 showed far worse results 
                                               
89
 NIK (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) stands for Supreme Chamber of Control.  
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in comparison to the whole decade of the 90s. The first year of the XXI century was marked 
by the collapse of investments, collapse of public financial sector and worsening situation on 
the work market. Thus it should not be surprising that the media extensively reported on 
economic and finance policies. Additionally, the economic deterioration had also a political 
dimension, which took of form of demission of Minister of Finance Jarosław Bauc in the last 
weeks of the campaign. Media coverage on economy in 2001 was intensified in case of all 
analyzed newspapers and amounted to 19% in the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 26% in the 
“Rzeczpospolita” and 34% in the “Super Express”90.  
 
Interestingly, Polish media devoted much space to articles discussing the relations between 
the state and politics. This theme concentrated on evaluation of political institutions, reported 
on political scandals, bribery etc. These issues were highlighted in 20% of articles in 1997, 
compared to 12% in 2001 and 19% in 2005. This high percentage of articles discussing 
relations between the state and politics can be partly attributed to the transformation 
processes, where media continuously analyzed the development of democratic practices in 
Poland. Polish press did evaluate politicians’ fitness for public offices. Before 1997 elections 
the media extensively reported inter alia about Kwaśniewski-Ałganow scandal91 and debates 
over lustration law92. Four years later the media was mainly concerned with economic issues 
and the events of 11th September. However, it still devoted much space to the evaluation of 
relations between the state and politics, particularly to the degree of development of the Polish 
democracy. Finally, in 2005 Polish newspapers evaluated the performance of post-communist 
government in the context of, among others, the Orlen scandal93 or the Rywingate. 
Additionally, the media launched the so-called “Campaign controlled” (kampania 
kontrolowana) which aimed at showing whether party leaders were telling the truth during the 
time of campaigning.   
 
                                               
90
 It should be remembered that the analysis included articles published in sections related to politics. The 
smaller volume of articles referring to economy in quality newspapers was partly caused by the fact that both the 
“Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita” have separate sections devoted exclusively to economic policy 
that were not included in the empirical evaluation. The “Super Express” however does not provide readers with 
additional pages discussing only economic matters. Thus the financial matters were articulated in articles 
reflecting politics in Poland and therefore their number was greater.  
91
 One of Polish newspapers accused president Kwaśniewski of spending holidays with the Russian agent 
Ałganow, which became a theme of detailed and lasting media coverage.  
92
 The issue of lustration law has not been so far fully resolved in Poland. The problem of identifying 
collaborators, active in service of communist regime frequently emerges during the time of elections when 
parties address this matter in their political programmes.  
93
 The so-called “afera Orlenu” regarded the privatization process of oil giant PKN Orlen.  
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The theme spectrum of German press remained relatively stable, giving priority to media 
reporting on party campaigning. The percentage of articles referring to campaign increased 
from 39% in 1998 to 40% in 2002 and than rose rapidly to 53% in 2005. The significance 
level of .000 showed for Pearson’s chi-square indicated that media substantially increased the 
volume of articles devoted to party campaigning. These findings have a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the intensiveness of reporting on the 2005 campaign was partly caused by its shortness 
and debate on legal aspects related to earlier elections. It has to be remembered that since 
1945 German Bundestag elections were held earlier only twice, in 1972 and in 1983. Thus the 
political context of the 2005 election had additional news value. Secondly, the 2005 campaign 
was also characterized by a novelty of Chancellor candidates’ constellation which was 
marked by the entrance of a female candidate. This issue will be addressed at greater length in 
the paragraphs related to the personalization of media reporting. Thirdly, more intensive 
media coverage might have influenced by the expected outcomes of the elections, which 
showed substantial fluctuation among German voters. Apart from reporting on party 
campaigning itself German newspapers increasingly wrote about political leaders which 
constituted 10% of theme spectrum in 1998, compared to 17% in 2002 and 18% in 2005.  
 
Collected data showed that media coverage on party campaigning in Germany increased over 
the analyzed period. However, the study found no trend toward placing more articles related 
to party campaigning on the first pages (see Figure 13). In the 1998 media coverage 29% of 
articles showed very high or high prominence of placement compared to 34% in 2001 and 
30% in 2005. Kruskal-Wallis-Test showed that these differences were not significant 
(p=.383). Overall, articles related to party campaigning comprised approximately one third of 
journalistic pieces appearing on the first pages.  
 
Simultaneously the last month prior to the elections was in general characterized by 
continuous presence of economic and social policies. In all three analyzed periods financial 
issues remained one of the most prominent themes. Media coverage on economic matters 
amounted to 19% in 1998, 16% in 2002 and 15% in 2005. Financial situation was assessed in 
the context of high employment and the gap separating the new and the old Lands which 
overshadowed the overall performance of German economy. Social matters were discussed in 
6% of articles in 1998, compared to 6% in 2002 and nearly doubled in 2005. Journalistic 
pieces in 2005 concentrated on the so-called “Hartz IV” reform which altered the legal 
framework that determined the rights and duties of the unemployed and changed the benefit 
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system. Both economic and social policies were usually evaluated in a negative manner which 
will be explored at greater length in the next parts of this Chapter.  
 
Figure 13: Prominence of placement (very high or high) of German articles related to politics 
29%
34%
30%
campaign 1998 campaign 2002 campaign 2005
  
 Basis n=154 [1998 media coverage] | n=174 [2002 media coverage] | n=238 [2005 media coverage] 
 
Overall theme spectrum discussed in German press concentrated predominantly on four 
issues: party campaigning, political leaders, economic and social policies. However, this 
pattern was modified in the 2002 campaign when media devoted much of its coverage to the 
foreign policy. In both the 1998 and the 2005 reporting this topic was granted relatively small 
attention estimated at 4-6%. In contrast, foreign policy issues comprised 17% of theme 
spectrum in 2002. This result could be explained by the context of Iraq policy. Firstly, the 
press intensively reported about Schröder’s declaration that Germany would not participate in 
a military actions in Iraq war. Secondly, the question of foreign policy appeared often in the 
context of the party campaigning itself since this issue became one of the elements of SPD 
strategy.  
 
Through the extent of reporting on party campaigning varied from campaign to campaign, 
Polish and German media devoted the highest percentage of journalistic pieces to this topic. 
The intensiveness of media reporting was influenced by the context of each campaign, which 
was particularly true for the Polish parliamentary elections held in 2001 and 2005. The 
findings confirmed the hypothesis H1:  
 
H1: German and Polish media coverage concentrates on party campaigning 
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Simultaneously, a comparative perspective showed that overall party campaigning constituted 
45% of theme spectrum in Poland and 44% of theme spectrum in Germany. Similarly, Polish 
and German press did not differ in the prominence of placement of articles related to party 
campaigning. In the whole analyzed period very high and high prominence was noted in case 
of 32% (Poland) and 31% (Germany) of articles reporting on campaigning activities.  
 
However, coverage on party leaders caught dramatically different degree of media attention in 
both countries. Polish media devoted only 4% of the overall theme spectrum to party leaders, 
coded mainly during the 2005 campaign. In contrast, German coverage on political candidates 
constituted 15% of theme spectrum. The significance of .000 showed for Phi confirmed that 
this difference was significant. The result should be seen in the context of political system 
characteristics and was mirrored in more intensive depicturing of Chancellor candidates. The 
focus on party leaders will be also explored at greater length in the following paragraphs of 
this Chapter related to personalization of media reporting.  
 
  Figure 14: Theme spectrum in Polish and German media coverage  
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  Basis: n = 919 Polish articles | n = 1277 German articles 
 
As indicated in Figure 14 the study found no differences in the volume of journalistic pieces 
related to economic issues, which amounted to 16% in Poland and 17% in Germany. 
Similarly, newspapers in both countries devoted overall approximately 8% of its coverage to 
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social issues. These two themes, together with articles addressing party campaigning, 
constituted the core spectrum discussed in each campaign.  
 
However, the study found that Polish agenda devoted much space to reporting on the relations 
between the state and politics. Throughout the analyzed period this issue comprised 17% of 
the theme spectrum. In Germany, this topic was reflected in only 6% of theme spectrum. The 
significant level .000 showed for Phi proved that the difference in frequency of discussing this 
topic was significant. Again, these results should be seen in the context of political system 
characteristics, particularly in the light of transformation processes in Poland. The aspect of 
the relations between the state and politics was particularly strong in the context of party 
campaigning; both themes were frequently coded together in a given journalistic piece. This 
topic was addressed in limited number of German articles, however the titles in Germany paid 
more attention to environment and migration issues (6%), topics which were absent in Polish 
dailies (less than 1%).  
 
7.2. Focus on Leaders  
 
Increasing personalization is seen as one of the indicators of mediatisation and stands for a 
shift from the issue-based to the person-based reporting (Holtz-Bacha, 2000). In order to 
assess it, the coders analyzed the tone of depicturing of party leaders94. This category was 
coded only in articles presenting certain candidates mentioned in the coding instrument (see 
Appendix B). If a given article included references to more than one of coded politicians, then 
the extent of personalized reporting was coded for each of them. The coders measured the 
level of personalization using a five point scale ranging from clearly politics-oriented articles 
to clearly person-oriented ones.  
 
The results showed that the Polish media coverage in that respect has partly changed over 
time. During the 1997 parliamentary campaign 28% of all coded articles made any reference 
to the coded politicians95. In the articles where tendency for a given party leader(s) was noted, 
politics-oriented depicturing (52%) dominated person-oriented evaluations (37%). In 11% of 
the analyzed articles the proportion of politics-oriented and person-oriented components was 
                                               
94
 Party leader was defined as a Chair of a given party or as a leader of a given electoral alliance.  
95
 In the 1997 media coverage leaders of the following five parties were evaluated: AWS (Marian Krzaklewski), 
SLD (Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz), UW (Leszek Balcerowcz), PSL (Waldemar Pawlak) and ROP (Jan 
Olszewski).  In a given article each leader could be coded if any reference to him had been made.  
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similar (see Figure 15). Among discussed leaders the biggest attention was given to 
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who appeared in 45% of articles where tendency for party leaders 
was coded. This result can be attributed to the fact that Cimoszewicz was the Prime Minister 
of Poland during the 1997 parliamentary campaign. Therefore his presence in the media 
coverage, as head of the Polish government, was more frequent. Overall, 73% of articles 
related to this politician concentrated on presenting his position on political issues, whereas 
only 27% were person-oriented. Cimoszewicz was usually presented in the context of reforms 
such as, for instance, modernization of Polish army or education sector, which were subject of 
debate in the weeks before the polling day. Additionally, part of the media coverage reported 
on Cimoszewicz in the context of “vote of non-confidence” proposed by SLD’s coalition 
partner PSL, which criticized the outcomes of economic policy introduced by Cimoszewicz’s 
cabinet and aimed at creating new government.  
 
Figure 15: Personalization of media coverage in Poland 
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   Basis: n= 89 cases [1997 media coverage] | n= 71 cases [2001 media coverage] | n= 125 cases [2005 media coverage] 
 
In 2001 the percentage of articles with no reference to political leaders96 constituted 73%. In 
the remaining 27% of articles the tone of presenting leaders was again more politics-oriented 
(70%) than person-oriented (24%). In 6% of articles, where top politicians were addressed, 
issues related both to politics and politician himself were present to the same degree. Among 
                                               
96
 In the 2001 media coverage the number of evaluated leaders increased as there were nine analyzed parties 
which included: AWSP (Jerzy Buzek), SLD/UP (Leszek Miller and Marek Pol), UW (Bronisław Geremek), PSL 
(Jarosław Kalinowski), PO (Donald Tusk, Maciej Płażyński, Andrzej Olechowski), PiS (Lech and Jarosław 
Kaczyński), LPR (Roman Giertych) and Self-Defense (Andrzej Lepper). For certain groupings more than one 
leader was coded because at the time of election campaigns they did not have any “formal” leader. Thus 
founding fathers of a given grouping were analyzed. PO serves as a good example in that respect.   
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the discussed leaders the biggest attention was given to Jerzy Buzek. Again, that was partly 
due to the fact that Buzek was head of the Polish government at that time, similarly as 
Cimoszewicz four years earlier. The media coverage on Buzek was also strongly politics-
oriented (70%), and the percentage of person-oriented articles constituted only 30%. In the 
four weeks before the polling day, politics-oriented coverage presented Buzek mainly in the 
context of economic crisis and demission of Minister of Finance, Jarosław Bauc. 
Additionally, Buzek appeared in the context of Warsaw-Oslo agreement that guaranteed gas 
for Poland and ended Russian monopoly. Finally, Buzek was also partly portrayed as a leader 
of AWSP in reporting related to the campaign itself.   
 
 
Finally, in 2005 the coverage on candidates97 showed changing patterns of reporting. The 
percentage of articles depicturing political leaders constituted 36% of all articles. This 
finding, however, should be seen in the context of the presidential campaign that was 
overlapping with the parliamentary elections. The analysis showed that if the theme 
concerning presidential elections had been excluded from the analysis, the percentage of 
articles that made references to party leaders would have decreased from 36% to 32%. Thus 
the data indicated that the percentage of articles related to politicians might have been 
influenced by the context of the presidential election which produced more articles related to 
candidates. In the articles where a tendency for showing a given party leader(s) was noted, 
politics-oriented depicturing constituted 40% compared to 55% of person-oriented 
evaluations. In 5% of the analyzed articles the proportion of politics-oriented and person-
oriented components was similar. 
 
Furthermore, among the analyzed party leaders it is interesting to look more closely at the 
media coverage related to Donald Tusk, Lech Kaczyński and Andrzej Lepper - party leaders 
and also presidential candidates in the 2005 elections. In 2005 Tusk appeared in 41% of 
articles where political leaders were analyzed, compared to 46% of articles where Kaczyński 
was explicitly mentioned. The third presidential candidate Lepper would appear in 19% of 
articles where a tendency for political leaders was noted. Other leaders were given much 
smaller attention. A closer look at the media coverage on Tusk and Kaczyński revealed that it 
was strongly person-oriented (67% for Kaczyński, and 65% for Tusk). The media coverage in 
                                               
97
 The analysis regarding the 2005 election included leaders of PO (Donald Tusk), PiS (Lech and Jarosław 
Kaczyński), LPR (Roman Giertych), SLD (Wojciech Olejniczak), PSL (Waldemar Pawlak) and Self-Defense 
(Andrzej Lepper). 
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2005 concentrated on those two candidates98 as they were, according to the opinion polls, 
most likely to succeed in the race to the Belweder. Moreover, in 2001 all three candidates 
were granted far smaller attention - though they were also party leaders at that time (see 
Figure 16). Tusk appeared in 4% of articles where political leaders were mentioned, compared 
to 6% for Lech Kaczyński and 3% for Lepper99.  Thus it can be concluded that the higher 
number of articles related to political leaders found in the 2005 media reporting resulted 
partly from the presidential campaign which granted certain political leaders higher attention.  
 
  Figure 16:  Frequency of reporting about Donald Tusk, Lech Kaczyński and Andrzej Lepper 
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campaign 2001 campaign 2005
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Kaczyński
Lepper
 
  Basis: n= 62 [Kaczyński]; n= 54 [Tusk]; n= 26 [Lepper] 
 
In Germany, 40% of all coded articles in the 1998 coverage made reference to coded 
politicians100. In articles where tendency for a given party leader(s) was coded, person-
oriented evaluations (62%) clearly overweighed politics-oriented depicturing (28%). In the 
remaining 10% of analyzed articles the proportion of both politics-oriented and person-
oriented coverage was equal (see Figure 17). Among discussed leaders the majority of 
articles, where any reference to coded politicians was made, concentrated on Chancellor 
candidates.  Helmut Kohl appeared in 72% of articles where tendency for party leaders was 
                                               
98
 It should also be stressed that the personalization trend might have been strengthened by the announcement of 
television debates between presidential candidates that were supposed to take place before the parliamentary 
elections in 2005. The announcement of those debates led to protests of other political groupings which argued 
that both Tusk and Kaczyński should not be given that high attention as they were not only presidential 
candidates but also leaders of the two major parties.  
99
 These results, however, have to be evaluated with caution as in the media coverage in 2001 the total number of 
cases where a tendency for a party leader was coded amounted only to n=71.   
100
 Media coverage in 1998 embraced leaders from five parties: CDU/CSU (Helmut Kohl), SPD (Gerhard 
Schröder), FDP (Wolfgang Gerhardt), the Greens (Joschka Fischer) and PDS (Gregor Gysi).  
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coded. These findings can be seen as a result of the political position of Kohl as an incumbent 
at that time. Media coverage related to him was intensive as Kohl would appear in German 
press both as the head of government and Chancellor candidate of the Union. Nevertheless the 
analysis showed that 66% of articles related to Kohl were focused on person-oriented 
coverage, compared to 25% of articles concentrating on political issues. In 9% of articles the 
proportion of person- and politics-oriented depicturing was similar.  
 
  Figure 17: Personalization of media coverage in Germany 
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   Basis: n= 158 cases [1998 media coverage] | n= 260 cases [2002 media coverage] | n= 234 cases [2005 media coverage] 
 
In the 1998 media coverage Chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder appeared in 49% of 
articles where any reference to coded party leaders was found. Again, the large proportion of 
articles mentioning SPD candidate was due to the fact, that he was regarded as the main 
opponent of Kohl. When analyzed in detail, media reporting on Schröder was more person-
oriented (76%) than politics-oriented (14%). In 10% of coverage on SPD candidate the 
volume of both politics- and person-oriented depicturing was equal. The smaller percentage of 
media coverage was partly caused by the fact that Schröder as a challenger would have fewer 
opportunities to appear in media coverage than the incumbent. 
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In this context it should be however remembered that the study by Wilke & Reinemann 
(2000) found no ‘Chancellor” bonus”101 for the 1998 campaign. Still, one should bear in mind 
that the authors analyzed only articles related to party campaigning and Chancellor 
candidates. Furthermore, they also analyzed every second article in the last four weeks of 
campaigns and a broader press spectrum, that included, among others, “Die Welt”, which 
devoted much more space to campaign coverage compared to such titles as “FAZ” or 
“Süddeutsche Zeitung” (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000, 2003, 2006). However, the authors found 
“Chancellor bonus” for 2002 coverage on Schröder and Stoiber and noted that it diminished 
in 2005 while reporting on Schröder and Merkel. These results obtained for the 2002 and 
2005 media coverage were also mirrored, as indicated in the next paragraphs, in this study.   
 
In the 2002 media reporting the volume of articles were reference to party leaders102 was 
noted increased to 59%. The majority of those articles were again person-oriented (73%) and 
politics-oriented coverage on coded politicians comprised 24%. In 3% of articles, where top 
politicians were addressed, issues related both to politics and politician himself were similar. 
Again, among appearing leaders, the biggest attention was given to Chancellor candidates. 
Gerhard Schröder appeared in 73% of articles were coded politicians were addressed. These 
results were not surprising given the fact that during the 2002 campaign SPD candidate was 
both leading the government coalition being simultaneously a Chancellor candidate of Social 
Democrats. The findings indicated that media coverage on Schröder remained more person- 
(75%) rather than politics-oriented (22%). In 3% of articles the proportion of person- and 
politics-oriented depicturing was similar. As observed by Wilke & Reinemann (2003:44) 
during the 2002 campaign Schröder’s image was neatly connected with themes that 
dominated the parliamentary campaign. This was particularly true for the issue of Iraq-policy 
and led to the evaluation of policies in a form of evaluating Schröder. As a result person-
oriented depicturing dominated media coverage on the German Chancellor.  Furthermore, it 
should be remembered that Schröder’s telegenic personality might be also partly responsible 
for personalized reporting.  
 
Among analyzed leaders, the main opponent of Schröder, Edmund Stoiber appeared in 48% 
of articles related to coded politicians. More detailed analysis of depicturing of Stoiber 
                                               
101
 Chancellor bonus is understood as an attention advantage of the incumbent Chancellor.  
102
 Media coverage in 2002 embraced leaders from five parties: CDU/CSU (Edmund Stoiber), SPD (Gerhard 
Schröder), FDP (Guido Westerwelle), the Greens (Joschka Fischer) and PDS (Gregor Gysi). 
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showed that media tended to highlight person-oriented aspects (80%) rather then the 
candidate’s political stand (18%). The remaining 2% included articles related to both person- 
and politics depicturing. The high percentage of person-oriented evaluations can be partly 
explained by the formats of party campaigning. In 2002 both Schröder and Stoiber 
participated in two Fernsehduells. Additionally, each of them delivered a speech in Bundestag 
on 14th September. Both events were widely reported by the media, which personalized a race 
between both candidates. Since Wilke & Reinemann (2003) analyzed a broader spectrum of 
newspapers, it is useful to illustrate the intensiveness of the media coverage with the results of 
their study. Among titles they analyzed journalistic pieces published on Mondays and 
Tuesdays after both Fernsehduells contained more evaluations of Chancellor candidates than 
the total number of evaluations in some of the earlier campaigns. Furthermore, after the 
Rededuell in Bundestag all coded newspapers, except from “FAZ” presented two photos of 
the both leaders on the cover, indicating a direct confrontation between the rivals. Thus both 
Duells in TV and Bundestag led the “explosion’ (Wilke & Reinemann, 2003) of depicturing 
Chancellor candidates.  
 
Finally, the results of German coverage during the 2005 parliamentary campaign103 revealed 
changes in media reporting. The percentage of articles related to party leaders constituted 
again more than half of all analyzed articles and amounted to 52% articles. However, person-
oriented depicturing embraced 55% of articles compared to 40% articles that were politics-
oriented. In 5% of articles were political leaders were evaluated the relation between person 
and politics-oriented reporting was similar. Compared to earlier campaigns in 1998 and 2002 
when politics-oriented coverage was coded in about one fourth of articles where tendency for 
depicturing was found, the 2005 media coverage concentrated more on political stands of 
politicians rather than person aspects. These findings were also mirrored in the coverage on 
Chancellor candidates.  
 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder appeared in 64% of articles where tendency for politicians was 
measured. The volume of person-oriented reporting amounted to 60% compared to 34% 
politics-oriented articles. In the remaining 6% of articles the percentage of both person- and 
politics-oriented remarks was similar. The analysis of media coverage on Union candidate 
Angela Merkel showed that Merkel appeared in 60% of all articles where tendency for party 
                                               
103
 Media coverage in 2005 embraced leaders from five parties: CDU/CSU (Angela Merkel), SPD (Gerhard 
Schröder), FDP (Guido Westerwelle), the Greens (Joschka Fischer) and PDS (Gregor Gysi).  
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leaders was coded. Thus the gap between the intensity of media coverage related to 
Chancellor candidates was marginal. Furthermore, among articles relating to Merkel only 
49% of articles were image related compared to 43% of politics-related articles. These results 
suggest that the depicturing of Union candidate was to the larger extent based on her political 
stand. Events that furthered Merkel’s presence in 2005 were neatly connected with so-called 
Merkel-Team and controversy surrounding Merkel’s finance expert Paul Kirchhof. Thus the 
media debate devoted much coverage to economic aspects of the campaign.  
 
As observed by Wilke & Reinemann (2006) the 2005 elections could be seen as an 
‘exception” since it was the first campaign in which there was a female Chancellor candidate. 
A woman competing for one of the highest political offices was a novum and thus had higher 
news value. Therefore the media coverage would describe Merkel as “the first one” and her 
participation as “the first time” and in so doing stressed the exceptional character of the 2005 
Bundestag elections. As showed in this study, for Angela Merkel this “novelty” aspect 
resulted in presence bonus. The percentage of media coverage on Schröder and Merkel was 
similar. The same results were delivered by Wilke & Reinemann (2006) in their content 
analysis of German newspapers and by Schulz & Zeh (2005) in their analysis of the German 
television news. Overall, it can be stated that there was no clear pattern of the magnitude of 
the Chancellor bonus in three analyzed campaigns. The gap between the candidates was larger 
in 1998 and 2002 and diminished considerably in 2005. Thus it can be concluded that the 
degree of personalization depended on such factors as candidates’ constellation, political 
context of a given election campaign and intensiveness of the campaign itself. 
 
In sum, German media coverage on party leaders proved to concentrate mostly on Chancellor 
candidates. The analysis showed that in 1998 reporting Chancellor candidates from SPD and 
UNION appeared in 88% of articles where tendency for top politicians was coded. Similar 
results were noted in 2002 and 2005 coverage (86% and 93% respectively). The leaders of the 
Greens, Liberals and PDS were granted far smaller attention. The total percentage of articles 
where tendency for the Greeens, FDP and Socialists was found amounted to 26% in 1998, 
31% in 2002 and only 18% in 2005 media coverage. Among German parties the smallest 
attention was given to PDS’s leader and constituted between 3-5% percent of articles related 
to depicturing politicians in all analyzed campaigns. The results indicate that media preferred 
to centre they coverage round political actors that were competing for the position as the head 
of German government.  However, Chancellor candidates in the first two analyzed campaigns 
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were mostly showed in person-oriented coverage and only in the last campaign the proportion 
of politics-oriented reporting increased. In this context it is also interesting to look at the 
media coverage on Guido Westerwelle, who was declared a Chancellor candidate by FDP in 
2002. This declaration brought rather little media resonance and the reporting concentrated on 
the leaders of SPD and the UNION. The study found that in 2002 Westerwelle appeared in 
17% of articles where tendency for candidates was coded104. This limited number of 
evaluations referring to Westewelle was also proved by Wilke & Reinemann (2003:43) who 
found in their newspapers analysis that only 7% of the articles mentioned this political leader.   
 
The second hypothesis to be examined is that personalization is more visible in German than 
in Polish media coverage. In order to verify this hypothesis the study compared the proportion 
of person-oriented versus politics-oriented depicturing of party leaders in both countries. In 
the next step, the analysis looked more closely whether the extent of personalization was 
different in quality press and tabloids in both countries.  
 
The findings confirmed that German media coverage was more focused on leaders 
themselves. In order to show it the study compared the overall tone of depicturing of 
candidates in three analyzed campaigns, separately for each country. The results indicated that 
person-oriented depicturing constituted 64% of German reporting compared to 42% in 
Poland. The proportion of politics-oriented depicturing was much higher in Poland and 
amounted to 51%. In Germany, only 30% of articles were tone of depicturing of leaders was 
coded was rather politics-focused. Finally, the proportion of articles where both person- and 
politics-oriented aspects of candidates’ presentation was showed was similar in both countries 
and amounted to 7% in Poland and 6% in Germany (see Figure 18). The significance level of 
.000 showed for Pearson’s chi-square indicates that the difference in focus on leaders between 
German and Polish media reporting was significant. Thus the hypothesis H2 was confirmed: 
 
H2: Personalization is more visible in German than in Polish media coverage 
 
These results can be explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, the extent of personalization 
was partly defined by the differences resulting from the political system characteristics. Major 
German parties, especially the UNION and SPD, did concentrate their campaigning on 
                                               
104
 These results should be evaluated with caution due to small number of cases [n=42].  
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Chancellor leaders. And since the parties concentrated in their campaigning on their leaders 
they also provided more opportunities for the media coverage. One example of that is the 
influence of such media events as Fernsehduelle or Rededuelle in Bundestag which provided 
additional basis for candidate-oriented reporting. The dominance of this continuous 
dichotomy between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats was proved tangibly in 
2002 when FDP declared Guido Westerwelle its Chancellor candidate, which did not increase 
media coverage on this particular leader.  
 
  Figure 18: Personalization of media coverage in Poland and Germany  
30%
6%
64%
51%
7%
42%
Politics-oriented Ambivalent Person oriented
Germany
Poland
 
  Basis: n = 285 cases (Poland) | n = 652 cases (Germany) 
 
In contrast, Polish political campaigns were still less focused on party leaders and more on the 
political parties as such. In Chapter 4, the study stated that the closest similarity of Polish 
media coverage to German reporting was likely to be found during the 2005 campaign. 
Therefore the study compared the media reporting on presidential candidates Tusk, Kaczyński 
and Lepper with articles on Chancellor candidates Schröder and Merkel. The results showed 
that if only these candidates were taken into a count, the depicturing of leaders in both 
countries was similar. In Poland, person-oriented evaluations constituted 62% of articles 
where tendency of depicturing for Tusk, Kaczyński and Lepper was noted. In Germany, 
person-related aspects were highlighted in 54% of articles, in which Schröder and Merkel 
were presented. Similarly, politics-oriented depicturing of three Polish candidates constituted 
36% compared to 40% in German articles. The significance level of .219 showed for 
Pearson’s chi-square proved that there was no significant difference between both countries.  
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It would require an analysis of future media reporting to determine whether higher 
personalization noted in the 2005 elections in Poland was only an “exception” influenced by 
the context of parallel presidential campaign. Limited focus of leaders in earlier campaigns 
might also result from the structural elements of political groupings. For instance, in 2001 
Civic Platform was not officially a party and acted as electoral alliance under the leadership of 
Tusk, Płażyński and Olechowski, its funding fathers. Thus the media reporting was less 
focused on one political candidate. In 2005, PO had formalized party structures and an official 
leader, Donald Tusk. Finally, what should be also taken into account is the degree if openness 
of media system for radical parties. Polish newspapers, especially quality titles as to be 
demonstrated in this Chapter, devoted much less space to coverage on radical groupings. 
Thus, through both Self-Defense and League of Polish Families had distinct leaders, they 
were granted relatively small media attention.  
 
  Figure 19: Personalization and Type of Newspapers in Poland and Germany 
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  Basis: n = 732 [quality newspapers] | n = 205 [tabloids] 
 
Secondly, it is also interesting to scrutinize whether the extent of personalization differed 
according to the type of newspapers (see Figure 19). The study showed that there was 
substantial difference in depicturing of candidates in quality newspapers. In Germany, 66% of 
articles where tone of depicturing of politicians was found was rather person-oriented. 
Politics-oriented depicturing constituted more than two times less, only 28% of the 
journalistic pieces. Finally, 6% of articles indicated both person- and politics-related aspects. 
In Poland, the proportion of articles was quite different. Overall, only 40% of articles focused 
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on personality of candidates, whereas 53% was politics-oriented. In the remaining 7% of 
articles, mixed evaluations were found. The significance level of .000 showed for Pearson’s 
chi-square proves significant difference in depicturing of political leader between Polish and 
German quality titles. However, these results became more complex when tabloids were taken 
into account. The findings indicated that there was no significant difference in extent of 
personalization in both countries, which amounted to 50% in Poland and 56% in Germany. 
The percentage of politics-oriented depicturing was also similar and constituted 42% of Polish 
and 39% of German reporting. The significance level of .496 showed for Pearson’s chi-square 
showed that there was no difference between tabloids in both countries since they depictured 
political leaders in the same manner. This result can be explained by the type of journalism 
exercised by tabloid press, characterized, inter alia, by personalization of articles (Esser, 
1999). In general, both the “Bild” and the “Super Express” reflected campaigns via the 
images of the political leaders. These titles published also more pictures of the political 
leaders than the quality press.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the selection of coding periods and the number of analyzed 
newspapers influenced the use of categories. It awaits another analysis to scrutinize person-
oriented depicturing of political leaders in Germany and Poland as greater length which could 
also focus on the candidates’ features stressed in media reporting. Additionally, it would be 
undoubtedly useful to examine the differences in depicturing between head of government in 
both countries. In this context it can be expected that German coverage would remain more 
personalized. Since this study was based on a smaller sample of answers embracing only the 
last four weeks prior to the polling day, these categories were not applied. However, instead 
the coding instrument embraced the evaluation of photos showing political leaders.  
 
The assessment of photos partly confirmed the patterns of personalized reporting reflected in 
articles’ analysis. Polish media reporting in 1997 portrayed mainly the Prime Minister 
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz who was showed on 12 photos. Cimoszewicz was mainly 
depictured in an official setting as a head of Polish government while exerting his duties. His 
appearance was predominantly evaluated as serious, capable of implementing his ideas. 
Additionally, even though Prime Minister was officially the leader of the electoral alliance 
SLD, he was not even once showed during party campaigning. Among other leaders Polish 
titles published photos showing the leaders of AWS, UW and PSL, each of them was 
portrayed 8 times. Jan Olszewski from ROP was showed only on 4 pictures. These leaders 
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were mainly depictured in the context of parliamentary campaign, in their electoral offices or 
while interviews with journalists. In contrast, in 2001 the highest attention was given to Jerzy 
Buzek who appeared on 11 photos, other leaders were given marginal attention. Again, 
Buzek’s appearance was seen as serious, however he was also depictured as lacking energy, 
unable to spread good humor. This assessment corresponded with the atmosphere of the last 
weeks prior to the polling day when the cabinet was confronted with budget crisis and 
attacked by the opposition. 
 
Finally, Polish photo coverage in 2005 tangibly mirrored the influence of presidential 
elections. Overall, Donald Tusk appeared on 16 photos, Lech Kaczyński on 19 images. Other 
presidential candidate Andrzej Lepper was showed on 7 photographs. In this context it should 
be remembered that during the 2001 campaign media coverage contained only between 1 and 
2 photos for each of these three candidates. Furthermore, there could be observed a change in 
style of portraying political leaders. In many articles both Tusk and Kaczyński were 
depictured together and photos concentrated on showing their rivalry. This type of depicturing 
was particularly present in the tabloid “Super Express”. Overall Tusk was seen depictured as 
more energetic, trustworthy and likable than Lech Kaczyński who was showed as more 
concentrated and capable of implementing his ideas. Simultaneously the photo setting for both 
candidates was more diverse and took a form of campaign meetings, campaign headquarters, 
party gatherings. Additionally, part of the images published by tabloids incorporated images 
of Tusk and Kaczyński into photomontages.   
 
In contrast to Polish newspapers, German titles were more centered round showing the images 
of two competing leaders. Thus the majority of photos published in all analyzed campaigns 
concentrated on Chancellor candidates. In media reporting in 1998 Helmut Kohl was showed 
on 21 photos whereas Gerhard Schröder on 12 pictures. Both candidates were depictured 
together on additional 8 photographs. Overall the study showed that the media portrayed the 
challenger as more energetic (mean value: 2,09), more trustworthy (mean value: 1,64), more 
easy going (mean value: 3,09) and more capable of implementing his ideas (mean value: 1.73) 
than Helmut Kohl. In 2002 Gerhard Schröder was portrayed on 21 photos, compared to 11 
pictures showing Edmund Stoiber. Overall, additional 10 photos showed both candidates. The 
depicturing of Chancellor candidates was similar, however Gerhard Schröder again appeared 
as more easy going (mean value: 3,07) and was also perceived as more likable (mean value: 
2,67). Finally, the media coverage in 2005 was dominated by the images of Gerhard Schröder 
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and Angela Merkel, however the study did not note any major differences in their depicturing. 
The last analyzed media coverage contained 22 images of Gerhard Schröder, 14 pictures of 
Angela Merkel and 6 photographs showing both candidates.  
 
7.3. Negativity   
 
Increasing mediatisation can be also manifested in a rising volume of negativity in media 
coverage. The following paragraphs present the results of the evaluation of the Polish and 
German press in that respect. Firstly, the overall extent of negativity in articles in Poland and 
Germany is showed. In this context it will be also indicated whether in articles that articulated 
conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks media reported in a dramatized manner and 
whether their portraying was rather conflict or cooperation-oriented. Secondly, negativity 
related to depicturing coded themes in both countries is discussed at greater length. Finally, a 
comparative perspective on extent of negative evaluations in Germany and Poland is 
provided.  
 
In order to assess the extent of negativity in the Polish press, the tone of articles was analyzed. 
The tone was defined as an overall impression of depicturing of themes in a given article. 
Using a five point scale ranging from very positive/optimistic to very negative/pessimistic 
evaluations, the coders examined the overall tendency of depicturing of the analyzed media 
reporting. Positive tone was coded for articles where described themes were showed in a 
positive way or promised positive outcomes in the future. If an article evaluated a given 
theme in a negative manner it was classified as a negative/pessimistic depicturing.  
 
One of the most striking findings to emerge from this study was the increasing volume of 
negative media coverage in Poland over time (see Figure 20). Negative/pessimistic105 tone 
was present in 51% of articles during the 1997 media coverage, compared to 59% in 2001 and 
61% in 2005. The percentage of articles with overall positive/optimistic106 tone was smaller 
and amounted to 46% of articles in 1997, dropped to 39% in 2001 and further decreased to 
38% in the 2005 media coverage. Ambivalent tone was found in 3% of articles in 1997, 3% in 
2001 and 2% in the 2005 reporting. In order to assess the negativity, mean value of tone of 
articles published in a given analyzed period was created. In the next step mean values 
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 Answers “very negative/very pessimistic” and “negative/pessimistic” were added. 
106
 Answers “very positive/optimistic” and “positive/optimistic” were added.  
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obtained for media coverage in 1997, 2001 and 2005 were compared. ANOVA (analysis of 
variance) test showed a significant difference in negativity over time (p=.031). In light of 
these findings one could pose a question why the tone of media coverage has become more 
negative over time. This issue will be discussed at greater length when negativity attributed to 
themes and political parties is presented.   
 
  Figure 20: Negativity in tone of articles in Poland 
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  Basis: n= 261 [1997 media coverage] | n= 230 [2001 media coverage] | n= 329 [2005 media coverage] 
 
Another interesting finding was the volume of commentary pieces in media reporting and 
negative depicturing in commentary articles. The results indicated that throughout all 
analyzed campaigns the percentage of commentary articles increased from 26% in 1997 to 
38% in 2001 and amounted to 44% in the 2005 media coverage. The significance level of 
.000 showed for Pearson’s chi-square proved that changes in the volume of non commentary 
versus commentary articles were significant. Thus the results indicated that Polish newspapers 
included more analytical pieces in their reporting, in which journalists commented on political 
news. Simultaneously, commentary pieces increasingly acquired negative tone though this 
trend according to ANOVA tests was not significant (p=.362).  
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In order to assess the negativity in each analyzed medium, mean value of tone of articles 
published in all analyzed campaigns was created107. ANOVA tests indicated significant 
differences between analyzed newspapers (p=.000). Post-hoc tests showed that reporting in 
the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was significantly more negative than in the “Super Express” 
(p=.001). Post-hoc tests run for the “Rzeczpospolita” and the ‘Super Express” again indicated 
significant (p=.000) difference in negative tone of media coverage, where more negative news 
were found in the “Rzeczpospolita”. The results thus showed that Polish quality newspapers 
were overall more negative in their reporting than a tabloid. Higher level of negativity in 
quality press resulted from different theme spectrum, namely depicturing of party 
campaigning and economic issues. While negative coverage on party campaigning comprised 
one third of articles published in the “Super Express”, it amounted to 40% of articles in the 
“Rzeczpospolita” and half of the articles published in the “Gazeta Wyborcza”. Both quality 
papers reported in a negative manner on economic and finance policies, which comprised 
nearly two thirds of articles related to this theme in each newspaper. The “Super Express” 
published only 46% of articles related to economy that were negative in nature. The highest 
negativity in tone of articles noted for the “Rzeczpospolita” resulted also from more critical 
evaluation of social issues (79%) than the “Gazeta Wyborcza” (52%) and the “Super Express” 
(57%).  
 
It is also interesting to look closer at how the Polish press reported on articles where conflicts, 
material and immaterial losses and risks were articulated. Measured on a five point scale, the 
coders could indicate whether possible risks and dangers related to a given conflict were 
presented in a dramatized manner or whether the authors tended to minimize possible 
negative consequences. In so doing the extent of dramatization in media coverage was 
estimated. The comparison of mean values108 between the three analyzed periods showed that 
the Polish press rather dramatized the possible risks and dangers related to conflicts (mean 
value: 2,23). ANOVA test indicated that there was no significant difference (p=.594) between 
media coverage in 1997, 2001 and 2005 in that respect. In this context one could pose a 
question concerning the reasons for dramatized depicturing of conflicts by the Polish media. 
Since this variable was coded on the article level, it was not possible to attribute dramatization 
to any concrete theme. However, overall dramatized reporting was mainly visible in articles 
                                               
107
 Obtained mean values: 2.96 (“Super Express”), 3.35 (“Gazeta Wyborcza”) and 3.39 (“Rzeczpospolita").  
108
 Note that, measured on a 5 point scale, 1 indicated high dramatization compared to 5 which stood for 
minimizing of dangers. Thus higher mean value indicated smaller dramatization.  
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where such themes as party campaigning, political parties and relations between the state and 
politics were coded. Though no systematic empirical evidence can be provided, it is likely 
that dramatization mirrored mainly journalistic concerns about the lack of consensus within 
the Polish political system, which hindered transformation.   
 
Finally, in articles where conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were articulated, 
the coders analyzed whether an article was rather cooperation or conflict-oriented. Again, this 
variable was measured on a five point scale ranging from conflict-oriented to cooperation-
oriented depicturing. The results showed that the Polish media tended to concentrate on the 
conflict-oriented aspects more intensively (mean value: 1.78). ANOVA tests indicated that 
there was no significant difference (p=.265) in that respect between all analyzed campaigns 
and that the conflict-oriented depicturing was rather stable over time.  
 
However, a comparison between media and post-hoc tests proved that the differences between 
all analyzed newspapers were significant. Among the analyzed newspapers the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza” tended to show the most conflict-oriented depicturing (mean value: 1,43), 
followed by the “Rzeczpospolita” (mean value: 1,71) and the tabloid “Super Express” (mean 
value: 2,19). These results can be attributed to the thematic spectrum of analyzed press. T-test 
proved that the conflict-oriented depicturing was much more frequent in articles where the 
theme concerning political parties was presented (p=.037). Among the analyzed media the 
“Gazeta Wyborcza” devoted the largest volume of articles where the theme of political parties 
was discussed (50%) compared to the “Rzeczpospolita” (40%) and the “Super Express” 
(25%) which published the smallest number of articles related to parties. The differences 
concerning thematic spectrum should be seen in light of the titles’ profiles. For a long time the 
“Super Express” ignored such news values as politics and instead concentrated on human-
interest stories. This was confirmed by the study which found a limited number of articles 
related to the political sphere especially in 1997 and, to a lesser extent, in 2001. The 
“Rzeczpospolita” established itself as the quality newspaper and leader in providing 
information on economic and legal sectors and its coverage on political parties was not as 
intense as in the “Gazeta Wyborcza” which from the moment it was established devoted much 
of its reporting to political life in Poland.  
 
To examine the media coverage more profoundly, the coders analyzed the evaluation of 
themes presented in a given article. Using a five point scale ranging from very 
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positive/optimistic to very negative/pessimistic evaluation, the coders evaluated the 
presentation of a given theme. In the next step, the forecast for a given theme was measured. 
Again, the coders used a five point scale ranging from a very positive/optimistic to a very 
negative/pessimistic depicturing. Both evaluation and forecast were not coded for themes 
regarding political parties, party leaders and political campaigning. In case of the 2005 media 
coverage also theme referring to the presidential elections in Poland was not taken into 
account.  
 
The results did not provide a clear answer whether negative evaluations of themes had 
increased over time. That was mainly due to the limited number of evaluations and forecasts 
pro a given theme. This was caused by the fact that the coders predominantly coded one 
theme that dominated the article, whereas two or three themes were hardly coded in a single 
journalistic piece. During the “hot phase” of campaign the media predominantly concentrated 
on party campaigning and thus the volume of articles referring to other themes was generally 
smaller. Secondly, the number of cases was decreased by the fact that for certain themes 
journalists provided no evaluation or forecast. For instance, a given article described current 
state of social policies but refrained from making claims as to its future development. 
Therefore, due to the limitations of data the results should be evaluated with caution. It would 
probably be necessary to code the press in a longer time perspective or include more titles to 
make any firm claims about the negativity of media coverage related to a given theme. Thus 
the following paragraphs present only results related to evaluation of three topics, namely 
economic policies, social issues and the relations between the state and politics, as the 
number of cases here was higher when compared to other themes. To present the evaluation 
of a given theme only articles where this topic was addressed were selected and the mean 
value of all evaluations was examined. The same procedure was applied separately to media 
coverage in 1997, 2001 and 2005. In the next step, the obtained mean values were compared.  
 
The results showed (see Table 19) that economic and finance policies were generally 
presented in a negative manner (mean value: 3,72). Similar tone of evaluations was noted for 
social policies (mean value: 3,80). However, ANOVA test showed that media reporting on 
economic issues in 2001 was significantly more negative (p=.006) than in other campaigns. 
Negativity in depicturing of the economic sphere in 2001 resulted, as indicated in earlier 
paragraphs, from the deepening crisis in Poland. The fact that media were anxious about the 
economic situation was also mirrored in the thematic spectrum of the Polish media coverage; 
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articles related to economic and financial policies constituted 26% of media coverage in 2001. 
Overall, however, one could ask why the media depictured economy in a negative way if in 
the analyzed transition period Poland joined the European Union and introduced party 
successful legislative measures in financial sector. In this context it should be remembered 
that the empirical analysis included articles published only in sections related to politics. Thus 
financial matters were usually articulated in the context of party campaigning (mainly 
negative). Separate sections devoted only to economic issues, published by both the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita” were not included in the analysis. 
 
Table 19: Evaluation of themes in Polish articles 
Economic and finance policies n mean value 
1997 28 3,14 
2001 57 4,04 
2005 35 3,66 
Total  120 3,72 
Social policies   
1997 17 3,88 
2001 20 3,50 
2005 27 3,96 
Total    64 3,80 
Relations between the state and 
politics 
  
1997 57 3,89 
2001 27 4,07 
2005 61 4,18 
Total 145 4,05 
 
Simultaneously, the comparison of mean values for media coverage on the relations between 
the state and politics proved that it has become more negative over time. Though according to 
ANOVA test this tendency was not significant (p=.189), the mean value (4,05) suggested that 
the media was predominantly negative in showing the condition of the young Polish 
democracy. The theme spectrum described in the first paragraphs of this Chapter showed 
tangibly that newspapers devoted substantial amount of articles to show the interdependencies 
between the state and politics. Additionally, the entrance to parliament of radical parties 
contributed to lower political standards that were subject to journalists’ critical evaluations. 
This critical assessment of such groupings as League of Polish Families or Self-Defense will 
be discussed at greater length in the following paragraphs of this Chapter.  
 
The findings concerning German titles indicated that there was no consistent trend in the 
volume of negativity in journalistic pieces (see Figure 21). Negative/pessimistic tone 
comprised 37% of articles in 1998 media reporting, rose to 43% in 2002 and then decreased to 
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38% during 2005 campaign. Simultaneously, the percentage of articles where 
positive/optimistic tone was found amounted to 31% in 1998, 30% in 2002 and 40% in the 
2005 media coverage. One of the interesting findings that emerged from the analysis was that 
German press presented ambivalent tone of depicturing in about one fifth of journalistic 
pieces in every coded campaign. Polish titles were in general more likely to portray articles as 
either negative or positive and ambivalent tone was noted in about 3% in each analyzed 
period. The reasons for the differences between both countries will be outlined in the next 
parts of this Chapter.  
 
  Figure 21: Negativity in tone of articles in Germany 
37%
43%
38%
32%
27%
31% 30%
40%
22%
campaign 1998 campaign 2002 campaign 2005
positive / optimistic tone
mixed / ambivalent
negative / pesimistic
tone
 
  Basis: n = 373 [1998 media coverage] | n = 424 [2002 media coverage] | n= 436 [2005 media coverage] 
 
In order to verify the level of negativity in German articles, mean value of tone of articles 
published in a given period was created. ANOVA test showed that newspapers in Germany 
were significantly more negative during 2002 campaign (p=.015) when compared to reporting 
in 1998 and 2005. It is noteworthy to explore at greater length the reasons that led to more 
negative tone of articles in the 2002 coverage. Negative tone resulted partly from the context 
of the campaign. As indicated in previous paragraphs, the 2002 theme spectrum was 
characterized by strong presence of articles referring to foreign policy, and more specifically 
Iraq war. Schröders’ policy concerning German involvement in Iraq was subject to critical 
evaluations in media reporting. Even the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, which generally favored the 
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SPD candidate, was critical in its assessment of German foreign policy and Chancellor’s 
performance. Secondly, negativity in tone of articles was also intensified by combination of 
economic policies and other external events such as floods in the eastern part of Germany.   
 
Finally, another vital aspect neatly connected with tone of depicturing in 2002 was the volume 
of commentary pieces in media reporting. The results showed that the percentage of 
commentary pieces was much higher in 2002 and amounted to 41%. In both 1998 and 2005 
campaigns commentary pieces constituted 33% and 35% respectively. ANOVA test showed 
that commentary pieces in 2002 were more negative than in 1998 and 2005 and that this 
difference was significant (p=.012). The majority of commentary articles published during the 
2002 media coverage referred to such themes as party campaigning, foreign policy and 
economic issues.  
 
Simultaneously, ANOVA test showed that there was significant difference (p=.000) between 
German media in their tone of depicturing. In order to assess the negativity in analyzed 
newspapers in detail, post-hoc tests were applied. The results showed that all titles differ from 
one another and that the difference was in each case significant (p≤.05). The “Süddeutsche 
Zeitung” was the most critical in its evaluations (mean value: 3.27), followed by the 
“Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (mean value: 3.02), and the “Bild” (mean value: 2.88). 
Higher negativity in quality newspapers resulted from the fact that they devoted more space to 
coverage on parties which led to more negative tone of a given article. Both the “Süddeutsche 
Zeitung” and the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” were also depicturing political groupings 
more negative than the “Bild” which will be outlined in this Chapter. Additionally the 
negative tone of articles in quality press was also partly influenced by the media coverage on 
foreign policy in 2002. Issues related to Iraq war and Schröder’s decisions found much less 
attention of the tabloid which devoted two times less of its coverage to this theme in 2002.  
 
In this context it is noteworthy to explore how German media reported on themes were 
conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were articulated. The study showed that 
German media presented possible risks and dangers related to conflicts in a rather dramatized 
manner (mean value: 2,54). However, ANOVA test indicated no significant difference 
(p=.096) in that respect between 1998, 2002 and 2005 campaigns. Again, ANOVA test was 
run to compare the degree of dramatization between analyzed titles. Post-hoc tests revealed 
significant difference in the extent of dramatized reporting between all newspapers (p≤.05). 
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Among analyzed media, the “Bild” published articles that were more dramatized than both 
quality newspapers’ articles, followed by the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and the “Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung”. Higher dramatization noted for the tabloid can be attributed to two 
reasons. Firstly, German economy, especially the issues of unemployment, was frequently 
presented in negative manner and also illustrated by the stories of individuals who suffered 
economic hardship. Secondly, the “Bild” devoted much of its coverage, two times more than 
the quality titles, to the Chancellor candidates and showed the rivalry between party leaders in 
a more dramatized manner.  
 
In the next step, in articles where conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were 
found, the coders examined whether German depicturing was conflict-oriented or 
cooperation-oriented. The findings indicated that in articles where conflicts were found, 
German media rather concentrated on conflict-oriented depicturing (mean value: 2.09 for all 
analyzed campaigns). ANOVA tests indicated that there was no significant difference 
(p=.241) in that respect between all analyzed campaigns. Similarly, a comparison between 
German media proved that there was no significant differences (p=.319) between their 
depicturing.  
 
Finally, in order to explore the issue of negativity in German coverage more closely, the 
coders analyzed evaluation of themes presented in a given article. Similarly as in case of 
Poland, the findings did not give a clear answer whether negative evaluations of themes 
increased over time. That was again due to the limited number of evaluations and forecasts 
pro a given theme, as already addressed in the analysis of Polish media coverage. Therefore 
the following analysis discusses again only themes regarding economic and finance policies 
and social policies109. The selection of those themes resulted from the fact that they were 
more often addressed in articles in all three campaigns and thus the number of cases was 
higher to be included in the analysis. 
 
The results indicated that economic and finance policies were generally depictured in a 
negative manner (see Table 20). ANOVA test showed that the media reporting on economy in 
2002 was significantly more negative (p=.014) than in other campaigns. A closer look at 
                                               
109
 The study does not report on one of the main themes in 2002, foreign policy. This is due to the fact that this 
topic found little media coverage in both the1998 and the 2005 elections and thus no reliable comparison can be 
provided.  
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depicturing social policy also revealed negative reporting. Media coverage on social policy 
was negative throughout all analyzed campaigns (mean value: 3.69), with, again, most 
negative depicturing in 2002. Overall however ANOVA test did not indicate that media 
reporting had become more negative over time (p=.464). The negative depicturing of both 
economic and social policies should be seen in the content of domestic structural difficulties, 
particularly in the new Lands and continuously high unemployment.  
 
Table 20: Evaluation of themes in German articles 
Economic and finance policies n mean value 
1998 63 3,40 
2002 62 3,90 
2005 44 3,70 
Total  169 3,66 
Social policies   
1998 21 3,57 
2002 19 3,89 
2005 45 3,67 
Total    85 3,69 
 
Having outlined the negativity in articles in both countries, it is noteworthy to provide a 
comparative perspective. In this respect, the study showed that there was a significant 
difference in tone of depicturing of articles between Germany and Poland. T-test indicated 
that Polish media overall used more negativity (mean value: 3,27) than German newspapers 
(mean value: 3,08) marking this result as significant difference (p=.001). This difference was 
particularly high between both campaigns in 2005 (p=.000). The higher negativity of Polish 
reporting, especially in 2005, should be seen in the context of critical assessment of the 
relations between the state and politics. Strong presence of such radical groupings as Self-
Defense or League of Polish Families led to their negative portraying, as to be showed in the 
last part of this Chapter, which in turn worsened the overall tone of articles. In sum, the 
degree of negativity in articles confirmed the hypothesis H3:  
 
H3: Negativity is more frequent in Polish than in German media 
 
What is also interesting is that differences in negativity were mainly observed in quality 
newspapers. Post-hoc tests run for all newspapers revealed that especially the “Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung” was more positive in its depicturing (mean value: 3,02) than the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza” (mean value: 3.35) and the “Rzeczpospolita” (mean value: 3.39). Obtained results 
proved significant difference (p≤.05). Simultaneously the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” contained a 
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comparable level of negative evaluations (mean value: 3,27) noted on the article level as its 
Polish equivalents. In contrast, the study showed that tabloids in Germany and Poland 
contained similar volume of negativity in articles (mean value: 2.97 for the “Super Express” 
compared to 2.88 for the “Bild’).  
 
The study found that Polish media used more dramatized reporting instead of minimizing 
possible risks and conflicts. T-test showed that in that respect the difference between press in 
both countries was significant (p=.000). However, it should be also noted that overall the 
variable related to dramatized reporting was coded in 39% of German and 23% of Polish 
journalistic pieces where conflicts were articulated, which in turn might have influenced the 
overall assessment of dramatization. It is also noteworthy to stress that the comparison 
revealed no difference in the extent of dramatized coverage in both tabloids (p=.787). At the 
same time however, the study proved that Polish quality newspapers used more dramatized 
tone in their portraying of conflicts. This result should be seen in the context of correlation 
between tone of article and dramatization (Pearson correlation coefficient = -,318, p=01). 
Overall, more dramatized coverage was likely to be found in journalistic pieces where the 
tone was negative, which was demonstrated in the comparison of quality press in both 
countries (p≤.05).Simultaneously, the study showed that dramatization was higher in articles 
which stressed conflict-oriented rather than consensus-oriented depicturing (Pearson 
correlation coefficient = -,110, p=05). This corresponded with the finding that Polish quality 
press used more conflict-oriented depicturing than German quality titles (p=.000). However, 
again this phenomenon was not applicable to tabloids in both countries (p=.995).  
 
Table 21: Evaluation of themes in Polish and German media 
 n mean value 
Economic policies 
Poland 
Germany 
 
120 
169 
 
3,72 
3,66 
 
Social policies 
Poland 
Germany 
 
64 
85 
 
3,80 
3,69 
 
 
Finally, when negativity in themes is taken into account, the study did not find any major 
difference in depicturing between Germany and Poland. The results for the main themes were 
summarized in Table 21. Overall, there was no evidence to confirm that Poland – as a 
transition country – was characterized by more negative depicturing of themes. This could be 
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explained by the fact that German economic and social policies did also undergo the process 
of transformation which should be seen in the context of minimizing the cleavages between 
West and East parts of the country. However, it can be stated that negative Polish coverage 
was more firmly embedded in the context of the relations between the state and politics.  
 
7.4. Media’s political sympathies 
 
Finally, the analysis was indented to show whether the media’s sympathies were pronounced 
in the articles. In order to assess this trend, the coders measured whether the media coverage 
was in favor of a particular party. In the following paragraphs the tone of depicturing of 
political parties by Polish and German media is presented. Every coded article could include 
an evaluation of coded parties if a given political grouping was addressed. The tendency was 
coded for the whole article and reflected whether parties were presented in a positive or 
negative manner. Again, the category used a five point scale ranging from clearly positive to 
clearly negative tendency. In order to assess the depicturing of all parties a mean value for 
each of the three media coverage in a given year was calculated. In this context it should be 
mentioned that the study does not report whether certain parties were responsible for failures 
or for positive achievements, a variable described in Chapter 5. This was caused by the fact 
that the number of cases referring to the performance of political groupings was too limited. 
The exclusion of this variable will be addressed in Chapter 8.  
 
The results indicated that the Polish media coverage on political parties has become more 
negative over the last three parliamentary campaigns (see Table 22); ANOVA test proved that 
this trend was significant (p=.000). If one were to attribute negative depicturing of parties to 
concrete topics, the theme - relations between the state and politics - stood out. In nearly two 
thirds of the articles where tendency for political parties was coded, political groupings 
presented in the context of this theme were showed in a negative manner. Additionally, 
parties were also criticized in the context of social and economic policies. The increasing 
negativity in depicturing of political parties can also be attributed to the fact, as to be 
presented in the next paragraphs, that the political landscape in Poland was marked by 
dramatic changes within the political landscape and the appearance of radical parties like 
League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense that were negatively evaluated especially 
by the quality press. Both LPR and Self-Defense were depictured negatively in more than 
80% (87% - LPR and 85% - Selft-Defense) of articles published before the 2005 elections 
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where tendency for these parties was coded. Undemocratic practices of the Polish elites were 
critically evaluated by the press, which was particularly true for Self-Defense. 
 
Table 22: Tendency of depicturing of parties in Poland 
 n mean value110 
1997 134    2,908 
2001 95                   3,040 
2005 140                   3,464 
 
In order to assess the tendency of depicturing of political parties more closely, the tendency of 
presenting of government parties in each campaign was measured. Thus the analysis of the 
1997 media coverage included the post-communist SLD and its coalition partner PSL. In 
2001 media reporting on government parties comprised AWSP and UW, groupings derived 
from the former Solidarity camp. Finally, post-communist government parties SLD and PSL 
were again the object of analysis in the 2005 articles. To assess the depicturing of government 
parties a mean value of depicturing them in a given media coverage was calculated. As 
indicated in Table 23, the comparison of mean values showed that the evaluation of current 
coalitions ruling the country remained similar. ANOVA test indicated that there were no 
significant changes in media coverage in that respect (p=.086).  
 
Table 23: Tendency of depicturing of government parties in Poland 
 n mean value 
1997 98 3,097 
2001 44                   2,864 
2005 54                   3,407 
 
However, out of three analyzed campaigns the media coverage on government parties was 
more positive in the 2001 elections (mean value 2,864). These results might be somewhat 
surprising given the fact that the right-wing government failed to introduce four major 
reforms which built the core of its political programme. Incompetence of the government 
administration was further aggravated by the economic crisis which also led to a budget 
deficit in 2001.  In the end of the legislative period the government led by Buzek had a very 
small support in Polish society. This rather positive coverage on the AWS/UW government 
could be attributed to the fact that the Polish quality press tended to write more positively 
about post-Solidarity parties. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” and, to a lesser extent, the 
                                               
110
 Higher mean value indicated a more negative tendency of depicturing. 
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“Rzeczpospolita” had a political leaning towards post-Solidarity groupings. Even though four 
years of the right-wing government were marked by the collapse of economic situation and 
obstacles accompanying the reforms, the overall evaluation of AWSP and UW was rather 
positive. 
 
The study indicated that the overall level of negativity in presenting of political parties and 
government parties varied depending on the analyzed medium. In order to assess the 
depicturing in a given newspaper, a mean value of coded tendencies was calculated111. 
Overall the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was depicturing parties more negatively than the 
“Rzeczpospolita”. The conducted T-test shows that the difference was significant (p=.000). 
The same pattern of reporting was found in depicturing of the government parties. Again, the 
“Gazeta Wyborcza” presented political players comprising the government more negatively 
than the “Rzeczpospolita”. T-test reveals that the difference was significant (p=.027). These 
findings should be seen in the context of newspapers’ profiles. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” 
generally devoted much more space to the assessment of the political groupings, which was 
also confirmed earlier by the analysis of the theme spectrum. Furthermore, it also depictured 
post-communists more negatively than the ‘Rzeczpospolita” as to be presented below. 
Nevertheless, in 2001 both titles reported about the AWS/UW government in a similar 
manner and T-test did not find any significant difference in that respect (p=.074). This finding 
can be explained by political orientations of the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita” 
which presented the post-Solidarity government more positively than the SLD/PSL 
coalitions112. 
 
Simultaneously, one could pose a question how the extent of negativity in depicturing of 
political parties increased in all newspapers in the analyzed period. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” 
reports increased the negative depicturing of political parties over time. However, according 
to ANOVA test this trend was not significant (p=.074). As far as the media coverage on the 
government parties was concerned, the ANOVA test indicated that the media coverage in 
2001 was more positive compared to two other campaigns and that the difference in that 
                                               
111
 The “Super Express” was excluded from this analysis due to a much smaller number of articles. As indicated 
earlier, for a substantial period of time the Polish tabloid did not devote much coverage to politics. Thus the 
number of available articles that met the coding criteria, especially the 1997 media reporting, is very limited.  
112
 The media coverage analyzed in this study included articles published four weeks prior to the polling day. 
Therefore negativity in presenting of political parties could not be evaluated in the context of the presented party 
leaders as the number of cases was limited. This would have been possible if the coding process had included 
more research material and a longer time perspective.   
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respect was significant (p=.003). This phenomenon, as already indicated, could be attributed 
to the political orientation of the title.   
 
The analysis of the “Rzeczpospolita” showed that the title has become more negative in terms 
of depicturing of both the government and political parties. ANOVA test indicated that the 
difference in depicturing over time was significant (p=.003 for parties; p=.038 for 
government). The same tendency (though these results should be treated with caution due to a 
limited number of cases) could be observed in case of the Polish tabloid “Super Express” 
where depicturing of parties and government has also become more negative over time. 
Again, the analysis of variance indicated that this trend was significant (p=.032 for parties; 
p=.28 for government). These results should be seen in the context of worsening political 
standards and a proliferation of scandals among the Polish elites, including especially the 
radical Self-Defense, which made the press more critical.    
 
Finally, the study compared the overall depicturing of political parties throughout analyzed 
campaigns. The analysis included parties that were coded in at least two campaigns and 
comprised SLD, AWS/AWSP, UW, PSL, PO, PiS, LPR, Self-Defense113. In the next step, 
mean value for tendency of depicturing a given party in every campaign was created. The 
comparison of mean values showed that League of Polish Families and Self-Defense were 
presented in a more negative manner. The radical groupings were followed by a rather 
negative evaluation of post-communist SLD and its frequent coalition partner PSL. As 
indicated in Table 24, the evaluation of right wing parties (AWS/AWSP, UW, PO, PiS) by 
Polish press was generally more positive in all analyzed periods.  
 
Table 24: Depicturing of political parties in Poland 
 LPR Self-Defense PSL SLD PiS AWS/AWSP PO UW 
n 
 
mean value 
40 
 
4,15 
37 
 
3,78 
 
93 
 
3,26 
 
207 
 
3,11 
 
93 
 
2,88 
 
99 
 
2,71 
 
93 
 
2,70 
96 
 
2,30 
 
 
Another interesting aspect of the analysis is how the depicturing of each party changed over 
time in all analyzed campaigns. SLD, successor of communist heritage, was showed more 
negatively in every campaign, however according to ANOVA this trend was not significant 
                                               
113
 Polish parties ROP and UP were not included in the analysis due to the fact that they were coded only in one 
campaign and the number of available cases was limited.   
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(p=.084). If one compares mean value for the tendency of depicturing party SLD it was the 
“Gazeta Wyborcza” that presented post-communist grouping more negatively than the 
“Rzeczpospolita” throughout all analyzed campaigns114. T-test showed that the difference in 
depicturing of SLD was significant (p=.000). The Rzeczpospolita was similar to the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza” in political orientation; however it was more moderate in its evaluations. The 
same tendency was observed in case of PSL, which was also presented more negatively by the 
“Gazeta Wyborcza”. Again, T-test showed that the difference in depicturing this grouping by 
both newspapers was significant (p=.002). The “Gazeta Wyborcza” generally tended to 
depicture post-communists more negatively, whereas in the “Rzeczpospolita” political 
sympathies were less pronounced.  
 
As for PSL, the media coverage differed throughout the campaigns. The party was evaluated 
more negatively in 1997 and 2005, and was presented more positively in 2001. ANOVA test 
showed that the difference in reporting in 2001 was significant (p=.004). This can be partly 
attributed to the fact that during the 1997 and the 2005 parliamentary campaigns PSL was still 
in a position of an incumbent. Thus the negative evaluations of the post-communist 
government were also visible in negative tendency of depicturing PSL, which was SLD 
coalition partner. As a consequence PSL was frequently evaluated in context of its 
performance in Polish cabinets.  
 
If one looked at the tendency of evaluating the right wing AWS/AWSP and UW over two 
campaigns115 changes in depicturing were visible as well. In the 1997 both parties were 
presented rather positively, Polish press favored optimistic depicturing showing that post-
Solidarity groupings would accelerate political changes in the country. Positive tone resulted 
also from the fact that the right wing parties succeeded in creating election alliance and acted 
together during the campaign.  Four years of governing made media coverage on coalition 
partners more negative. T-test indicated that the difference in the extent of negative coverage 
was significant both for AWS/AWSP (p=.000) and UW (p=006). This was the result of both 
internal fights in right wing parties116 and the failures in the governing process in the whole 
                                               
114
 Due to the limited number of cases the “Super Express” was excluded from this analysis regarding the 
depicturing of single parties.  
115
 Both AWS/AWSP and UW were not included in the analysis in 2005 as they were not longer present in 
Polish parliament at that time.  
116
 Internal fights resulted in the proliferation of new parties like PO, PiS. Additionally, both AWSP and UW did 
not manage to secure parliamentary seats in 2001 and vanished from the political scene.   
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legislative period. However, as indicated earlier, overall the depicturing of AWS and UW in 
2001 was more positive than the evaluation of post-communist governments.  
 
In case of the other parties PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense the tendency of depicturing 
remained rather similar over time. T-tests indicated that there were no significant differences 
in their depicturing (p=.81 for PO; p=.309 for PiS; p=.597 for LPR; and p=.055 for Self-
Defense). Both PO and PIS, which have a Solidarity background, were evaluated by the 
media in a rather positive manner. However, it has to be stressed that both Civic Platform and 
Law and Justice remained an opposition in the Polish parliament between 2001 and 2005, 
which could have weaken their critical assessment by the Polish titles.   
 
LPR and Self-Defense continued to be showed negatively and there was no significant 
difference in their depicturing in both the 2001 and the 2005 elections. This result was not 
surprising given the fact that both parties represented political practices and programmes that 
were not supported by the Polish press. Both League of Polish Families and Self-Defense 
stood for isolation of Poland, opposed EU and NATO enlargement, ideas that were far from 
the policy promoted by both the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita”. Both 
newspapers supported the Polish access to the European Union, NATO and promoted joint 
European policies. Again, T-test indicated that the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was significantly more 
negative in the evaluations of League of Polish Families (p=.048) and Samoobrona (p=.032).   
 
Overall, the assessment of Polish parties showed that quality newspapers demonstrated 
political sympathies in their reporting. This was particularly true for the positive coverage of 
Buzek’s government and the depicturing of the right-wing parties. In contrast, the evaluations 
of post-communist SLD was predominantly negative. Thus the results confirmed the 
hypothesis H4 for the Polish media:  
 
H4: Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies 
 
Finally, assessment of depicturing was undertaken separately for coded German parties. The 
findings indicated that German media did not become more negative in their portraying of 
political players over the last three analyzed periods (see Table 25). This result was confirmed 
by ANOVA test which showed no significant difference in tendency of depicturing (p=.179). 
Among coded themes German parties were more negatively presented in the context of such 
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topics social and finance policies. In each case political groupings portrayed within this theme 
spectrum were showed in a negative light in about half of the articles, whereas one fifth was 
positive and about 30% marked as ambivalent. Simultaneously, it should be stressed that 
German media used ambivalent tone in assessing political parties more often than Polish 
newspapers which were likely to depicture a given party in either positive or either negative 
manner. Journalists in Germany more often refrained from distinct evaluations leaving the 
judgment to the readers.  
 
Table 25: Tendency of depicturing of parties in Germany 
 n mean value 
1998 241 3,008 
2002 269                  3,082 
2005 299 2,941 
 
In this context it is noteworthy to show how the extent of negativity increased in all 
newspapers in the analyzed periods. Overall, the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” was more negative in 
its evaluations of political parties in 2002 when compared to its media reporting in other 
periods. ANOVA test showed that the difference in depicturing was significant (p=.006). This 
result can be attributed to more negative depicturing of SPD, especially in the context of 
economic reforms and foreign policy. Simultaneously, the analysis of variance proved that the 
“Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” had not changed its depicturing of parties throughout 
analyzed periods (p=.872). The same pattern of reporting was observed in case of the “Bild” 
(p=.221).  
 
In order to evaluate the tendency of depicturing political parties more profoundly, the 
tendency of presenting government parties in each campaign was measured. Therefore the 
analysis of 1998 media reporting embraced CDU/CSU and FDP. In both 2002 and 2005 
media coverage on SPD and its coalition partner the Greens was analyzed. As indicated in 
Table 26, the comparison between mean values proved that the evaluation of current coalition 
remained rather stable. ANOVA test proved that there were no significant changes in media 
coverage in that respect (p=.348). Though not significantly different, media coverage on 
government parties was slightly more negative in 2002 (mean value: 3,03). It is likely that 
extending the number of analyzed journalistic pieces would confirm more negative 
evaluations in 2002 than in other campaigns. Firstly, as indicated earlier, economic and social 
policies were depictured more negatively in 2002 than in other campaigns which could also 
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result in less favorable assessment of the government. Secondly, more negative evaluations in 
2002 could be also provoked by the context of floods in Germany as well as Schröder’s 
foreign policy, which was critically viewed even by the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”. Overall, 
government parties were most negatively presented in articles referring to social and 
economic policies (55% of evaluations were negative). Simultaneously, the study found no 
significant difference in depicturing of government parties by German media, in each case 
ANOVA tests proved that no significant difference was found.  
 
Table 26: Tendency of depicturing of government parties in Germany 
 n mean value 
1998 183 2,893 
2002 213 3,033 
2005 206 3,015 
 
Nevertheless, the study indicated that German media varied in their depicturing of political 
parties. ANOVA tested proved that the difference was significant (p=.002). Post-hoc tests 
showed that depicturing of parties in the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and the “Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung” was more negative than in the “Bild” (p≤.05). Simultaneously, post-hoc 
tests did not detect any significant difference in depicturing between both quality newspapers 
(p=.116).  In this context one could ask which political parties were more critically assessed 
by the quality press. ANOVA test showed that there were significant differences in 
depicturing only in case of two parties, the Liberals and CDU/CSU. In both cases the 
“Süddeutsche Zeitung” was depicturing these parties significantly more negative than the 
other German newspapers (p≤.05).  These findings party confirmed political orientation of the 
press since the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” is seen as a conservative title favoring 
Christian Democrats. Simultaneously, according to Semetko & Schönbach (2003:55) the 
“Bild” “has been commonly viewed as a newspaper that would vote for the CDU if it had the 
opportunity to cast a ballot”.  The study demonstrated political sympathies only in reporting 
on two parties. Political orientations of German press seem less distinct than in Poland and the 
results could only partly confirm the hypothesis H4 for the German media:  
 
H4: Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies 
 
Simultaneously, one could also pose a question which parties were evaluated the most 
negatively by analyzed German press throughout the campaigns. In order to assess the 
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tendency of depicturing political parties a mean value was created. Among analyzed parties 
PDS was depictured in the most negative manner (mean value: 3.42). Moreover, PDS was 
also portrayed by the media less often than other German groupings. The successors of SED 
were frequently presented in the context of party campaigning and negative assessment was 
further aggravated by unfavorable remarks expressed by its political opponents, mainly the 
Liberals and Christian Democrats. In the 2005 media coverage the volume of negative 
evaluations was particularly increased by one of the leaders of Linkspartei Oscar Lafontaine, 
who was criticized for his luxurious life, far from the ideas of the party.  
 
The negative assessment of PDS was followed by SPD (mean value: 3.09). Social Democrats 
remained depictured in a similar manner throughout all analyzed campaigns. The party was 
negatively depictured mainly in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” and more positive in 
the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”. Though the difference in depicturing was not significant (p=097), 
these results were again in line with political traditional sympathies of German press 
articulated in Chapter 3. However, in this context it should be noted that even a traditional 
leaning towards SPD observed for the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” did not prevent critical 
journalistic assessment, particularly in 2002. Similar findings were also noted by Wilke & 
Reinemann (2003) who showed less favorable articles on Schröder in this title in their 
analysis of the 2002 media coverage. Finally, the “Bild” became more critical in its 
assessment of SPD performance which again corresponded with its political sympathies. 
Among other analyzed parties – FDP, the Greens and CDU/CSU - ANOVA tests did not find 
any significant changes in depicturing over time. Table 27 demonstrates mean value of 
depicturing for each of analyzed groupings. 
 
Table 27: Depicturing of political parties in Germany 
 PDS SPD FDP The Greens CDU/CSU 
n 
 
mean value 
123 
 
3,42 
553 
 
3,09 
259 
 
3,03 
 
306 
 
2,99 
 
535 
 
2,98 
 
 
The results obtained for both countries indicated that political parties were presented more 
negatively in Poland than in Germany. T-test proved that the difference in depicturing was 
significant (p=.035). Simultaneously, the highest contrast was observed in a comparison 
between the 2005 campaigns in both countries (p=.000). This can be undoubtedly attributed to 
the fact that the overall assessment of Polish parties was worsened by the critical portraying of 
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the League of Polish Families and the Self-Defense, which received tangibly worse ratings. 
Simultaneously, in 2005 the negative tone was further aggravated by the assessment of the 
government parties, particularly SLD. While T-test reflected no difference in assessing 
political cabinets (p=.124) between Germany and Poland, a comparison between the 2005 
government parties showed that Polish press was more negative in evaluating its government 
(p=.022).  
 
In this context it should be said that the negativity in depicturing was partly embodied in the 
context of the same themes. Overall, political parties were frequently negatively presented in 
articles referring to the social policy and economic matters. Additionally, Polish parties were 
also depictured more critically in the context of party campaigns itself. This pattern of 
media’s evaluation was visible in all analyzed campaigns; prior to the elections journalists 
generally evaluated the performance of governing groupings commenting on the 
effectiveness, mainly in the field of social issues and economic situation. Nevertheless, Polish 
media were also far more prone to show political parties in the context of the relations 
between the state and politics, as already indicated usually in negative terms (65%). In 
Germany, this issue was addressed in about one third of the articles. Finally, Polish media 
were more likely to demonstrate clear stand in their evaluations. While assessing a 
performance of a given political groupings journalists rather refrained from being ambiguous 
and judged the parties as either positive or negative.  
 
7.5. Conclusions 
 
While party spots, as discussed in Chapter 6, were largely influenced by the political system 
characteristics, the analysis of media coverage demonstrated more complex interdependencies 
between political and media framework. Firstly, media reporting in both countries was 
modified by the presence of other themes marked by high news value. Though, as indicated in 
Chapter 1, newspapers’ coverage in Western democracies is said to increasingly concentrate 
on the process of campaigning, the study did not find a clear confirmation of this 
phenomenon. In Poland, coverage on party campaigning was not marked by continuously 
higher number of journalistic pieces. In contrast, media reporting in 2001 and 2005 devoted 
much space to the terrorist attack on WTC and presidential campaign respectively.  
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Secondly, the impact of political system characteristics remained a vital factor that influenced 
the patterns of media reporting. This was visible in the explanation of each of four formulated 
hypotheses. For instance, the theme spectrum in both countries showed tangibly that Polish 
media often examined relations between the state and politics, while German titles paid rather 
marginal attention to this issue. Another example that illustrated the importance of political 
system characteristics was mirrored in the degree of focus on political candidates. Coverage 
on party leaders, especially Chancellor candidates, was more pronounced by German 
newspapers than their Polish counterparts. Yet another exemplification of influence of 
political system could be observed in the overall degree of negativity in media coverage, 
which was higher in Poland. It can be assumed that the negative assessment was partly 
stimulated by political parties, mainly Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, that fuelled 
newspapers’ criticism and exposed the watchdog function of analyzed titles.  
 
Thirdly, the media system characteristics also largely influenced the patterns of reporting. In 
that context the media played a decisive role as gatekeepers deciding which information 
would be published. However, the process of filtering political news might have been affected 
by their news values but also by journalistic role models. Perhaps the most important outcome 
to emerge from the newspapers’ analysis is that press reporting in both Poland and Germany 
was marked by political sympathies. This was particularly true for Polish media, especially 
the “Gazeta Wyborcza” that remained critical in its assessment of post-communist SLD. In 
Germany, the political leaning demonstrated by the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, “Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung” and the “Bild” also showed that journalists were likely to demonstrate 
their political sympathies. It would be undoubtedly interesting to extent the analyzed material 
sample to longer time framework and to previous campaigns to show to what extent the 
newspapers’ political leaning in both countries has changed. The directions for future analysis 
together with conclusions referring to media coverage will be discussed in the next Chapter.  
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Chapter 8 | Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
The last Chapter discusses the findings of the study in light of theory and proposed 
hypotheses. In the next step, the limitations of conducted analysis and barriers that are likely 
to be encountered by scholars comparing established democracies and transition countries are 
scrutinized at greater length. The last part outlines which aspects of political communication 
should be analyzed in future comparative projects on countries that are marked by different 
degree of maturity of political system. It also refers to the methodology to be employed in 
such undertakings.  
 
8.1. Conclusions in Light of Theory and Hypotheses 
 
This study proposed a number of hypotheses which scrutinized the patterns of political 
communication in Poland and Germany. In that respect, two separate case studies that 
examined the performance of two different players were presented. In the first step, the study 
formulated six hypotheses related to party advertisements. The empirical evaluation 
demonstrated that five of them were confirmed. In this context it should be asked how the 
processes of mediatization described in Chapter 1 were reflected in style and content of 
political advertising. Simultaneously, one can pose the following question: can political 
advertising be prescribed? Indeed, as showed by the study the characteristics of party spots 
indicated how political advertising was “political system – sensitive”.  
 
The dependence of party broadcasts on the political system is already visible in the fact that 
party spots were allowed and could be presented in both public and private television in 
Poland and Germany. The regulations related to party campaigning build an integral part of 
electoral regulations and are thus subject to the political system. In that sense, the shape of the 
political system provides first prerequisite for presenting political ads. Even now there can be 
named a number of countries where the broadcasting of political ads is either prohibited by 
law, or political actors (such as parties or candidates) agree not to employ that sort of 
advertising channel during campaigning. For instance, part of Northern European countries 
provides a good example on being reluctant to allow political ads on television. In Sweden 
political advertising is only imported though channels that broadcast from outside the country. 
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In Norway, the introduced regulations traditionally prohibited advertising on television; 
however new legislative measures that are being developed may pave way to allot free time 
for the parties (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). These two examples illustrate that in established 
European democracies political advertising may be also subject to rigid regulations. In 
contrast, electoral regulations in Poland and Germany, as decribed in Chapter 2, gave political 
parties the opportunity to address the voters via television.  
 
Another issue that is neatly connected with dependence on political system is whether parties 
receive financial support in a form of state subsidies. While Poland and Germany profit from 
that type of assistance, in other countries the absence of state funding is yet another reason (or 
excuse) for limiting access to political ads. For instance, in Switzerland political advertising is 
banned for both television and radio during election and referendum campaigns. Since Swiss 
parties do not receive any state funding, it is assumed that political groupings do not have 
sufficient resources to finance the production of the advertisement and to purchase time in 
television. However, at the same time Switzerland provides a good example of extensive party 
advertising in print media, which constitutes the source of revenues for newspapers and is also 
another reason for banning for ads in electronic media. In this respect, both Poland and 
Germany profited from access to both public and private television stations. Additionally, the 
fact that political groupings in both countries received state subsidies also broadened the 
opportunity for conducting parliamentary campaigns.  
 
Once the possibility for political broadcasting had been opened, it was still the political 
system that dominated the format and content of the ads. First of all, legal regulations 
concerning access to unpaid time in state television and length of the broadcasts, outlined in 
Chapter 2, should be taken into account. The fact that Polish ads were not legally limited to 90 
seconds, as in Germany, should be considered when discussing the style and content of 
produced advertisements. The length of the broadcasts can be seen as one of the factors which 
influenced the answer to virtually all hypotheses referring to political ads in this study. 
Moreover, it can be expected that the shortening of the length if Polish commercials will also 
alter their substance which is likely to be found in the future analysis of the ads produced in 
2007.  
 
The next aspect of the political system that exerted influence on political ads was rooted in the 
nature of party system. There are a number of examples that illustrate this interdependence for 
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Polish and German political advertising. For instance, higher focus on leaders in Germany 
reflected the fact that parliamentary elections were mainly focused on Chancellor candidates. 
In Poland, party campaigning was more party-oriented though one may observe a trend in 
increasing focus on leaders in certain groupings. However, it should be also stressed that the 
focus on leaders and the number of candidates presented in commercials was also, as 
indicated above, influenced by the length of the broadcasts and the amount of time that could 
be offered to a given politician.  
 
Another vital element concerning the nature of party system should be seen in the context of 
patterns of coalition building outlined in the theoretical part of this study. This was clearly 
visible in incumbent and challenger strategies adopted by parties in both countries. The nature 
of party system was also neatly connected with the degree of maturity of political parties 
participating in elections. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, among analyzed German groupings 
most of them (except from PDS) had more than twenty years of parliamentary experience. 
Hence, they could utilize previous campaigns which served as a basic matrix for establishing 
a more advanced model of campaigning. In Poland, some parties included in the analysis had 
a very short history, often being represented in Sejm only for one legislative period. This was 
clearly demonstrated in the spots produced by ROP and also partly in ads prepared by Self-
Defense. Simultaneously, Polish political groupings with longer parliamentary experience 
like, for instance, the post-communist SLD showed higher professional standards already in 
1997.  
 
Finally, political ads in both countries reflected specific historical and cultural background 
which was again neatly connected with the development of political system. For instance, the 
issue of negativity serves as a good example in that respect. While the study did not detect 
any major difference in the overall negativity level between Germany and Poland, the type of 
criticism observed in both countries was very different. The study showed that certain 
political groupings, such as Self-Defense, continuously used negative appeals. Moreover, 
negative appeals presented in Polish broadcasts reflected a wide array of themes, which 
should be seen in the context of political transformation. It is remarkable that negativity in 
Polish advertisements was frequently used for addressing the relations between the state and 
politics. Apart from that it is also striking that Polish parties explicitly stressed their honesty 
when compared to their German counterparts. In a way such a strategy can be seen as 
anticipating and responding to the prevailing political culture in a given country. The fact that 
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Polish candidates stressed that they are honest matched well the overall dissatisfaction of the 
voters who have little trust in politics. Thus stressing this image quality might have been used 
to address their unfulfilled expectations concerning political representatives.  
 
The issue of political culture was also visible in other aspect of party broadcasts. For instance, 
the study showed major difference in a way of evoking emotions. While in Germany the 
emotional sphere was often stimulated by the dynamic, music-clips style and visual level, in 
Poland it worked partly in a different manner. As showed in Chapter 6, certain Polish parties 
appealed to the voters’ emotions by stressing such aspects as patriotism, religious beliefs. This 
was particularly visible in commercials produced by right-wing parties, such as ROP and later 
League of Polish Families. Polish flags were also equally often used in advertising, a strategy 
that could be found only in one commercial produced by the CDU in 1998. The use of 
religious and national symbols was yet another way to strengthen voters’ identification with a 
given grouping.  
 
In this context media system characteristics were rather of secondary importance for style and 
content of political commercials. Since party spots were prepared solely by political actors 
and showed in an unfiltered, unabridged way by television, the external media influence 
remained rather limited. What should be however taken into account are perhaps the media 
consumption patterns, which were presented at greater length in Chapter 3. Television is a 
primary source for political communication in both Germany and Poland and thus political 
groupings were interested in utilizing it as a channel for addressing the voters. Yet another 
issue related to dependence of political advertising on the media system should be perhaps 
seen in terms of esthetics. This raises the question of how to capture the voters’ attention and 
prevent him or her from changing the television channel. The study did not provide empirical 
evidence referring to this issue. Still, it can be assumed that voters would find static talking-
head formats more boring since they were accustomed to modern media formats showed in 
television programmes. This however raises the issue of the effects of voters’ exposure to 
party campaigning, which should be also scrutinized in future research studies and will be 
discussed in detail in the next part of this Chapter.   
 
In the second step, the study proposed four hypotheses to show changing patterns of media 
reporting observed in newspapers. In so doing the analysis intended to show whether Polish 
and German journalists report about parliamentary campaigns in a similar manner and where 
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potential differences could be found. As stated in Chapter 1, media systems are becoming 
increasingly alike in their products (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). If one were to perceive media 
reporting on politics as such product, then the case of Poland and Germany proved that 
coverage on party campaigning did differ. In contrast to party spots, media reporting in both 
Poland and Germany was characterized by a high degree of mutual interdependence between 
political actors and journalists. The study found three major aspects that need to be taken into 
account when evaluating journalistic pieces. Firstly, other competing events should be taken 
into consideration. Secondly, differences inherent to the political system characteristics were 
also of importance. Thirdly, differences derived from the media system characteristics were 
yet another vital factor that needs to be considered. These three aspects will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs in detail.   
 
Firstly, the media in both countries concentrated mostly on party campaigning since this 
theme provided high news value. However, the study found no clear trend towards increasing 
coverage on campaigning activities. On the contrary, journalistic pieces in Poland and 
Germany were clearly affected by other competing themes. For instance, in Poland the 
terrorist attack on World Trade Centre altered the focus of media reporting in 2001. Again, in 
2005 Polish media could choose between two events of comparable news value – 
parliamentary and presidential campaigning that occurred nearly at the same time.  
 
Secondly, the very focus on parliamentary campaigns was also stimulated by the political 
system itself. One can see this phenomenon in the context of two elements. What should be 
taken into account is the fact that in the analyzed period political parties increased the quantity 
of their activities and thus provided media with events of high news value. Secondly, the 
focus on the campaigns observed in the media needs to be also seen from the perspective of 
expected outcomes and the intensity of party campaigning itself. As demonstrated in Chapter 
7, German media reporting in 2005 served as a good example in that respect. Due to high 
degree of uncertainty related to the election outcomes and the presence of a female Chancellor 
candidate the media coverage was intensified.  
 
There are also other examples that may suggest the influence of the political system 
characteristics on the type of media coverage. For instance, similarly as in case of party spots 
analyzed in Chapter 6, the study found much higher focus on leaders in German newspapers 
than in their Polish counterparts. This phenomenon should be again seen in the context of 
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higher exposure of Chancellor candidates in German elections. In Poland, the media was 
rather centred round reporting on political parties participating in parliamentary campaigns. 
The openness of the party systemin Poland, as discussed in Chapter 2, resulted in an emphasis 
on parties rather than of individuals, especially that it was sometimes not certain not who 
would win the elections but which political grouping would enter Sejm at all. In that respect 
Polish media reporting in 2005, which was marked by higher focus on Tusk, Kaczyński and 
Lepper, did not provide enough evidence to claim that journalistic pieces in Poland became 
more person-oriented. It is more likely that the exposure of these leaders was caused by their 
participation in presidential elections which made them appear in a role of both prominent 
party leader and presidential candidate.  
 
Another example that exposed the importance of political system characteristics was the issue 
of negativity. According to mediatization trends outlined in Chapter 1 German media, as a 
more advanced one, should be characterized by higher negativity than Polish newspapers. 
However, the results showed the opposite. Negativity in Polish media coverage resulted partly 
from critical evaluation of problems inherent to the transition processes. This was expressed, 
among others, in the assessment of the relations between the state and politics. In Germany, 
this theme was articulated in a rather limited number of journalistic pieces. Apart from 
transition processes that were negatively presented one needs also to address the issue of 
Polish political scene. As showed in Chapter 7, some of the groupings, to give an example of 
Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, were continuously viewed in a critical manner by 
the media, especially by quality newspapers. As a consequence, the tone of depicturing of the 
parties influenced the overall tone of articles and the negativity level.  
 
Thirdly, the media system characteristics should be also taken into consideration. This can be 
seen in the context of such basic aspects as space available in newspapers or the process of 
selecting material for publication. Additionally, journalistic role models and degree of 
professionalization needs to be evaluated more closely. These aspects become particularly 
apparent when discussing the findings related to the hypothesis H4. The study showed how 
press reporting in both countries was partly characterized by political sympathies. In Poland, 
the titles derived from anti-communist opposition continued to write in a rather negative 
manner about post-communist parties such as SLD. It was particularly the “Gazeta 
Wyborcza” that pronounced its sympathies more than other analyzed papers which could be 
explained by the importance it assigned to advocacy function. It would be useful to analyze 
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media coverage is this particular newspaper also in earlier campaigns to determine whether 
the intensity of showing its political preferences weakened over time. In Germany, the study 
could also partly confirm existing political sympathies showing that the “Süddeutsche 
Zeitung” depictured the Liberals and CDU/CSU more negative than the ‘Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung” and the “Bild”. These outcomes indicated newspapers’ readiness to 
express their political leaning, which was also confirmed by earlier studies (Wilke & 
Reinemann, 2000; Semetko & Schönbach, 2003). Nevertheless, media reporting in both 
countries should not be seen as an emanation of “media-driven republic” (Mazzoleni & 
Schulz, 1999), but rather as one among many other mediacentric forces that influence the 
political discourse.    
 
8.2. Limitations of the Study and Barriers 
 
This study analyzed political communication in Poland and Germany. In this context one 
should also discuss the limitations of such research undertaking. Firstly, the type of evaluated 
data needs to be taken into account. Conducted analysis proposed in fact two separate case 
studies that provided insights into activities of two different actors engaged in the political 
communication. These two case studies were seen from the perspective of mediatization 
process that was utilized as an Archimedean point for the analysis. However, it would be 
undoubtedly useful to discuss political communication practices of political parties and the 
media drawing evidence on their other activities. However, as presented in Chapter 5, the 
study was limited by access to other resources either due to their availability or comparability. 
Since this analysis intended to compare political communication that occurred over three 
parliamentary campaigns research material embracing all analyzed campaigns was needed. 
Additionally, selected data needed to enable a comparison between Poland and Germany. In 
that respect party spots and newspaper coverage constituted the right resources for empirical 
examination.  
 
Secondly, the type of evaluated actors participating in political communication process should 
be also taken into consideration. This study proposed a number of hypotheses to show the 
performance of political parties and the media in the political environment. In that respect one 
of the limitations of the study lies in the fact that is did not address the third actor engaged in 
the political communication processes, namely citizens who are exposed both to political 
spots and newspaper coverage. However, this study should be seen become a point of 
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departure for further analysis that will focus also on media effects on citizens. This aspect will 
be discussed at greater length in the next paragraphs of this Chapter.  
 
Thirdly, the study was influenced by the size of the sample. For instance, if German political 
parties would produce more spots pro a single campaign, a longitudinal analysis of party 
campaigning over the analyzed period would have been possible. As stated in Chapter 5, 
smaller number of German ads resulted from the fact that the political parties traditionally 
produced far less advertisements than their Polish counterparts. This is yet another important 
finding from the study that illustrates different use of political ads as a specific channel to 
address the voters. Due to limited number of German ads Chapter 6 focused mainly on a 
comparative perspective and additional evaluation, which showed changes over time, could be 
presented only for Poland.  
 
Fourthly, differences inherent to collected data also played an important role. This issue was 
particularly reflected in the different length of Polish and German political ads. The 
possibility of acquiring more detailed results if sequence coding was applied cannot be 
excluded. However, in this study coding on the spot level was the most suitable research 
method. Nevertheless, the regulations of the KRRiT introduced in 2007 indicate that Polish 
spots are subject to changing regulations which shorten their length to approximately 2 
minutes. Thus, it is very likely that future research material will enable the use of coding 
procedures that scrutinize single sequences of political advertisements.  
 
Fifthly, the issue of selected period also influenced obtained results. One of the examples that 
illustrate this aspect can be found in analyzed newspaper coverage. The findings showed that 
coding of three newspapers over the last four weeks before the polling day did not provide 
enough empirical data for analysis of certain phenomena. For instance, limited number of 
cases hindered the evaluation of such variables introduced in Chapter 5 as whether parties 
were blamed for certain development or praised for their policies. If time framework was 
longer and more newspapers were considered, one would probably collect enough data to 
scrutinize the patterns of media reporting in that respect. Additionally, if selected period was 
longer, showing interdependencies between different categories would be possible. For 
example, one could address such aspects as: theme context in which political parties were 
positively or negatively evaluated; theme context in which political leaders were depictured in 
a positive or negative manner. These are yet aspects that require further research. Still, in this 
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particular project selected period was influenced by three major factors which led to coding of 
media coverage presented in the last four weeks prior to the polling day. Firstly, the study 
intended to scrutinize media coverage over longer period of time and thus decided in favor of 
analyzing more campaigns instead of discussing more media but only in one campaign. 
Secondly, selected period was also affected by available financial resources and access to 
coders. And finally, longer period would also visibly increase the amount of time needed for 
coding process. 
 
Overall, there are at least five barriers that influence comparative studies on advanced and 
evolving democracies. Firstly, as pointed out by Wirth & Kolb (2004) comparability and the 
establishing of functional equivalence is one of the most important factors affective the 
comparative design of the study. Secondly, the gathering of cross-national data frequently 
requires enormous effort (Kleinsteuber, 2004). However, the issue of data availability is 
quickly moving towards at least partial solution due to the increase of various international 
databases and surveys (Stevenson, 2004). Thirdly, the question of experience in conducting 
comparative research should be also included. In recent years enormous progress has been 
achieved with respect to the refinement of methodology. However, the working routines and 
the proficiency in use of empirical designs still reflect differences. For instance, as already 
indicated in Chapter 1, scholars from transition countries produce fewer analyses that are 
empirical in nature than their counterparts in West Europe or the United States. Fourthly, 
linguistic problems are an important factor in comparative studies. The research design 
usually requires adaptation of the instruments and profound knowledge of language of the 
cultures under examination. In this respect scholars representing established democracies 
frequently lack the linguistic credentials as their knowledge of Slavic languages is limited. 
Fifthly, financial resources are yet another vital prerequisite that determines such aspects as, 
for instance, the scope of the study or number of coders participating in the project.  
 
The barriers outlined above were also partly encountered in this study. Firstly, the issue of 
comparability and the establishing of functional equivalence, as already indicated, influenced 
the type of evaluated data and selected actors. Secondly, the gathering of cross-national data 
required much effort. Simultaneously, it required authors’ presence in both Poland and 
Germany, especially during the training for the coders and then during the coding process 
itself. Thirdly, methodological courses provided by the Institute of Media and Communication 
at TU Dresden helped prepare the coding instruments and offered SPSS training. At the same 
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time, language credentials limited linguistic problems while funding received for the project 
covered the expenses.  
 
8.3. Future Research 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, scholars analyzing political communication in a comparative 
framework can profit from a number of various studies that have populated the field of 
communication research over the last decades (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Still, what is needed is 
a greater reorientation towards analyses which include countries that are marked by difference 
degree of maturity of their political and media system. In that respect a comparative study on 
political communication in Poland and Germany is just one drop in a sea of needs and further 
research is needed.  
 
There are multiple directions for future comparative analyses on political communication in 
that respect. Firstly, research studies need to be expanded to other evolving democracies. This 
can be explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, comparative perspective including more 
transition countries could demonstrate the differences in political communication also within 
this particular group. Secondly, it would direct the attention of the scholars to the structural 
elements of the political and media system characteristics that influence and reshape political 
discourse in Central and East European countries. Thirdly, expanding the comparative 
framework would decrease the disproportional volume of studies on political communication 
in Western Europe or the United States when compared to the countries under transition. 
Fourthly, this could yet become another point of departure for projects engaging students in 
partner universities in the empirical part of the study.  
 
Secondly, the directions of future comparative studies are also dependant on methodology 
used in such undertakings. The literature concerning methodological procedures in 
comparative studies provides different approaches that can be followed (e.g. Swanson, 1992). 
Simultaneously, difficulties emerging from international undertakings can be avoided by 
studies that do not aim at direct cooperation. For instance, one possibility to overcome the 
difficulty is to collect case studies prepared by various scholars who examine a given 
phenomenon in their country of origin. In a way that sort of approach leads to establishing 
anthologies that devote one chapter to each individual country (e.g. Swanson & Mancini, 
1996; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). Nevertheless, future 
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comparative studies should extend the use of the same research design and instruments. 
Applying the same set of variables in all countries under examination would allow more 
detailed analysis of selected research material.  
 
Thirdly, future comparative studies on political communication should also aim at combining 
different research methodologies. One area that might be pursued using different 
methodology is the measurement of the effects of advertising exposure. Experimental studies 
could help isolate more detailed results and evaluate the effectiveness of political ads. For 
instance, data analyzed in this study could be used the assess to what extent the exposure to 
party spots from would affect image ratings for candidates or the extent to which emotional 
appeals may relate to the perception of a given party. The study by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha 
(1995) revealed extreme consistence in that respect across countries included in their analysis. 
It would be undoubtedly useful to assess similar phenomena within transition countries to 
explore which aspects of advertising make them select a given candidate or make them opt for 
a given political alternative. The results of such studies might attempt to scrutinize the 
interdependencies between exposure and voting patterns. This is particularly important in 
evolving democracies where voters are characterized by shifting political preferences.  
 
Fourthly, future studies comparing transition countries and established democracies should 
also include more aspects of political communication. As noted by Kleinsteuber (2004) the 
range of themes concerning comparative research on political communication is enormously 
broad and diverse. This can be exemplified by, among others, by volume offered by Esser & 
Pfetsch (2004) who provided a vast array of studies addressing various aspects of political 
communication. Still, the findings reflected in their publication were mostly considered within 
the context of established democracies. Similar studies should be also undertaken as a 
comparison between countries that differ in the maturity of their political system. In that 
respect studies that reflect the role of internet should be increasingly taken into account. As 
noted by Esser & Pfetsch (2004:15) the internet “brings with it a series of hopes with respect 
to the opening up of new avenues for democratization”. Thus research aiming at network 
communication might scrutinize the roots of political participation, which is particularly 
important in emerging democracies where civic engagement is low. 
 
Fifthly, comparative studies embracing established and evolving countries should also use 
different starting point. In this study, the analysis was organized round the concept of 
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mediatization. Another staring point however could be, among others, the issue of political 
culture. For instance, it would be interesting to show how political ads emerged within a 
particular culture. Studies exploring this phenomenon would be very likely to use a 
combination of historical, rhetorical and semiotic methods, showing how the cultural legacy is 
mirrored in political ads (Johnston, 2006). The fact that the cultural aspects may play a vital 
role in patterns of advertising is visible in the content of Polish ads which used religious and 
national symbols to appeal to the voters. It would be useful to explore this phenomenon at 
greater length, for instance by providing a description of techniques that serve to connect the 
ads to country-specific cultural images. The studies with reference to cultural factors that do 
not fade into a general notion of media influence build one of the aspects of political 
communication research that will increasingly receive attention (Stevenson, 2004).  
 
Sixthly, comparative research on political communication should also aim at providing 
longitudinal studies. This is all the more important since most of the available studies restrict 
themselves to scrutinizing the patterns of political communication on individual cases and 
very few of them (e.g. Patterson 1993; Wilke & Reinemann, 2000) examine the processes of 
change seen from a long-term perspective.  
 
Finally, the normative aspects of future research should not be forgotten. In that respect one 
needs to leave the beaten tracks and aim at projects that have clear normative goals and serve 
the community. This is all the more important in studies on European countries that do not 
share the same level of development. We often see Europe as one big forest, but there are 
differences among trees, especially if they grow in the Central European landscape. Countries 
in Eastern and Central Europe look to older, established democracies as models and thus a 
comparative perspective may provide knowledge they need. In sum, future research should 
resonate with something that contributes to strengthening of participatory democracy. 
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Appendices   
 
 
Appendix A 
Example of Coding Book for Party Spots in Poland 
 
I Allgemeine Codieranweisungen 
 
1. Ziel der Untersuchung und Struktur des Kategorienschemas 
 
Die Studie, dem dieses Codebuch zugrunde liegt, untersucht wie die wichtigsten deutschen 
und polnischen Parteien ihre Wähler ansprechen wollen. Ein Schwerpunkt des Interesses der 
Forschungsarbeit liegt bei der Frage nach der politischen Kultur in Deutschland und Polen.  
 
Diese Fragestellung mündet in eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung, die festzumachen 
versucht, wie die Parteien ihre Wahlspots gestalten und wie sie auf dieser Art und Weise ihre 
Rezipienten erreichen wollen. Hauptaugenmerk der Analyse liegt auf der Darstellung 
folgender Merkmale: Professionalisierung, Negativität, Personalisierung, Privatisierung, 
Emotionalisierung, Themen der Wahlspots, Amtsinhaber- und Herausfordererstrategien.  
 
Die Kategorien beziehen sich auf den ganzen Wahlspot. Es wird nur auf der Spotebene, und 
nicht auf der Sequenzenebene codiert.  
 
2. Untersuchungszeitraum 
 
Untersucht werden polnische Wahlspots, die in den folgenden Wahlkampagnen im öffentlich-
rechtlichen Fernsehen (TVP) gezeigt wurden.  
 
Wahlkampagne 1997 
Wahlkampagne 2001 
Wahlkampagne 2005 
 
3. Untersuchungseinheiten 
 
Untersucht werden die Wahlspots folgender Parteien: 
 
1997  Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (AWS) 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) 
Unia Wolności (UW) 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 
Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP) 
 
2001  Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy (AWSP) 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)/Unia Pracy (UP) 
Unia Wolności (UW) 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 
Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 
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Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) 
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 
  Samoobrona  
   
2005  Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 
Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)  
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 
Samoobrona 
 
4. Analyseeinheiten 
 
Analyseeinheit ist der ganze Spot. Es wird nur auf der Spotebene, und nicht auf der 
Sequenzenebene codiert.   
 
5. Stichprobe 
 
Vollerhebung 
 
 
II Kategoriensystem  
 
1. Formale Kategorien 
 
1.1. Codierer 
COD 
Jeder Codierer erhält eine eindeutig identifizierbare Nummer. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Codierer 
 
1 Ewa Musiałowska 
2 Katarzyna Borowiec 
3 Adriana Kiędzierska 
 
1.2. Produzent 
PROD 
Festgehalten wird, welche Partei den jeweiligen Wahlspot produziert hat.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Quelle 
 
1997  1 Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (AWS) 
2 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) 
3 Unia Wolności (UW) 
4 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 
5 Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP) 
 
2001  1 Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy (AWSP) 
2 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)/Unia Pracy (UP) 
3 Unia Wolności (UW) 
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4 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 
6 Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 
7 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) 
8 Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 
  9 Samoobrona  
   
2005  2 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) 
4 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 
6 Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 
7 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)  
8 Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 
9 Samoobrona 
 
1.3. Datum 
JAHR 
Das Erscheinungsjahr des Wahlspots wird folgendermaßen codiert. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Datum 
 
1 Wahlkampagne 1997 
2 Wahlkampagne 2001 
3 Wahlkampagne 2005  
 
1.4. Länge der Wahlspots  
LANG 
Beim Wahlspots wird zusätzlich die Länge verschlüsselt. Die Dauer des jeweiligen Spots wird 
in Sekunden ermittelt  
 
Beispiel: Spot von PiS - 120 Sekunden 
 
 
2. Inhaltliche Kategorien 
 
2.1. Der Professionalisierungsgrad 
PROFGRAD 
Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots eingeschätzt werden. Unter dem 
Professionalisierungsgrad wird dabei verstanden, ob der jeweilige Spot als professionel  oder 
unprofessionel eingestuft werden kann. Dies wird aus der heutigen Perspektive (2006) 
analysiert. Hinweise auf den Profesionalisierungsgrad geben u.a. unterschiedliche 
Kameraeinstellungen (Kamera in Bewegung vs. Stativaufnahmen), Schnitttechnik (z.B. viele 
Schnitte, weiche Überblendungen), Einsatz von Spezialtechniken, Verwendung von 
Hintergrundmusik. Außerdem sind Wahlspots mit hohem Profesionalisierungsgrad oft durch 
den hohen Einsatz verschiedener journalistischer Stilformen (z.B. O-Töne, verschiedene 
Standorte, Verwendung von historischen Aufnahmen etc.) gekennzeichnet.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Professionalisierungsgrad 
 
1 Hoher Professionalisierungsgrad 
Hoher Professionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn der jeweilige Spot einen hohen 
Bearbeitungsgrad zeigt. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn folgende Elemente zum Einsatz 
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kommen: unterschiedliche Kameraeinstellungen, kurze Schnittsequenzen, Hilfe verschiedener 
Spezialtechniken. Der hohe Professionalisierungsgrad ist oft durch die Musik verstärkt, die 
das Bildmaterial unterstützt.  
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
z.B. SLD 2005 mit dem Olejniczak Wahlspot 
 
2 Mittlerer Professionalisierungsgrad 
Mittlerer Professionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Spot Qualitätsdefizite 
vorhanden sind. Die Sendung zeigt mittleren Bearbeitungsgrad, d.h. Kameraeinstellungen 
sind häufig, Schnittsequenzen sind relativ kurz, der Einsatz von verschiedenen Stilformen 
wird genutzt.  
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
3 Geringer Professionalisierungsgrad 
Geringer Professionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn der Spot amateurhaft wirkt. Dies ist dann 
z.B. dann der Fall, wenn der jeweilige Spot schlechte Qualität hat und teilweise peinlich 
erscheint. 
z.B. Selbstverteidigung 2001 mit ihren Wahlspot „Oni już byli“. 
 
2.2. Einsatz von Spezialtechniken 
SPETECH 
Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots eingeschätzt werden. Unter dem Einsatz von 
Spezialtechniken wird verstanden, ob der jeweilige Spot moderne Produktionstechniken (z.B. 
Computeranimationen, Überblendungen, Blue Box etc.) verwendet.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Einsatz von Spezialtechniken 
 
1 Hoher Einsatz von Spezialtechniken 
Spezialtechniken werden im hohen Maße eingesetzt. 
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
z.B. PO 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
2 Mittlerer Einsatz von Spezieltechniken 
Spezialtechniken werden gelegentlich verwendet. 
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
3 Geringer Einsatz von Spezialtechniken 
Spezialtechniken finden kaum Anwendung. 
z.B. Selbstverteidigung 2001 mit ihren Wahlspot „Oni już byli“. 
 
2.3. Kameraeinstellungen 
KAMEIN 
Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots eingeschätzt werden. Es wird der Eindruck 
abgestuft, wie oft Kamereinstellungen gewechselt werden. Der Wechsel der 
Kameraeinstellungen wird vom Codierer geschätzt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Kameraeinstellungen 
 
1 Hoher Einsatz von wechselnden Kameraeinstellungen  
Kamereinstellung wechselt sehr oft.  
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z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
z.B. PO 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
2 Mittlerer Einsatz von wechselnden Kameraeinstellungen  
Kamereinstellungen werden Spezialtechniken werden gelegentlich verwendet. 
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
3 Geringer Einsatz von wechselnden Kameraeinstellungen  
Der Wahlspot ist überwiegend stabil, wechselnde Kameraeinstellungen finden kaum 
Anwendung. 
z.B. Selbstverteidigung 2001 mit ihren Wahlspot „Oni już byli“ 
 
2.4. Der Negativitätsgrad 
NEGGRAD 
Unter Negativität werden implizite und explizite Angriffe auf politische Gegner (Politiker, 
Parteien) des jeweiligen Partei verstanden. Die Einschätzung bezieht sich auch auf die Musik 
und bildliche Ebene, die negativ wirken können. Hier wird codiert, welchen Gesamteindruck 
der Wahlspot beim durchschnittlichen Zuschauer hinterlässt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Negativitätsgrad 
 
1 hoher Negativitätsgrad 
Hoher Negativitätsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot negative Angriffe 
dominieren. Der Rezipient muss den Eindruck erhalten, dass politische Gegner der Partei, die 
die Sendung produziert hat, überwiegend negativ dargestellt werden. Dies kann u.a. durch 
explizite oder implizite Kritik des politischen Programms oder Angriffe auf Eigenschaften 
anderer Parteien erreicht werden. Die Negativität kann gleichzeitig durch den Einsatz von 
negativwirkenden Musik und die Centralität negativer Bilder (Arbeitslose, kranke Menschen, 
Demonstrationen etc.) erzogen werden. 
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
z.B. Samoobrona 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
2 mittlerer Negativitätsgrad 
Mittlerer Negativitätsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot weniger als die Hälfte der 
Sequenzen negatives Bild der politischen Gegner präsentiert.  
z.B. FDP 1998 mit dem Spot „Lassen Sie nicht zu, dass Rot-Grün Reformen zurückdreht“ 
z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihrem Wahlspot, wo die Steuerreform präsentiert wird 
 
3 geringer Negativitätsgrad  
Geringer Negativitätsgrad liegt vor, wenn negative Angriffe nur in sehr bescheidenem 
Ausmaß kommuniziert werden. Die ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn nur vereinzelte Aussagen 
oder Bilder, die negativ wirken, eingesetzt werden. 
z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005 mit dem Spot „Die Grünen sind an Allem schuld“ 
z.B. PO 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
4 keine Negativität 
Es handelt sich hier um solche Wahlspots, in denen keine Negativität vorkommt. 
z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Spot „Wollen wir zusammen Deuschland erneuern?“ 
 
 242 
ACHTUNG: Kategorie 2.5. wird nur codiert, wenn für Kategorie 2.4 – 1, 2 oder 3 festgestellt 
wurde! 
 
2.5. Bezugspunkt der Kritik: Programm- oder Eigenschaftsorientierung 
BEZKRIT 
Unter Bezugspunkt der Kritik wird der Typ der Angriffe verstanden. Negativwertende 
Aussagen über Parteien können sowohl programmorientierter als auch 
eigenschaftenoriertierter Charakter haben.  Mit andern Worten: politische Gegner können 
aufgrund des Programms (Leistungsschau etc.) oder/und ihrer Eigenschaften (Diebe, Verräter 
etc.) implizit oder explizit kritiziert werden. Es wird codiert, welchen Gesamteindruck der 
Wahlspot beim durchschnittlichen Zuschauer hinterlässt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Programm- oder Eigenschaftsorientierung 
 
1  programmorientiert 
Als programmorientiert gelten negativewertende Aussagen, die sich überwiegend auf das 
politische Programm der Gegner beziehen. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn negative Effekte der 
von anderen Parteien durchgeführten Reformen angesprochen werden. 
z.B. FDP 1998 mit dem Spot „Lassen Sie nicht zu, dass Rot-Grün Reformen zurückdreht“ 
z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Wahlspot, wo die Steuerreform präsentiert wird 
 
2  gleichgewichtig  
Als gleichgewichtig werden solche Wahlspots eingestuft, die sowohl programmorientierte als 
auch eigenschaftenorientierte Angriffe gleichermaßen einsetzen. 
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
3  eigenschaftenorientiert 
Als eigenschaftenorientiert werden negativewertende Aussagen eingestuft, die überwiegend der 
Beschreibung des Profils der Gegner dienen. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn andere Parteien 
als Diebe, Verräter etc. beschrieben werden oder wenn die (negativ gefärbte) politische 
Biographie der Partei thematisiert wird.  
z.B. Samoobrona 2001 mit dem Spot „Samoobrona powie Wam całą prawdę“ 
 
9   Nicht erkennbar 
 
2.6. Präsentationsformat 
FORMAT 
Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob im jeweiligen Spot Formate ohne Kandidaten oder Formate mit 
Kandidaten zum Einsatz kommen.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Präsentationsformat 
 
1 Formate mit Kandidaten  
z.B. SPD 2005 mit dem Spot „Sie entscheiden“ 
 
2 Formate ohne Kandidaten  
z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Spot „Wollen wir zusammen Deuschland erneuern?“ 
 
2.7. Anzahl der politischen Hauptakteure 
ANZHAU 
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Es wird die Anzahl der Hauptakteure innerhalb des Wahlspots angegeben. Als Hauptakteure 
sollen Politiker gelten, die in dem jeweiligen Spot eine dominante Position einnehmen. Der 
Umfang der Dominanz wird vom Codierer geschätzt. Es werden bis zu drei Hauptakteure 
codiert. Wenn mehr als drei Hauptakteure nach den o.g. Kriterien infrage kommen, werden 
nur die drei codiert, die für den durchschnittlichen Zuschauer am auffälligsten sind 
(Reihenfolge: Bekanntheitsgrad, Position, Umfang des Auftritts etc.). Für jeden Hauptakteur 
werden die Kategorien 2.8., 2.9., 2.10. und 2.11 auf dem Codebogen getrennt erhoben  
Achtung: Es wird hier gleichzeitig der Name und Vorname des jeweiligen Kandidaten 
separat aufgeschrieben. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Anzahl der politischen Hauptakteure 
 
1  ein politischer Hauptakteur 
z.B. SPD 2005 mit dem Spot „Sie entscheiden“ 
 
2  zwei politische Hauptakteure 
z.B. SLD 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots „Przywrócmy normalność, wygrajmy przyszłość” 
 
3  drei politische Hauptakteure 
z.B. PSL 2005 mit dem Spot „Zawsze blisko ludzi“  
 
4 mehr als drei Haupakteure 
z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihrem Wahlspots 
 
ACHTUNG: Kategorien 2.8. (Personalisierungsgrad), 2.9. (Zentralität des 
Hauptakteurs), 2.10. (Privatisierungsgrad), 2.11 (Charaktereigenschaften) werden für 3 
Hauptakteure getrennt verschlüsselt. 
 
 
2.8. Der Personalisierungsgrad 
PERSO 
Unter Personalisierung wird verstanden, wie personenorientiert ein Wahlspot ist. Die 
Personalisierung wird nur für diese drei Politiker codiert, die als Hauptaktuere eingestuft 
wurden. Politische Programme und Konzepte von Parteien werden hier von Spitzenpolitiker 
verkörpert. Diese Personen sind eine materielle Ausdrucksform des politischen Angebots.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Personalisierungsgrad 
 
1 hoher Personalisierungsgrad 
Die Aussagen über einzelne Politiker stehen im Vordergrund oder es wird ausschließlich über 
den jeweiligen Politiker gesprochen. Andere Themen werden nur am Rande präsentiert.  
z.B. SPD 1998 mit dem Spot, der Gerhard Schröder beim Spaziergang am Strand zeigt 
z.B. FDP 2002 mit Guido Westerwelle 
z.B. Grüne 2005 mit dem Wahlspot“Die Grünen sind anders“ 
 
2 mittlerer Personalisierungsgrad 
Mittlerer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn dem Politiker und anderen Themen etwa 
gleich viel Platz eingeräumt wird.  
z.B. CDU 1998 mit dem Landschaften-Wahlspot 
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3 geringer oder keiner Personalisierungsgrad 
Geringer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn die Wahlspots in mindestens einem Satz auch 
Hintergrundinformationen zu dem jeweiligen Politiker geben. Mit dieser Kategorie werden 
auch die Wahlspots erfasst, wo keine Personalsierung zu finden ist. 
z.B. CDU 2002 mit dem Wahlspot „Die Menschen in Deutschland haben verdient, dass es 
endlich aufwärts geht." 
z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Spot „Wollen wir zusammen Deuschland erneuern?“ 
z.B. FDP 2002 mit dem spot „Früher wählte man SPD oder CDU/CSU“ 
 
2.9. Zentralität des Hauptakteurs  
ZENTRUM 
 
Mit dieser Kategorie wird ermittelt inwiefern der jeweilige Politiker eine zentrale Position im 
Wahlspot hat. Die Zentralität des Hauptakteurs wird nur für diese drei Politiker codiert, die 
als Hauptaktuere eingestuft wurden und für die auch der Personalisierungsgrad gemessen 
wurde.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Zentralität des Hauptakteurs 
 
 
1 hohe Zentralität des Hauptakteurs 
Der der jeweilige Politiker spielt eine zentrale Rolle im Wahlspot. Andere Politiker werden 
nur am Rande präsentiert.  
z.B.  CDU 1998 mit dem Kohl-Wahlspot 
z.B. Grüne 2005 mit dem Wahlspots „Zweitstimme ist Joschka Stimme“ 
 
2 mittlere Zentralität des Hauptakteurs 
Dem Politiker wird gleich viel Platz wie den anderen Politikern eingeräumt.  
z.B. SLD 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots „Przywrócmy normalność, wygrajmy przyszłość” 
 
 
3 geringe Zentralität des Hauptakteurs 
Der jeweilige Politiker wird nur am Range des Wahlspots dargestellt. Anderen Themen oder 
Personen wird mehr Platz eingeräumt.  
z.B. PSL 2005 mit dem Spot „Zawsze blisko ludzi“  
 
2.10. Der Privatisierungsgrad 
PRIVAT 
Unter Privatisierung wird verstanden, ob der Wahlspot die Politiker im privaten Umfeld zeigt. 
Als privates Umfeld gelten alle Sachverhalte, die sich klar vom politischen Umfeld  
abgrenzen lassen. Der Codierer entscheidet sich für eine Möglichkeit nach seinem subjektiven 
Eindruck. Der Privatisierungssgrad äußert sich über Aussagen, die sich Politikern, ihren 
Angehörigen persönlich widmen und über Bilder, die Politikern im privaten Umfeld zeigen . 
Dabei wird vor allem ihr Privatleben thematisiert. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Privatisierungsgrad  
 
1 hoher Privatisierungsgrad 
Hoher Privatisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn das Privatleben eines Politikers stark thematisiert 
wird 
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z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Spot, der die Biographie von Lech Kaczyński thematisiert 
 
2 mittlerer Privatisierungsgrad 
Mittlerer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn das Privatleben des Politiker und anderen 
Themen etwa gleich viel Platz eingeräumt wird.  
z.B. PO 2005 mit dem Spots, der von politischen Biographie Tusks spricht 
 
3 geringer Privatisierungsgrad 
Geringer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn die Wahlspots in mindestens einem Satz auch 
Hintergrundinformationen zu dem Privatleben des jeweiligen Politikers geben. 
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
4 keine Privatisierung 
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
 
2.11.Charaktereigenschaften - Ehrlich 
CHAREIG  
Es wird verschlüsselt welchen Eindruck die Hauptakteure auf den durchschnittlichen 
Betrachter machen. Der Eindruck, den die Politiker auf den durchschnittlichen Betrachter 
machen, wird für die Eigenschaft „ehrlich“ verschlüsselt. Es wird unterschieden, ob diese 
Eigenschaft vorkommt oder nicht.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Charaktereigenschaften - Ehrlich 
 
1 Kommt vor 
2 Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.12. Emotionalisierung 
EMOTIO 
Unter Emotionalisierung wird die emotionale Ansprache der Wähler verstanden. Das Gegenteil 
davon ist dann er Fall, wenn vor allem rationale Ansprache verwendet wird. Die Einschätzung 
der Emotionalisierung bezieht sich auch auf die Musik und bildliche Ebene, die emotional 
wirken können. Es wird codiert, welchen Gesamteindruck der Wahlspot beim 
durchschnittlichen Zuschauer hinterlässt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Emotionalisierungsgrad 
 
1 hoher Emotionalisierungsgrad 
Hoher Emotionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot emotionale Ansprache 
dominiert. Diese Ansprache kann entweder eine implizite oder eine explizite Form haben. Die 
Emotionalisierung wird hier oft durch den Einsatz von emotionalisierenden Musik und die 
Centralität emotionalisierenden (positiver und negativer) Bilder (Arbeitslose, kranke Menschen, 
Demonstrationen etc.) erzogen werden. Die rationale Argumentation ist kaum zu finden.  
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005 mit dem Spot „Die Grünen sind an Allem schuld“ 
 
2 mittlerer Emotionalisierungsgrad 
Mittlerer Emotionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot weniger als die Hälfte 
der Sequenzen emotionalisierende Elemente erhält. Es werden gleichzeitig mehrere rationale 
Argumente eingesetzt. 
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z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005 mit dem Spot 2xFischer 
z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Spot, der die Biographie von Lech Kaczyński thematisiert 
 
3 geringer Emotionalisierungsgrad 
Geringer Emotionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn Emotionalisierung des jeweiligen Wahlspots 
nur in sehr bescheidenem Ausmaß vorhanden ist. Die ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn nur 
vereinzelte emotionalisierende Aussagen oder Bilder eingesetzt werden. Es werden 
überwiegend rationale Argumente eingesetzt.  
z.B. CDU 1998 mit dem Kohl-Wahlspot 
 
4 keine Emotionalisierung 
Es handelt sich hier um solche Wahlspots, in denen keine Emotionalisierung vorkommt. Es 
werden nur rationale Argumente eingesetzt.  
z.B. FDP 1998 mit dem Spot „Lassen Sie nicht zu, dass Rot-Grün Reformen zurückdreht“  
 
2.13. Themen des Wahlspots 
THEMA 
Unter Thema wird der Bereich verstanden, zu dem der Spotgegenstand gehört. Bis zu fünf 
Themen können codiert werden. Themen werden nach einer allgemeinen Themenliste 
zugeordnet. Zunächst wird das Hauptthema verschlüsselt. Hauptthema ist das Thema, auf das 
der meiste Platz bzw. die meiste Zeit verwandt wird. Im Anschluss daran können bis zu vier 
Nebenthemen verschlüsselt werden. Bei mehr als fünf Themen werden nur die wichtigsten 
verschlüsselt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Themen 
 
1 Kandidat 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, in denen die Kandidaten präsentiert werden. 
z.B. PiS 2001 mit dem Wahlspot, wo Biographie Kaczyńskis thematisiert wird 
z.B. SPD 1998 mit dem Spot, der Gerhard Schröder beim Spaziergang am Strand zeigt 
 
2 Wahlkampfbezogene Themen 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit dem Wahlkampf befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. 
allgemeine Wahlaufrufe, Erklärungen zum Wahlverfahren (dabei wird oft die Bedeutung von 
Erst- und Zweitstimme thematisiert). In diesem Themenbereich gehört auch die 
Thematisierung von Koalitionen, Warnungen vor einer möglichen zukünftigen Koalition, 
Warnungen von politischen Gegnern etc. 
z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Wahlspot „Wollen wir zusammen Deutschland erneuern?“ 
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
 
3 Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich im allgemeinen mit der Wirtschaft befassen. Dazu 
zählen z.B. Situation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt (Arbeitslosigkeit, Firmenpleite etc.), Belastung 
der Bürger und Unternehmen, Steuerreformen; Staatsverschuldung,  Finanzkrise; Zustand der 
Volkswirtschaft; Investitionen etc.  
z.B. UW 1997 mit Balcerowicz Spots 
z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Wahlspot, wo die Steuerreform präsentiert wird 
 
4 Sozialpolitk 
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In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit der sozialen Aspekten befassen. Dazu zählen 
z.B. Renten-, Kranken-, Pflegeversicherung, Sozialhilfe und andere Sozialleistungen, 
spezifische Vorschäge bezüglich Kinder, Jugend, Familie etc. 
z.B. CSU 1998 mit dem Spot „Mit Bayern gewinnt Deutschland“ 
z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
5 Zustand von Staat und Politik 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die die Relationen zwischen Staat und Politik zeigen. Dazu 
zählen u.a. Beiträge über Parteien, Politiker, politische Einrichtungen, Regierung, Parlament 
(z. B. Politikverdrossenheit, Glaubwürdigkeit von Politikern), ebenso Beiträge über politische 
Skandale (Parteispenden etc.). 
z.B. Sammobrona 2001 mit dem Spot „Oni już byli“ 
z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
6 Sozialer Zustand des Gemeinwesens 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die den sozialen Zustand der Gesellschaft zeigen. Dazu 
zählen u.a. Beiträge über Soziale Kälte, Gerechtigkeit, Ungleichheit, „Neue Armut“ etc.  
z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
7 Innere Sicherheit 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit den Fragen der inneren Sicherheti befassen. 
Dazu zählen z.B. Beiträge über die allgemeine Sicherheit der Bürger, die Effizienz der 
Sicherheitskräfte, die Leistungsfähigkeit der Strafverfolgung etc.  
z.B. PiS 2001 mit den Wahlspots 
z.B. CSU 1998 mit dem Spot „Mit Bayern gewinnt Deutschland“ 
 
8 Außenpolitik  
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit Fragen der Außenpolitik befassen. Dazu 
gehören u.a. Beiträge, in denen Ausweitung der EU, Mitgliedschaft in NATO, Rolle 
Deutschlands (Polens) in internationalen Organizationen etc. angesprochen werden. 
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
 
9 Umwelt/Energie 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich den Umwelt- und den Energiefragen widmen. Dazu 
zählen z.B. Thematisierung des Umweltzustandes (Luft, Wasser, Wäldern etc.), 
Thematisierung von Atomenergie, Atomkraftwerke etc. 
z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998 mit dem Spot „Grün ist der Wechsel“ 
 
10 Ausländer / Asylanten 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, in denen Probleme der Ausländer/Asylanten problematisiert 
werden. Dazu zählen z.B. Thematisierung von Diskriminierung, Rassismus etc.  
z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998 mit dem Spot „Grün ist der Wechsel“ 
 
2.14. Amtsinhaber und Herausforderer-Strategien 
AMTHER 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Amtsinhaber und Herausforderer-Strategien 
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Amtsinhaber-Strategien  
 
2.14.1. Politische Ämter werden genannt 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.2. Kompetenz und Amt 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.3. Betont, was erreicht wurde 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.4. Im Kreis von Politikern anderer 
Länder 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.5. Bestätigung durch Politiker 
anderer Parteien 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.6. Andere sprechen für den 
Kandidaten 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
 
Herausforderer-Strategien 
 
2.14.7. Aufruf zu Veränderungen  
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.8. Offensive Haltung zu Themen 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.9. Betont Optimismus für die 
Zukunft 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.10. Betonung traditioneller 
Werte 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.11. Angriff auf die Politik des 
Gegners 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
2.14.12. Hat die Unterstützung seiner 
Partei 
1   Kommt vor 
2   Kommt nicht vor 
 
 
 
2.15. Einsatz von nicht-politischen Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern 
GLAUB 
Unter dem Begriff Glaubwürdigkeitsträger werden Personen verstanden, die das positive Bild 
jeweiliger Partei vermitteln. Dies ist dann der Fall, wenn sie Testimonials angeben und 
bestimmte politische Gruppierungen empfehlen. Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots 
eingeschätzt werden.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern 
 
1 hoher Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern 
Glaubwürdigkeitsträger werden im hohen Maße eingesetzt. 
z.B. AWS 1997 Wahlspots 
 
2 mittlerer Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern 
Glaubwürdigkeitsträger werden gelegentlich verwendet. 
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots 
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3 geringer Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern 
Glaubwürdigkeitsträger sind kaum oder überhaupt nicht zu finden. 
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot 
 
 
Appendix B 
Example of Coding Book for Media Coverage in Germany (2002) 
 
I Allgemeine Codieranweisungen 
 
1. Ziel der Untersuchung und Struktur des Kategorienschemas 
 
Die Studie, dem dieses Codebuch zugrunde liegt, untersucht wie die wichtigsten deutschen 
und polnischen Nachrichtenmedien den Wahlkampf darstellen. Hauptaugenmerk der 
Untersuchung liegt auf der Darstellung der Akteure des Wahlkampfs (Parteien und Politiker) 
sowie die für die Wahl möglicherweise ausschlaggebenden Themen.  
 
Die Wahl der drei Untersuchungszeiträume zielt dabei darauf ab, einen Eindruck davon zu 
erhalten, wie sich die Medienberichterstattung verändert und wie sich die deutschen und 
polnischen Medien unterscheiden.  
 
Die Kategorien beziehen sich auf den ganzen Beitrag oder auf einzelne Aussagen im Beitrag. 
Hier wird unterschieden, ob es sich um formale Merkmale, um themenunabhängige Inhalte, 
um Inhalte über Parteien, Politiker und den Wahlkampf oder um einzelne politische 
Sachthemen handelt.  
 
2. Untersuchungszeitraum 
 
Untersucht wird eine Stichprobe deutscher Medien in den folgenden Zeitraum: 
 
26.08.2002 – 21.09.2002 
 
3. Untersuchungseinheiten 
 
Untersucht wird eine Stichprobe folgender deutschen Printmedien: 
 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Bild 
 
4. Ressorts der Tageszeitungen, die untersucht werden sollen 
 
Untersucht werden bei allen Zeitungen der überregionale Politik- und Nachrichtenteil, sowie 
die nachstehend aufgeführten Ressorts.  
 
Nicht erfasst werden alle alleinstehenden Statistiken und Grafiken, sowie Pressestimmen und 
Leserbriefe. 
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AUSNAHME: Statistiken und Grafiken mit Wahlprognosen, Wahlumfragen, 
Wahlergebnissen und ähnlichen Daten (siehe: Zugriffskriterien) werden verschlüsselt. Die 
Grafiken gelten dabei nicht als Bilder, sondern ihre inhaltlichen Informationen werden wie 
Text verschlüsselt.  
 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Zeitgeschehen. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung: Themen des Tages, Die Seite Drei, Meinungsseite. 
Bild: komplett außer Sportteil 
 
5. Analyseeinheiten 
 
Analyseeinheit ist der einzelne Beitrag. Als einzelner Beitrag gilt ein in sich abgeschlossener 
Bericht über ein Thema. Ein Beitrag in einer anderen Präsentationsform zum gleichen Thema 
wird als neuer Beitrag behandelt. 
 
Fotografien und Karikaturen werden nur untersucht, wenn Spitzenpolitiker darauf zu sehen 
sind. Zu ihrer Verschlüsselung gibt es eine eigene Kategorie. (siehe: 2. Zusatzcodierungen für 
Bilder). Bilder in Zeitungen, die integraler Bestandteil des Berichtes sind, werden als Teil des 
Beitrags betrachtet. 
 
Beispiel: Illustrierendes Foto in einem Interview. 
 
Eigenständige Bilder mit eigener Bildunterschrift ohne Texteinbindung in der Presse werden 
als eigenständige Beiträge behandelt und verschlüsselt. Falls ein Beitrag mehrere Bilder 
enthält, auf denen Spitzenpolitiker zu sehen sind, wird jeweils nur eines verschlüsselt, und zwar 
das größte bzw. bei gleicher Größe das erste. 
 
6. Stichprobe 
 
Jeden zweiten Tag rotiert nach Stichprobenplan. 
 
7. Zugriffskriterien 
 
Codiert werden Beiträge, die eines der unten aufgeführten Themen betreffen 
(Zugriffskriterien). Dabei ist folgendermaßen vorzugehen: Bei Zeitungen werden die Artikel 
zumindest angelesen, um anhand der Überschrift und des Leads (erster Absatz) zu 
entscheiden, ob ein Zugriffskriterium erfüllt wird. 
 
Bei Zeitschriften wird anhand des Inhaltsverzeichnisses beurteilt, ob ein Artikel vermutlich 
von mindestens einem der Zugriffskriterien erfasst wird. Scheint ein Artikel nach dem 
Inhaltsverzeichnis auf ein Zugriffskriterium zu passen, so wird er angelesen, um die 
Vermutung zu überprüfen.  
 
Erfasst werden nur Beiträge, in denen die unten genannten Themen im Mittelpunkt stehen. 
Nicht erfasst werden Beiträge ohne explizite Bezüge zu einem der in der Liste genannten 
Themen.  
 
Parteien  
Es werden Beiträge über folgende Parteien analysiert: 
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- CDU 
- CSU 
- SPD 
- FDP 
- BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 
- PDS 
 
Codiert wird nur, wenn die Parteien tatsächlich Gegenstand des Beitrags sind, und nicht nur 
nebenbei erwähnt werden. 
 
Spitzenpolitiker 
Codiert werden Beiträge über folgende Spitzenpolitiker: 
 
- Edmund Stoiber 
- Gerhard Schröder 
- Guido Westerwelle 
- Joschka Fischer 
- Gregor Gysi 
 
Wahlkampf  
Beiträge, in denen es um den Wahlkampf, die Wahlkampf-Zentralen, die 
Wahlkampfstrategien, die Wahlwerbung der Parteien oder die Rolle der Medien im 
Wahlkampf geht. 
 
Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich im allgemeinen mit der Wirtschaft befassen. Dazu 
zählen z.B. Situation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt (Arbeitslosigkeit, Firmenpleite etc.), Belastung 
der Bürger und Unternehmen, Steuerreformen; Staatsverschuldung,  Finanzkrise; Zustand der 
Volkswirtschaft; Investitionen etc.  
 
Sozialpolitk 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit der sozialen Aspekten befassen. Dazu zählen 
z.B. Renten-, Kranken-, Pflegeversicherung, Sozialhilfe und andere Sozialleistungen, 
spezifische Vorschäge bezüglich Kinder, Jugend, Familie etc. Nicht codiert werden Berichte 
über Einzelschicksale, es sei denn, die oben genannten allgemeinen Aspekte werden 
angesprochen. 
 
Zustand von Staat und Politik 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die die Relationen zwischen Staat und Politik zeigen. Dazu 
zählen u.a. Beiträge über Parteien, Politiker, politische Einrichtungen, Regierung, Parlament 
(z. B. Politikverdrossenheit, Glaubwürdigkeit von Politikern), ebenso Beiträge über den 
Populismus, die Lustration, politische Skandale (Parteispenden etc.). 
 
Sozialer Zustand des Gemeinwesens 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die den sozialen Zustand der Gesellschaft zeigen. Dazu 
zählen u.a. Beiträge über Soziale Kälte, Gerechtigkeit, Ungleichheit, „Neue Armut“ etc.  
 
Innere Sicherheit 
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In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit den Fragen der inneren Sicherheti befassen. 
Dazu zählen z.B. Beiträge über die allgemeine Sicherheit der Bürger, die Effizienz der 
Sicherheitskräfte, die Leistungsfähigkeit der Strafverfolgung etc.  
 
Außenpolitik  
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit Fragen der Außenpolitik befassen. Dazu 
gehören u.a. Beiträge, in denen Ausweitung der EU, Mitgliedschaft in NATO, Rolle 
Deutschlands (Polens) in internationalen Organizationen etc. angesprochen werden. 
 
Umwelt/Energie 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich den Umwelt- und den Energiefragen widmen. Dazu 
zählen z.B. Thematisierung des Umweltzustandes (Luft, Wasser, Wäldern etc.), 
Thematisierung von Atomenergie, Atomkraftwerke etc. 
 
Ausländer / Asylanten 
In diesem Feld gehören Themen, in denen Probleme der Ausländer/Asylanten problematisiert 
werden. Dazu zählen z.B. Thematisierung von Diskriminierung, Rassismus etc. 
 
 
II Kategoriensystem 
 
1. Beiträge 
 
1.1. Formales 
 
1.1.1. Codierer 
COD 
Jeder Codierer erhält eine eindeutig identifizierbare Nummer. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Codierer 
 
4 Antal Wozniak 
5 Hannah Szynal 
6 Mandy Pampel 
7 Ewa Musialowska 
 
1.1.2. Medium 
MED 
Die verschiedenen Medien werden wie folgt verschlüsselt: 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Medium 
 
1 = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
2 = Süddeutsche Zeitung  
3 = Bild 
 
1.1.3. Beitragsnummer 
BNR 
Für jeden Zeitungsbeitrag wird eine fortlaufende Nummer in der jeweiligen Ausgabe 
vergeben, um Beiträge ggf. später identifizieren zu können. Gezählt werden nur Beiträge, die 
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codiert wurden. Die Nummern der Beiträge werden deutlich sichtbar in den Medien notiert. 
Die Numerierung erfolgt „zeilenförmig“, d.h. zuerst von links nach rechts, dann von oben 
nach unten.  
 
1.1.4. Datum 
TAG, MONAT, JAHR 
Das Erscheinungsdatum des Beitrags wird in der Reihenfolge Tag-Monat-Jahr codiert. 
 
Beispiel:  17. September 2005 = 17 09 05 
                         9. September 2002 = 09 09 02 
 
 
1.1.5. Seitenzahl des Beitrags 
SB 
Die Seitenzahl des untersuchten Beitrags wird dreistellig verschlüsselt. Ausschlaggebend ist 
der Anfang des Artikels. 
 
Beispiel:  Seite 1 = 001 
  Seite11 = 011 
  Seite 111 =111 
 
 
1.1.6. Quelle 
QUELLE 
Festgehalten wird, ob es sich um einen Eigenbericht, oder einen Agenturbeitrag handelt. Die 
Quelle kann namentlich genannt oder durch Kürzel kenntlich gemacht sein. Sie kann am 
Anfang oder am Ende eines Artikels genannt sein.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Quelle 
 
1 = Keine Angabe 
2 = Presseagentur 
3 = Mehrere Agenturen 
4 = Mehrere Agenturen / Mehrere Quellen 
5 =  Eigener Bericht 
9 = Sonstiges 
 
 
1.1.7. Beachtungsgrad in der Presse 
BEACH 
Beim Beachtungsgrad wird verschlüsselt, wie prominent ein Beitrag plaziert wurde. 
Maßgebend ist die Stelle, an der der Beitrag beginnt. Bei Zeitungen werden jeweils vier 
Beachtungsgrade unterschieden.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Beachtungsgrad in der Presse 
 
1 Höchster Beachtungsgrad 
Aufmacher = größter Artikel auf der oberen Hälfte der Titelseite, Kommentare auf der 
Titelseite. 
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2 Zweithöchster Beachtungsgrad 
Mehrspalter auf der Titelseite, Seitenaufmacher auf den Innenseiten. 
 
3 Dritthöchster Beachtungsgrad 
Einspalter Titelseite, Mehrspalter Innenseiten. 
 
4 Vierthöchster Beachtungsgrad 
Zeitungen: Einspalter Innenseiten. 
 
 
1.1.8. Stilform 
STIL 
Die Zuordnung zu den verschiedenen Stilformen ist meist durch eine Kennzeichnung von 
Seiten der Redaktion gegeben. Eine derartige Kennzeichnung kann durch die Nennung der 
Stilform in der Artikelüberschrift, in einer Unter- oder Zwischenüberschrift oder durch eine 
besondere Schrifttype für Text oder Überschrift erfolgen.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Stilform 
 
1 Nachricht, Bericht  
Vollständig oder zumindest überwiegend  tatsachenbetonter Beitrag. 
 
2 Reportage, Feature 
Beitrag mit subjektiver Färbung durch Einschätzungen, Wertungen des Autors. 
 
3 Kommentar, Glosse 
Vollständig oder zumindest überwiegend wertender Beitrag, der auch als solcher redaktionell 
kenntlich gemacht ist. 
 
4 Interviews und Dokumentationen 
Dokumentationen sind Beiträge, die 
- als Dokumentation gekennzeichnet sind 
- Positionen politischer Akteure weitgehend ungekürzt und unkommentiert im Wortlaut 
wiedergeben 
- ausschließlich dokumentarische, z.B. chronologische Abrisse der Ereignisse enthalten. 
 
 
1.2. Themenunabhängige Merkmale 
 
1.2.1. Tenor des Beitrags 
TENOR 
Unter Tenor wird der optimistische bzw. pessimistische Charakter bzw. Grundton eines 
Beitrags verstanden. Ein positiver oder optimistischer Charakter liegt vor, wenn der Beitrag 
dem durchschnittlichen Rezipienten den Eindruck erweckt, dass der betreffende Sachverhalt 
etc. in Ordnung ist oder positive Entwicklungen möglich bzw. wahrscheinlich sind. Dies ist 
zum Beispiel dann der Fall, wenn Probleme als gelöst oder lösbar erscheinen, der Beitrag über 
Erfolge berichtet etc. Der Rezipient muss den Eindruck erhalten, dass die Welt nicht schlecht 
bzw. verbesserungswürdig ist. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall bei Beiträgen, die als eindeutig oder 
eher pessimistisch eingestuft werden.  
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SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Tenor des Beitrags 
 
1  eindeutig positiver, optimistischer Charakter/Grundton 
2  eher positiv, optimistisch 
3  ambivalent 
4  eher negativ, pessimistisch 
5  eindeutig negativer, pessimistischer Charakter/Grundton  
 
9  Nicht erkennbar (Restkategorie z.B. für Kurzmeldungen; in der Regel ist ein Tenor 
erkennbar) 
 
Beispiel: Mit „1“ zu codieren wäre ein Bericht, der den Eindruck vermittelt, dass die 
Parteien die Arbeitslosigkeit erfolgreich bekämpfen können. Mit „5“ zu codieren wäre ein 
Bericht, in dem die Maßnahmen gegen Arbeitslosigkeit ungenügend oder nicht 
erfolgversprechend erscheinen. 
 
Anweisung für die nachfolgenden Kategorien  
 
Die nachfolgenden Kategorien werden nur verschlüsselt, wenn der Beitrag auch oder 
ausschließlich die folgenden Parteien behandelt: CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN, PDS. 
 
Dabei kann es auch möglich sein, dass der Beitrag gleichzeitig einzelne politische 
Sachthemen behandelt. Diese werden unten verschlüsselt. Bei den Kategorien handelt es sich 
um Merkmale des ganzen Artikels, d.h. es muss -  so weit dies möglich ist – ein 
Gesamteindruck codiert werden, wie ihn ein durchschnittlicher Leser nach dem Lesen des 
ganzen Beitrags erhält.  
 
1.2.2. Tendenz der Parteidarstellung 
TENDENZ 
Unter der Tendenz eines Beitrags wird verstanden, welchen Eindruck der gesamte Beitrag von 
einer Partei hinterläßt. Dieser Eindruck kann die Folge von expliziten Werturteilen der 
Journalisten oder anderer zitierter Quellen sein. Ausschlaggebend ist der Eindruck, den ein 
Durchschnittsleser / -zuschauer nach dem Lesen / Ansehen des ganzen Beitrags erhält. Für die 
Verschlüsselung der Tendenz wird eine fünfteilige Skala verwendet, deren Extrempunkte 
„eindeutig positiv“ und „eindeutig negativ“ bedeuten. Die Werte dazwischen dienen der 
Abstufung des Eindrucks von der Tendenz. Ist keine Tendenz erkennbar, wird die 9 
verschlüsselt: 
 
Beispiel für positive Tendenz: Beitrag, der die Innenpolitik von SPD als Erfolg präsentiert. 
Beispiel für negative Tendenz: Kritischer Bericht über die aktuelle Entiwicklung der 
Wahlkampagne von CDU.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Tendenz 
 
1  eindeutig positiv 
2  eher positiv 
3  ambivalent 
4  eher negativ 
5  eindeutig negativ 
 256 
 
9  Tendenz nicht erkennbar  
/ kommt nicht vor 
 
CDUTEN  CDU-Tendenz 
CSUTEN  CSU-Tendenz 
UNIONTEN Union-Tendenz: wird nur verschlüsselt, wenn sich die Urteile nicht 
sinnvoll auf CDU-CSU zurückführen lassen (Restkategorie) 
FDPTEN  FDP-Tendenz 
SPDTEN  SPD-Tendenz 
GRUENTEN  Bündnis 90/Grüne 
PDSTEN  PDS-Tendenz 
 
1.2.3. Personalisierung  
PERSO 
Unter Personalisierung wird verstanden, wie personenorientiert ein Beitrag ist. Die 
Personalisierung wird nur codiert für Beiträge, in denen bestimmte Politiker (Stoiber, 
Schröder, Westerwelle, Fischer, Gysi) vorkommen,. Kommen mehrere Politiker vor, wird der 
Grad der durchschnittlichen Personalisierung im Beitrag für alle codiert. Kommt keiner dieser 
Politiker vor, wird „/“ codiert.  
 
Sachthema: Im Mittelpunkt des Beitrages steht die Sachpolitik eines Politikers, nicht seine 
Person. 
 
Personalisierter Beitrag: Im Mittelpunkt des Beitrages steht die Person, nicht die Sachpolitik 
eines Politikers. 
 
STOIPERSO Stoiber-Personalisierung  
SCHROPERSO Schröder- Personalisierung   
WESTPERSO Westerwelle- Personalisierung 
FISCHPERSO Fischer- Personalisierung  
GYSIPERSO Gysi- Personalisierung  
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Personalisierung der Beiträge 
 
1  eindeutig sachpolitikorientiert  
2  eher sachpolitikorientiert  
3  gleichgewichtig 
4  eher personenorientiert 
5  eindeutig personenorientiert 
 
9  nicht erkennbar  
/ Kommt nicht vor 
 
z.B. Beitrag über Charakterstärken und –schwächen Stoibers  als Person: 5 zu codieren. 
Beitrag über Schröders Haltung zur EU-Erweiterung: 1 zu codieren. 
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z.B. Beitrag, der überwiegend über Stoibers Auftreten und Resonanz beim CDU-Parteitag 
berichtet: 4 zu codieren; Beitrag, der überwiegend über das Programm berichtet, das CDU auf 
ihrem Parteitag beschlossen hat: 2 zu codieren. 
 
1.2.7. Konflikthaltigkeit  
KONF 
Unter Konflikthaltigkeit wird erfasst, inwiefern Auseinandersetzungen direkt oder indirekt im 
Beitrag thematisiert werden. Der Beitrag ist konfliktorientiert, wenn widersprechende 
Standpunkte gezeigt werden. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall bei Beiträgen, in den den Sachverhalt 
nicht kontrovers diskutiert wird. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN : Konflikthaltigkeit 
 
1  eindeutig konfliktorientiert  
2  eher konfliktorientiert  
3  ambivalent 
4  eher kooperationsorientiert 
5  eindeutig kooperationsorientiert 
 
9  nicht erkennbar  
 
Beispiel: Mit „1“ zu codieren wäre ein Bericht, der widersprechende Standpunkte bezüglich 
der Arbeitslosigkeit zeigt. Mit „5“ zu codieren wäre ein Bericht, der ähnliche Standpunkte 
bezüglich des Bildungssystems präsentiert. 
 
 
1.3. Themen und zugehörige Kategorien 
 
1.3.1. Thema des Berichtsgegenstands 
THEMA1-THEMA3 
Unter Thema wird der Bereich verstanden, zu dem der Beitragsgegenstand gehört. Bis zu drei 
Themen können codiert werden. Zunächst wird das Hauptthema verschlüsselt. Hauptthema ist 
das Thema, auf das der meiste Platz bzw. die meiste Zeit verwandt wird. Andere Indikatoren 
sind die Inhalte der Überschrift, des Leads. Im Anschluss daran können bis zu zwei 
Nebenthemen verschlüsselt werden. Bei mehr als drei Themen werden nur die wichtigsten 
verschlüsselt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Themen 
 
1          Parteien  
- CDU 
- CSU 
- SPD 
- FDP 
- BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 
- PDS 
2          Spitzenpolitiker (Stoiber; Schröder, Fischer, Westerwelle, Gysi) 
3          Wahlkampf  
4 Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 
5 Sozialpolitk 
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6 Zustand von Staat und Politik 
7 Sozialer Zustand des Gemeinwesens 
8 Innere Sicherheit 
9 Außenpolitik  
10 Umwelt/Energie 
11 Ausländer / Asylanten 
 
 
ACHTUNG 
Ab hier (Kap. 1.3.2. – 1.3.3.) wird nur noch für Sachthemen, nicht für Politiker, Parteien 
und Wahlkampf verschlüsselt! 
 
 
1.3.2. Lage bei den thematisierten Politikbereichen  
LAGE1-LAGE3 
Wie wird die Lage dargestellt? Verschlüsselt wird die Darstellung der Lage für die drei 
wichtigsten Themen. Enthält ein Beitrag keine Äußerung zur Lage, ist „/“ zu codieren. Wird die 
Lage nicht erkennbar, ist 9 zu codieren. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Lage in Polen 
 
1 eindeutig positiv 
2 eher positiv 
3 ambivalent 
4 eher negativ 
5 eindeutig negativ 
 
9 nicht erkennbar 
/ kommt nicht vor 
 
Bsp.: Beitrag beschreibt anhaltend hohe Arbeitslosigkeit: “5" zu codieren. Beitrag berichtet 
von einer großen Chance, dass Deutschland EU-Fonds bekommt: “1" zu codieren. 
 
1.3.3. Prognose 
PROG1-PROG3 
Erfasst werden hier Aussagen über zukünftige Entwicklungen. Verschlüsselt wird die Prognose 
für die drei wichtigsten Themen. Wird in einem Beitrag die Prognose nicht erkennbar, ist 9 zu 
codieren. Sind keine Aussagen über die Zukunft vorhanden, wird „/“ verschlüsselt. 
  
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Prognose 
 
1 eindeutig positiv 
2 eher positiv 
3 ambivalent 
4 eher negativ 
5 eindeutig negativ  
 
9 nicht erkennbar 
/ kommt nicht vor 
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Bsp.: Ein Beitrag stellt heraus, dass der EU-Politik langfristig eine stabile 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung in Deutschland gewährleistet: “1“ zu codieren. Ein Beitrag sieht 
deutlich höhere Rentenbeiträge auf die Deutschland  zukommen: “5“ zu codieren 
 
 
1.4. Themenunabhängige Frames 
 
1.4.1. Schuldframe (Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung) 
 
Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob einer Partei die Schuld an Missständen zugeschrieben wird, oder 
ob eine Entschuldigung ausgesprochen wird. 
 
Beschuldigung: Als Beschuldigung werden alle Hinweise darauf verschlüsselt, dass die 
Ursachen für negative Entwicklungen ausschließlich oder in wesentlichem Maße bei dem 
Betreffenden liegen. 
 
Entschuldigung: Als Entschuldigung werden alle Hinweise darauf verschlüsselt, dass der 
Betreffende an einer negativen Entwicklung nicht schuldig ist, weil die Ursachen 
ausschließlich oder in wesentlichem Maße bei anderen liegen. 
 
Beschuldigung und Entschuldigung werden nach folgendem Schlüsselplan für die unten 
angegebenen Parteien verschlüsselt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Beschuldigung und Entschuldigung 
 
1 Eindeutig Beschuldigung 
2 Eher Beschuldigung 
3 Ambivalent 
4 Eher Entschuldigung 
5 Eindeutig Entschuldigung 
 
9   Nicht erkennbar 
/ kommt nicht vor 
 
 
CDUSHUA CDU-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung  
CSUSHUA CSU-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung  
UNIOSHUA 
 
 
Union-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung: wird nur 
verschlüsselt, wenn sich die Urteile nicht 
sinnvoll auf CDU-CSU zurückführen lassen 
(Restkategorie) 
FDPSHUA FDP-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung  
SPDSHUA SPD-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung  
GRUNSHUA Bd’90/Grüne-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung  
PDSSHUA 
 
PDS-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung  
 
1.4.2. Anerkennung und Aberkennung von Verdiensten 
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Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob einer Partei Verdienste für positive Entwicklungen zugeschrieben 
werden, oder ob diese Verdienste abgesprochen werden. 
 
Anerkennung von Verdiensten: Als Anerkennung von Verdiensten werden alle Hinweise 
darauf verschlüsselt, dass die Ursachen für positive Entwicklungen ausschließlich oder in 
wesentlichem Maße bei dem Betreffenden liegen. 
 
Aberkennung von Verdiensten: Als Aberkennung von Verdiensten werden alle Hinweise 
darauf verschlüsselt, dass der Betreffende für eine positive Entwicklung nicht verantwortlich  
ist, weil die Ursachen ausschließlich oder in wesentlichem Maße bei anderen liegen. 
 
Anerkennung und Aberkennung von Verdiensten werden nach folgendem Schlüsselplan für 
die unten angegebenen Parteien verschlüsselt.  
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Anerkennung und Aberkennung von Verdiensten 
 
1 Eindeutig Anerkennung 
2 Eher Anerkennung 
3 Ambivalent 
4 Eher Aberkennung 
5 Eindeutig Aberkennung 
 
9   Nicht erkennbar 
/ kommt nicht vor 
 
 
CDUANEA CDU-Verdienste  
CSUANEA CSU-Verdienste  
UNIOANEA 
 
 
Union-Verdienste: wird nur verschlüsselt, wenn 
sich die Urteile nicht sinnvoll auf CDU-CSU 
zurückführen lassen (Restkategorie) 
FDPANEA FDP-Verdienste  
SPDANEA SPD-Verdienste  
GRUNANEA Bd’90/Grüne-Verdienste  
PDSANEA 
 
PDS-Verdienste  
 
1.4.3. Dramatisierung vs. Minimierung 
DRAMATIS 
 
Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob ein Bericht eine negative Entwicklung oder einen Missstand 
dramatisierend darstellt oder ihn eher verharmlost (minimierende Darstellung). Dieser Frame 
wird nur verschlüsselt, wenn in Berichten Konflikte, materielle oder immaterielle Schäden 
oder Gefahren angesprochen werden. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Dramatisierung vs. Minimierung 
 
1 Eindeutig Dramatisierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als 
außergewöhnlich groß, bedeutsam, gefährlich charakterisiert. 
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2 Eher Dramatisierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als groß, 
bedeutsam, gefährlich charakterisiert. 
3 ambivalent 
4 Eher Minimierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als gering, 
bedeutungslos, ungefährlich charakterisiert. 
5 Eindeutig Minimierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als 
außerordentlich gering, bedeutungslos, ungefährlich charakterisiert. 
 
9  Nicht erkennbar  
 
/ kommt nicht vor   
 
 
2. Zusatzcodierungen für Bilder  
 
2.1. Formales 
Alle folgenden Kategorien werden nur verschlüsselt, wenn folgende Politiker im Beitrag zu 
sehen sind. Zunächst ist daher zu verschlüsseln, welcher Politiker im Beitrag vorkommt. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: abgebildeter Politiker (Wahlkampagne 2002) 
 
1   Schröder  
3   Stoiber  
5   Westerwelle 
6   Fischer 
7   Gysi 
 
2.2. Erscheinungsbild des Politikers   
BILDART 
 
Bei Presseberichten mit integrierten Bildern sind die Bilder Teile des Beitrags. Hier werden 
die Bildcodierungen an die Wortcodierungen angehängt. Bei eigenständigen Bildern in 
Pressebeiträgen (mit oder ohne Text) werden die Bilder als eigenständige Beiträge betrachtet. 
Hier wird für jedes einzelne Bild ein eigener Codebogen angelegt. Auf die Wortcodierung 
wird verzichtet.  
 
Zunächst geht es darum, welchen Eindruck die Politiker auf Fotos und in Karikaturen 
vermitteln. Dabei ist der Eindruck zugrunde zu legen, den der Durchschnittsbetrachter 
gewinnt. Die Zusatzcodierung ist nur vorzunehmen, wenn die Politiker zu sehen sind. 
Zunächst ist zu verschlüsseln, um welche Art bildlicher Darstellung und es sich handelt. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Art der bildlichen Darstellung 
 
1  eigenständiges Foto 
2  im Text integriertes Foto 
3  eigenständige Karikatur 
4  im Text integrierte Karikatur 
 
2.3. Eindruck des Politikers auf Bildern 
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Der Eindruck, den die Politiker auf den durchschnittlichen Betrachter machen, wird für 
mehrere Eigenschaften nach einer bipolaren Skala verschlüsselt. Mit den Werten zwischen 
den Extrempunkten kann der Eindruck abgestuft werden. 
 
2.3.1. Eigenschaften von Schröder (GS) 
 
Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die 
nachfolgenden Eigenschaften treffen auf Schröder zu. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Schröder im Bild 
 
3 trifft voll und ganz zu 
4 trifft überwiegend zu 
5 ambivalent 
6 trifft überwiegend nicht zu 
7 trifft gar nicht zu 
9 nicht erkennbar 
 
GSener Energisch 
GSvert Vertrauenswürdig 
GSbel Beliebt beim Wähler 
GSlock Locker 
GSlaun Verbreitet gute Laune 
GSunsic Unsicher 
GSsymp Sympathisch 
GSseri Seriös 
GSdurch Durchsetzungsfähig 
GSruhig Ruhig/ Gelassen  
 
2.3.2. Eigenschaften von Stoiber (ES) 
 
Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die 
nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Stoiber zu. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Stoiber im Bild 
 
1 trifft voll und ganz zu 
2 trifft überwiegend zu 
3 ambivalent 
4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu 
5 trifft gar nicht zu 
 
9 nicht erkennbar 
 
ESener Energisch 
ESvert Zuversichtlich 
ESbel Beliebt beim Wähler 
ESlock Locker 
ESlaun Verbreitet gute Laune 
 263 
ESunsic Unsicher 
ESsymp Sympathisch 
ESseri Seriös 
ESdurch Durchsetzungsfähig 
ESruhig Ruhig/ Gelassen 
 
2.3.3. Eigenschaften von Westerwelle (GW) 
 
Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die 
nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Westerwelle zu. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Westerwelle im Bild 
 
1 trifft voll und ganz zu 
2 trifft überwiegend zu 
3 ambivalent 
4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu 
5 trifft gar nicht zu 
 
9 nicht erkennbar 
 
GWener Energisch 
GWvert Zuversichtlich 
GWbel Beliebt beim Wähler 
GWlock Locker 
GWlaun Verbreitet gute Laune 
GWunsic Unsicher 
GWsymp Sympathisch 
GWseri Seriös 
GWdurch Durchsetzungsfähig 
GWruhig Ruhig/ Gelassen 
 
2.3.4. Eigenschaften von Fischer (JF) 
 
Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die 
nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Fischer zu. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Westerwelle im Bild 
 
1 trifft voll und ganz zu 
2 trifft überwiegend zu 
3 ambivalent 
4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu 
5 trifft gar nicht zu 
 
6 nicht erkennbar 
 
JFener Energisch 
JFvert Zuversichtlich 
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JFbel Beliebt beim Wähler 
JFlock Locker 
JFlaun Verbreitet gute Laune 
JFunsic Unsicher 
JFsymp Sympathisch 
JFseri Seriös 
JFdurch Durchsetzungsfähig 
JFruhig Ruhig/ Gelassen 
 
2.3.5. Eigenschaften von Gysi (GG) 
 
Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die 
nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Gysi zu. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Westerwelle im Bild 
 
1 trifft voll und ganz zu 
2 trifft überwiegend zu 
3 ambivalent 
4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu 
5 trifft gar nicht zu 
 
6 nicht erkennbar 
 
GGener Energisch 
GGvert Zuversichtlich 
GGbel Beliebt beim Wähler 
GGlock Locker 
GGlaun Verbreitet gute Laune 
GGunsic Unsicher 
GGsymp Sympathisch 
GGseri Seriös 
GGdurch Durchsetzungsfähig 
GGruhig Ruhig/ Gelassen 
 
2.4. Plus-Minus-Gesicht 
KOPF, HAND 
 
Hier geht es um die Kopfhaltung der Politiker auf Photos. Verschlüsselt wird für jeden 
Politiker, ob der Politiker neutral, mit einem „Plus-Gesicht“ oder einem „Minus-Gesicht“ 
abgebildet wird. Zusätzlich wird verschlüsselt, ob auf einem Bild Teile des Gesichts des 
Politikers von dessen Händen verdeckt sind. Dabei wird unterschieden, ob ein Bild die Hand 
des Politikers eine Hand irgendwo am Kopf zeigt, oder ob die untere Gesichtshälfte von der 
Hand überwiegend verdeckt wird. 
 
Kopfhaltungen: 
 
Neutral: Der Politiker hält den Kopf gerade, Blickrichtung ist auch gerade. 
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Plus-Gesicht: Der Kopf des Politikers ist nach oben gerichtet. Er blickt nach oben oder offen 
geradeaus, evtl. mit leicht vorgeschobenem Kinn. 
 
Minus-Gesicht: Der Kopf des Politikers ist nach unten gerichtet. Er blickt nach unten oder 
geradeaus,  evtl. sind die Augenbrauen zusammengezogen. 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Kopfhaltung 
 
1 Kopfhaltung neutral 
2 Plus-Gesicht 
3 Minus-Gesicht 
 
SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Handabdeckung 
 
1 Keine Handabdeckung 
2 Hand irgendwo am Kopf, untere Gesichtshälfte nicht überwiegend verdeckt 
3 Hand verdeckt die untere Gesichtshälfte überwiegend. 
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Social Impact", Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 25.05.2008 
 
The Long History of New Media: Contemporary and Future Developments 
Contextualized. McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 22.05.2008 (ICA 
preconference, participant) 
 
Die Rolle der Medien in Polen. ost-west-forum, Gut Gödelitz, Germany, 16-17.11.2007 
 
Ladies - Ready Steady Go! Reconstructing Media Sport Coverage. 57th Annual 
Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Creating 
Communication: Content, Control, Critique", San Francisco, USA, 28.05.2007 (together 
with Heike Grossmann, Antal Wozniak and Nils Andersen) 
 
Political Advertising in Poland. What Has Changed and Why? 57th Annual Conference 
of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Creating Communication: 
Content, Control, Critique", San Francisco, USA, 27.05.2007 
 
Setting the Agenda for Communication Research: The Next Five Years; Stanford 
University, Palo Alto, USA, 24.05.2007 (ICA preconference, participant)  
 
Political Communication in Germany and Poland: How Much Do We Have in Common?, 
Technical University of Dresden, Germany, 19.04.2007 
 
Populist Advertising: How We Do It in Poland. Conference 3. Studentische Medientage 
Chemnitz "Medienlust und Medienfrust ", Technical University of Chemnitz, Germany, 
30.03-31.03.2007 
 
Garnet Capacity Building Workshop, "Governance and Society: the Role of the Private 
Sector in the Transition to Democracy. Spreading Excellence through Dialogue", Mohyla 
Business School, Kiev, Ukraine, 6-8.09.2006 (participant, Working Group "Governance 
and Society: Networks") 
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56th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), 
"Networking Communication Research", Dresden, Germany, 19.06 - 23.06.2006 
(participant, member of the Local Host Committee of the Technical University of 
Dresden) 
 
Systemy medialne a polityka: konkurencja czy symbioza? Conference 'Media a Polityka", 
Wyższa Szkoła Studiow Międzynarodowych, Łódź, Poland, 27-28.04.2006  
 
Warum sollten wir mehr lesen? Conference 2. Studentische Medientage Chemnitz 
"Medien und Wirklichkeit", Technical University of Chemnitz, Germany, 31.03-
1.04.2006  
 
Komunikowanie polityczne: analiza komparatystyczna kampanii w Polsce i Niemczech. 
Conference "Ogólnopolska Konferencja 50 lat badań nad Komunikowaniem i Mediami w 
Polsce: Stan Obecny, Wyzwania i Perspektywy, University of Wrocław, Poland, 30-
31.03.2006  
 
Medien im Mittel-Ost Europa. Für wen? ifa Identität Seminar, Turcianskie Teplice, 
Slovakia, 6-7.07.2005  
 
Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland und Polen im Vergleich, Düsseldorfer Forum 
Politische Kommunikation, Heinrich-Heine-University, Germany, 8-10.04.2005  
 
Media Systems in Transition. The Case of Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. So Close - Why 
So Different?  Conference "Medien und politische Transformationsprozesse in Europa 
nach 1945", Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, Germany, 3-4.03.2005 
2004  
 
The Media Lenses: War Correspondents and The World Outside, Polish-American 
Communication Conference "The East-West Conflict From a Communication 
Perspective", University of Wrocław, Poland, 13-14.05.2004  
 
Wizerunek regionu - znaki szczególne. Panel Discussion "Wizerunek - trzy perspektywy", 
University of Wrocław, Poland, 10.12.2003  
 
Europabilder - wer sieht was in Europa?, International Conference "Jung Sein In 
Europa", Jugendwerk für Internationale Zusammenarbeit e.V. Aachen, Germany, 31.08-
19.09.2002  
 
Aktive Bürgerschaft - Bürgerschaftliches Engagement in und für Europa, International 
Conference "Jung Sein In Europa", Jugendwerk für Internationale Zusammenarbeit e.V., 
Aachen, Germany, 31.08 - 19.09.2002  
 
Die Rolle der EU in der Welt, International Conference "Jung Sein In Europa", 
Jugendwerk für Internationale Zusammenarbeit e.V., Aachen, Germany, 31.08 - 
19.09.2002 
 
Rechtsradikalismus, Intoleranz und deren Opfer, Bilateral Seminar "Europa auf dem 
Weg zur Einheit", Gesamteuropäisches Studienwerk e.V., Germany, 10-15.03.2002  
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Deutsch-polnische Vorurteile in der Karikatur, Bilaterales Seminar "Aus der 
Vergangenheit lernen, die Zukunft gestalten", Gesamteuropäisches Studienwerk e.V., 
Germany, 21-29.09.2001 
 
 
